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FBIS-EEU-93-177 *15 September 1993*

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Izetbegovic, Tudjman Reach Agreement on Cease-Fire

LD1409161293 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 14 Sep 93

[Text] We have just received a report from our correspondent who is following President Tudjman's visit to Geneva and the talks he is holding there with Alija Izetbegovic, the leader of the Bosnian Muslims.

[Correspondent Vinkovic] This is Tihomir Vinkovic reporting from Geneva for Croatian radio news. Following today's talks, Franjo Tudjman, the president of the Republic of Croatia, and Alija Izetbegovic, the president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, have signed a joint declaration, the text of which I will read out in its entirety:

Accepting the principles of the London conference and taking into consideration the solutions proposed by the Geneva peace conference on the constitutional set-up of the future union of Bosnia-Herzegovina; respecting the historic interests of the Croatian and Muslim nations; determined to put an immediate end to hostilities and create conditions for a permanent peace in the territory of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina; convinced of the need constantly to strengthen the trust between the Croatian and Muslim nations and take effective measures leading toward that; being ready immediately to launch the process of normalizing relations with the Serb nation in light of the solutions proposed at the Geneva peace conference; Presidents Izetbegovic and Tudjman have agreed that they will:

1. Urgently secure an end to all hostilities and military clashes between the units of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the Croatian Defense Council [HVO], in accordance with an agreement of 30 July 1993, immediately or by 1200 on 18 September at the latest; secure the unconditional closure of all detention camps and the release of all detainees on the territories under the control of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army or the HVO immediately or by 1200 on 21 September at the latest, whereby both sides will assume the responsibility for protecting and caring for the released detainees; ensure that both sides secure conditions for a free and unhindered passage for all humanitarian convoys and the activity of humanitarian organizations; set up a working group to monitor and safeguard human rights throughout the territories under the control of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army or the HVO, in accordance with the principles and draft solutions as proposed by the peace conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina; set up a working group to tackle the issues of border demarcation between the two republics within the proposed union of Bosnia-Herzegovina, including access to the sea [for Bosnia-Herzegovina] as an issue of common interest for the development of both parties; set up a working group to draw up and monitor the implementation of comprehensive measures for restoring and strengthening confidence and coexistence between the Croatian and Muslim peoples, including media and other activities, and programs to overcome mistrust between the two peoples.

2. In order to maintain stable relations between the two countries and to contribute together to peace in the region, Presidents Franjo Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovic have decided to establish a working group in charge of resolving humanitarian and material questions as well as the questions of status regarding the position of refugees and displaced people from Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Republic of Croatia and their return to Bosnia-Herzegovina; a working group in charge of preparing interstate agreements, including an agreement on exploitation of power and port facilities, communications, and other economic resources.

The two presidents agree that they will exert their influence in order to secure adequate support from international political and financial organizations for the restoration and development of the two countries.

3. In order to secure a fast, comprehensive, and credible implementation of all the agreed measures and activities under this joint declaration, Presidents Franjo Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovic have decided to appoint their own personal envoys who will be fully authorized and responsible for the full implementation of the agreements formulated under this declaration. President Franjo Tudjman has appointed Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and minister for foreign affairs of the Republic of Croatia, as his envoy. President Alija Izetbegovic has appointed Haris Silajdzic, the minister for foreign affairs of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as his envoy. The two presidents and their personal envoys will demand and secure the help and cooperation of international political, humanitarian, and other organizations and factors in order to fully implement all the measures envisaged by this declaration in the interest of a lasting peace and stability in this part of the world.

[Signed] Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia; Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Geneva, 14 September.

The following participated in the articulation of this declaration: Hrvoje Sarinic, Zeljko Matic, Miomir Zuzul, and Hidajet Biscevic on behalf of the Republic of Croatia, and Haris Silajdzic, Ejup Ganic, Muhamed Filipovic, and Ivo Kolsic on behalf of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Izetbegovic Comments on Accord

AU1409201493 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 14 Sep 93

[Report by Zoran Pirolic from Geneva—recorded]

[Text] [Pirolic] Today's talks between Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman in Geneva, followed with great media attention, have brought about very specific and encouraging results. The two presidents

have signed a joint declaration in which they obligated themselves to urgently stop hostilities between the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croatian Defense Council, as well as bilaterally and unconditionally to close down all prison camps and free prisoners from them.

It was an undoubtedly significant agreement, about which both presidents, Tudjman and Izetbegovic, spoke at a news conference in Geneva.

[Tudjman] We have not only reached an agreement, but have also signed a joint declaration that says that both presidents—and we agreed (?within) the delegations that accompanied us—will do everything with a view to having fire and all hostilities between Muslim and Croatian (?units) cease [words indistinct] of all humanitarian convoys without being blocked. Working groups will be established for solving all open questions between the Bosnian Muslim republic and the Croatian republic within the union of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in particular solve relations between the Republic of Croatia and the union of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In our opinion, in this way we gave set foundations for ending all hostilities between Muslims and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina and for a lasting cooperation between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Pirolic] In reply to the journalists' question of whether Mate Boban, who was not present at today's meeting between the two presidents, will respect the declaration, Tudjman only said that he is certain that it will be so.

President Izetbegovic, who addressed journalists in English, said that the main quality of the agreement lies in the fact that bodies have been established for the implementation of the agreement. This is a new quality of the agreement, President Izetbegovic added. When asked whether he believes that this means peace between Bosnia and Croatia, President Izetbegovic replied positively. He said that this declaration does not apply to negotiations about the constitutional setup of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I hope that we are going to continue these negotiations as soon as possible, President Izetbegovic said and added that President Tudjman has offered assurances that today's agreement will be respected.

We then asked President Izetbegovic for a special interview about the significance of the agreement with the Croatian president and the possible continuation of the Geneva negotiations on Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Mr. President, you and President Tudjman signed a joint declaration today. What is the essence of the document?

[Izetbegovic] Well, I am going to begin from what it does not apply to. One could expect it not to apply to the constitutional [word indistinct] agreement or arrangement, that is, the agreement on the (?constitutional) setup of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, this paper that you are holding in your hands now does not concern that, but concerns something that I would call current situation in the relations between the Croats and the Muslims, or between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, or between the Army and the Croatian Defense Council, and so on. It involves therefore the clashes that have been under way for about four or five months down in Mostar, in the Neretva valley where our people have been persecuted and where both our Army and civilians have been caught in pincers between Serbian units positioned at the foot of Mt. Velez and the Croatian Defense Council who are attacking from the direction of Mostar. Also, you know, roads are still closed down there, convoys carrying food cannot pass through. The situation is still very difficult and serious. Violations of human rights of our population, the Bosnian population, are very crude in the Mostar region, not only in Mostar itself. It is unfortunately so also in [words indistinct] in Tomislavgrad [formerly Duvno] and so on. It is the same in Ljubuski.

The aim, our motive here was to use an agreement, a declaration in order to remove this completely senseless conflict if possible. Therefore, it is a question of the cessation of conflict down there, on freeing civilian prisoners and also the war prisoners who are relatively few. There is a large number of civilians in real concentration camps about which the (?recent) human rights commission headed by Mazowiecki has reported. Finally, roads should be opened for humanitarian convoys to pass through.

As you can see from this document, which will probably be presented to the public in its entirety, we have tried to find a way out of the situation. What is new, what perhaps represents a quality, because we have in a way become (?famous) as regards the Croatian side, [words indistinct] I think this is a sad thing [words indistinct] to conclude agreements that are not being carried out.

Bearing this in mind I insisted on building in the mechanism for their implementation. As you can see, this primarily envisions the institution of presidential envoys, the envoys of both presidents. In the first case, in our case, this is Dr. Silajdzic [Bosnia-Herzegovina foreign minister] as my envoy, and Dr. Granic [Croatia's foreign minister] as Tudjman's envoy. They will have at their disposal a number of working groups that will deal with issues concerning the release of prisoners, ending of military activities, the transit of humanitarian convoys, and the problem of human rights in general.

Therefore they will have at their disposal a mechanism for carrying this out. This is perhaps a novelty of this document.

[Pirolic] Do you think that this could bring peace and stop the clashes between the Croatian Defense Council and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Izetbegovic] We all have a reason to be pessimists, considering our past experiences with the numerous cease-fire agreements, which have not been respected, and considering the numerous agreements on the transit of convoys, which have not been observed either, and so

forth. However, we must try again, we must always try again, we must try every day to solve the problem. Otherwise the suffering of our population will continue. The situation is extremely critical and we should not, of course, be demoralized and do not make new steps. This is a new step, which I think is a more serious than all the previous ones.

[Pirolic] You said that this does not refer to the constitutional issues, that is, the agreement on the constitutional setup of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Today, you spoke to Messrs. Owen and Stoltenberg. Is there anything new concerning the continuation of the Geneva negotiations on Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Izetbegovic] I would not say that there is anything new, except their readiness to continue efforts for the interrupted negotiations to resume, probably at the end of the month, and their efforts to persuade all three sides, above all, in our view, to persuade the Serbian-Croatian side to meet our justified demands.

Today, we discussed with them the problem, the problem that is very important for us, namely the exit to the sea. We discussed some options, some possible solutions, but I would not say that there is anything especially new at this moment.

[Pirolic] You recently visited Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Kuwait. Could you tell us something more about these visits, the talks that you held, and the outcome of these visits?

[Izetbegovic] I visited five countries. Turkey, the United States, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Kuwait. All in all, I said that we must... [pauses] that we have great political capital in the world. Our main card is still the political card. This card is not a military card. This is unfortunately so because we have been deprived of arms, because we are under an embargo. However, we have a very strong political trump card that we must use. This was an attempt to do so.

I think that our position is currently stronger than it has been. First of all, we spoke in a great detail in those countries about various problems concerning the constitutional setup of Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially the implementation. If I were to single out the most important aspects of these talks, I would say that it is the visit to the United States and the talks with President Clinton, in which we raised the issue of the United States' participation in the implementation. You know that this is of capital importance. Without this, however good and favorable the agreement was for us, there would be a question of how much this agreement would really be worth without a strong mechanism for its implementation. I think that we have convinced them that they should take part in this, and that these forces should above all be NATO forces. If they were chosen for that, they could come very quickly and can act very effectively.

So, this is what I would single out from my travels, this is what was of special value. Of course, the visit to a number of Muslim countries was also valuable. We sought support for our just cause, because, and one should know it, the main problem in Bosnia is, one could say, the Muslim issue of Bosnia-Herzegovina. There were attempts, and history will prove this, to wipe out and extinguish the Muslim people. I think that because of that we needed again to draw their attention, the attention of the Muslim world to this problem.

[Pirolic] Mr. President, thank you for the talk.

Sarajevo Radio Reports on Talks

AU1409162993 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 14 Sep 93

[Report by Zoran Pirolic from Geneva]

[Text] Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, is having talks with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman in Geneva today about the relations between the two countries and the establishing of truce in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This meeting has come about at the Croatian president's initiative. Under discussion is the draft of a document, the declaration on Bosnian-Croatian relations. This document envisages that clashes between the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croatian Defense Council should urgently cease, that all concentration camps should be closed down and all prisoners in them freed, free movement be urgently ensured for all convoys carrying humanitarian aid, and joint commissions formed that would discuss issues of mutual interest, including the cessation of media war.

The document also envisages the creation of a commission for border issues and formation of a body chaired by foreign ministers which would supervise this document's implementation. A joint commission for the protection of human rights is also planned. The declaration will contain two segments: One will refer to the relations between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and it affirms our country's sovereignty and territorial integrity while the other segment discusses relations within Bosnia-Herzegovina, above all between the Muslims and the Croats, that is, between the future Bosnian and Croatian republics in the Bosnian union. The issues of borders within Bosnia-Herzegovina remains to be discussed by a special commission.

Presidents Izetbegovic and Tudjman did not specifically discuss the problem of the Bosnian Republic's exit to the sea, something which still remains a major dispute between the two sides.

The Croatian president is a great opponent of the idea of giving the Bosnian side an area near Neum to construct a Bosnian port and he told numerous journalists today again that the Bosnian side may be given a free zone in the Ploce port, whic' is an old idea of his.

President Izetbegovic refrained from making any assessments of the talks so far and said that the examination of the offered draft document will be continued in the afternoon.

This document was prepared by a working group including representatives of both sides and the Geneva meeting was, as we have already said, initiated by the Croatian side.

The two presidents had a working luncheon with peace mediators David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg. This morning, President Izetbegovic had brief talks with the two diplomats about the possibility of the Geneva negotiations on Bosnia-Herzegovina resuming, but without reaching any specific agreement on the date of the resumption of the negotiation process.

A meeting of the managing committee of the conference on the former Yugoslavia is also under way in Geneva today. The main topics of the meeting are the continuation of the negotiations on Bosnia-Herzegovina and cessation of the most recent conflicts in Croatia which threaten to resume the Croatian-Serbian war.

It is planned for Owen and Stoltenberg to briefly meet President Tudjman as well. Today is a rather lively political day in Geneva, however there are so far no specific indications that a way out from the present negotiatiation standstill over Bosnia-Herzegovina may be found.

Hurd Discusses Response to Bosnia Conflict

AU1409145493 Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 14 Sep 93 p 9

[Interview with British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd by Jens Schneider; place and date not given: "'There Are No Victors in This War'"]

[Text] [Schneider] Minister, the mediation process with regard to Bosnia began a year ago with the London conference. There have been no successes so far. Has the EC contributed to the failure of the process by making crucial mistakes?

[Hurd] I do not think so. The difficulties were simply too great. That is not entirely the case today. The Serbs and Croats in Bosnia have declared that they accept a withdrawal. The issue now is that of providing the Muslims with reasonable access to the sea; discussions are also being held on a corridor through eastern Bosnia. Those are significant, but not insurmountable problems. The entire EC is now saying to the parties: Think about whether you should not return to the negotiating table and show somewhat more flexibility, or do you want to experience another winter with more deaths and suffering?

[Schneider] The Bosnian Government, and President Izetbegovic in particular, have leveled much criticism at the British. There has also been criticism of London in Germany. It is being said that Great Britain is protecting the Serbs.

[Hurd] From what?

[Schneider] From intervention.

[Hurd] Who suggested intervention then? I believe that we are just somewhat more open and honest with respect to the issue. There has been so much rhetoric, so many people have said that something has to be finally done. Then there was a lot of applause and that was that. At no time did any Western government propose the only solution that could have been effective, namely, the dispatch of a military intervention force that would then impose a solution from outside and would stay there for five years or more.

No one suggested that. There are no U.S. troops in Bosnia and there are no German troops there. I do not want to complain about that and I also do not want to criticize it, but neither of the two countries wants to dispatch troops. Some people talk of an end to the arms embargo, others talk of air strikes. However, no one can seriously assert that such measures—without the necessary support—can really bring peace. So, perhaps we stated these things more clearly than others when we were being criticized. Europe should not just strike a pose and remain in it, and it should not allow itself to be led up the garden path by rhetoric. We should do what we are able to do, and we should do that as well as possible.

[Schneider] A year ago, at the London conference on Bosnia, a resolution was adopted stating that results of ethnic cleansing would not be accepted. The current peace plan violates that principle—even if the Serbs and the Croats have to give up some of their territorial gains. In your opinion, was it a mistake to adopt that principle at all?

[Hurd] Look, we are talking about a part of Europe where Croats, Serbs, and Muslims are intermingled and have lived close together. They have been split up, violence was used to force some of them to leave, and some left, because they no longer felt safe. It is a tragedy that should not have occurred. What one needs now is a solution that will put an end to all of this. What we need now is a Bosnia with its three ethnic groups, in which all will feel confident that they can live in a viable state. Now, in September 1993, it is the best way of preventing another war from breaking out, because that would be a catastrophe. I think that there are no victors in this war.

[Schneider] However, here in Germany, one is inclined to see winners in the Balkans: the Serbs, and to some extent the Croats too.

[Hurd] But why have the Serbs and Croats proposed giving up a large part of their territorial gains? Because their territorial gains are not accepted by the rest of the world. Why is Milosevic negotiating? Because of the

sanctions. We have managed to force his economy to its knees, more or less. He is constantly speaking about that. He wants to see an end to the sanctions and that is why he is sitting at the negotiating table. So far, he has been unable to persuade the Bosnian Serbs to make sufficient concessions, but he has got them to consider giving up territory.

As far as the Croats are concerned, we are very much counting on the influence that the Germans can bring to bear. I have not pressed for sanctions against Croatia. However, it is very important that those who have traditionally had an influence on Croatia should make it clear that the Croats also have to withdraw and give the Muslims reasonable access to the sea.

[Schneider] Why have no sanctions been imposed on Croatia?

[Hurd] Because the German Government—and I accept it—has said: No, let's not do it.

[Schneider] Your replies make it sound as if there are no differences of opinion within the European Community regarding Yugoslavia. However, there was a controversy surrounding the recognition of Slovenia, and Croatia in particular. Today, some governments still consider it to have been a mistake. Warren Christopher, the U.S. foreign minister, criticized the decision to recognize the states. Do you think that it was a mistake?

[Hurd] It was a question of the timing. In the beginning, we all hoped that a Yugoslavia without communism could continue to exist in peace. The question was how long should one adhere to that concept. The Germans wanted the rapid recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. We, the French, and others said: No, let's wait for a time. Then, in December, we agreed to announce recognition in January. I never considered that a crucial point, because if we had not done it then, then we would have done it a few weeks later. So, I do not regret the decision. I also do not believe that it will be considered a decisive moment historically.

[Schneider] Are the Germans and the British not viewing the war in Bosnia too much in terms of a conceptual model from the past, that is, for example, with an eye to spheres of influence?

[Hurd] We are certainly not thinking in terms of spheres of influence or in terms of traditional friendship with the Serbs. We only have, to a certain extent, a different perception of the conflict. The British media and particularly the German media are depicting it as a case of Serb aggression. However, now there are Croats and Muslims fighting there. Thus, the complexity of the conflict is much more apparent now than six months ago. Our stance is shaped by these complexities and the difficulties of avoiding being drawn into military intervention that would be ineffectual and would only prolong the war. In Germany, the prevailing view tends to be one in which there is a good side and a bad side. [passage omitted]

Economy Effected by Sanctions Against Former Yugoslavia

AU1409175193 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1330 GMT 14 Sep 93

[Text] The UN embargo against former Yugoslavia has severely effected Albania's northern areas, due to the considerable decline in the level of trade with Montenegro and Kosova. This has also affected the national economy. Railroad traffic with the outside world has been completely paralyzed because the only railroad linking Albania with the international network goes through Montenegro. The Bajze railroad station has incurred losses of over U.S.$50,000 during the first nine months of this year; the previous year it had made a profit of U.S.$ 30,000 from its transit activities.

About 60 private firms in Shkoder and the highland region have gone bankrupt and more bankruptcies are expected. Another sector of the economy that has been adversely affected is the chromium mine at Kame, whose production is destined entirely for export to Kosova. In addition, the district of Tropoje has to rely for supplies on Tirana, which is 260 kilometers away, whereas previously commodities were bought in Gjakova, only 50 kilometers away. Shkoder, together with its surrounding area, was originally intended to become a free trade zone, but is currently threatened with emergency. The relevant UN institutions should be informed about these problems in detail, and the northern areas should be included in various emergency assistance plans.

Up to a few months ago, the country's overall losses as a result of the embargo were calculated at U.S.$400 million, which makes Albania the country most affected by the embargo against former Yugoslavia, including Greece and Bulgaria. Despite this, Albania's control over the implementation of sanctions against former Yugoslavia is the strictest of any.

Council of Europe Official on Membership Request

AU0909180093 Tirana ATA in English 08:18 GMT 9 Sep 93

[Text] Tirana, September 9 (ATA)—"We are sure that next year Albania will become a member of the Council of Europe," Mr. Atkinson, representative of the parliamentary delegation of the Council of Europe, declared at a press conference on September 8. During their scheduled visit to review Albania's request to become a full member of the Council of Europe, the delegation met with senior government officials, representatives of minority groups and religious communities, and got acquainted with the recent democratic developments in Albania, the freedom and the rights of Albanian nationals.

Our duty is to encourage non-member countries, which as of now there are 31, in their efforts to become full members of the Council of Europe. Albania's membership to the council calls for the fulfillment of certain conditions, the approval of the constitution being the principal one, Mr. Atkinson said. After doing this we think there is no other hindrance to Albania's membership to the Council of Europe.

The members of the delegation answered questions put by reporters.

In regard to the trial of former members of the Political Bureau and former communist officials, Mr. Atkinson said that different countries have handled the problem in different ways. In so far as the problems of Cams is concerned, the delegation said that it was familiar with the issue and would brief the Council of Europe on this. Regarding the aid to Albania, one of the members of the delegation said that it will be given in the form of technical assistance.

Industry Minister Meets Turkish Counterpart

AU1409174993 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1330 GMT 14 Sep 93

[Text] At the invitation of Mr. Tahir Koce, Turkish minister for industry and trade, a delegation from the Ministry of Industry, Mineral Resources, and Energy led by Minister Abdyl Xhaja, attended the 62nd International Trade Fair in Izmir.

The talks held by the delegation with the Turkish side stressed the positive cooperation between the two countries. The Eksim Bank of Turkey has undertaken to activate a credit of U.S.$35 million, granted by the Turkish Government to Albania in the framework of a bilateral agreement on industrial, economic, and trade cooperation. The Albanian minister also met high-level representatives from Slovenia, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Lithuania, Saudi Arabia, as well as representatives of internationally-known Italian firms such as Olivetti, AGIP, Banca di Roma, and others.

OSD Predicts No Elections Before End of 1994

AU1409133493 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 9 Sep 93 p 3

[Report by Boryana Kostova]

[Text] Sofia, 8 September—Parliament will continue working, the government will not fall, and elections are unlikely to take place before the end of next year, Professor Chavdar Kyuranov stated today at a news briefing given by the OSD [Alliance for Social Democracy]. According to Kyuranov, this implies that the National Assembly deputies should seriously consider parliament's legislative priorities. He considers that it is unrealistic to expect the National Assembly to adopt 20 laws during the 38 days of the autumn session. The OSD will insist that the autumn program gives priority to economic bills, amendments to the Law on the Supreme Judicial Council, and the police bill. In his opinion, for parliament to debate social legislation now would be tantamount to seeking cheap popularity.

Deputy Velislava Dureva described as wishful thinking the president's statement on restoring the old parliamentary majority. He sounded like a man who wants to meet his first love and immediately marry her, she said. According to Dureva, Zhelev now feels he is the most isolated politician; he realizes that no real political force stands behind him, and is therefore attempting to create a formation that will support him. However, the OSD believes that it is highly unlikely that, following the major rift in their relations, the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces], DPS [Rights and Freedoms Movement], and [NSD] New Alliance for Democracy "will clap hands and hug one another."

Zhelev Seen as Part of BSP Plan To Undermine SDS

AU1409122493 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 7 Sep 93 p 3

[Commentary by Eliezer Alfandari: "In 'Elegant' Manner Against Union of Democratic Forces"]

[Text] The president finally issued another edition of the statement he made last year in the Boyana field, and decreased public tension. We all thought that his appearance on the 4 September Panorama Television Program would provide an impetus to topple the government. What happened, however, was that the man demonstrated his consistency, and his attack on the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] continued with a new and "elegant" variant, as Zhelev put it, namely, a call to restore the parliamentary "friendship" between the SDS, Dogan's Movement for Rights and Freedoms [DPS] and the people of Ludzhev and Michkovski. Then Berov could fall. Then the SDS, reshaped according to this procommunist recipe, could form a government. According to the president, there will be early election "in any case." What for?

Actually, Zhelev did not say anything new, because he only repeated what the "free press" has been suggesting for many days, in an attempt to ruin the SDS, which at present has a clear anticommunist character. However, the president let the last remnants of his democratic mask fall, and without any scruples appeared as a proponent of the interests of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP]. In the final analysis the head of state launched the idea of replacing a procommunist but unpopular and already compromised government, by another, which will still be ruled by the BSP, which will remain in the shadow of power.

The fact that the BSP leader, Videnov, also appearing on the Panorama Program, dissociated himself from this ostensibly presidential model, proves that this indeed is what the president plans. It was no accident that the Socialists threatened that the "moment of truth" was coming for Berov. It also is not accidental that [DUMA chief editor] Prodev again presented the president as a supporter of the SDS and an "antihero." Prodev got carried away in his manipulation and even presented Zhelev, who is manipulated by the BSP, and not the BSP itself, as Berov's evil demon.

Actually, things are very clear. Indeed, everything is an internal SDS problem. Will the SDS allow itself to be manipulated in a sinister manner from outside in front of the entire nation? Will it allow this monstrous and insolent replacement of values, when the interests of the communist oligarchy are presented as all-nation interests? Will it allow itself to be used as a screen for plundering Bulgaria by a small group of people, at the expense of the people's well-being?

This could be prevented only if the budding conciliation ideas in the SDS do not gain the upper hand. Second, it is important that the SDS does not succumb to suggestions from outside to replace its leadership. This would only undermine the unity without which the SDS cannot act as an alternative to the Communists. In this context, the attempts of the "free press," made at the initiative of "higher circles," to promote the names of worthy SDS leaders as prime ministers of a cabinet formed by the parliamentary majority, so ardently desired by the president and the BSP, must be ignored. Garelov listed in his Panorama program the names of Kostov, Savov, and Sofiyanski as such candidates. This was a futile attempt, despite the fact that he invoked newspapers' articles. This is so because the subversive mechanism, the sinister plans, and the machinations behind the scene have already been unmasked to a certain degree. Thus, it is extremely clear that the persons, insistently promoted by the mass media, actually are supposed to serve as participants in the communist plans to further ruin Bulgaria. Other persons are supposed to facilitate the consolidation of the oligarchy's power. Nothing is said or written about them. Indeed, if anything is ever said about them, it is actually done in an attempt to divert attention from them. This is painfully clear for the SDS. Indeed, this is clear to every SDS supporter who really

cherishes the truth. Those supporters have demonstrated whom they accept, and whom they reject.

SDS Criticized for Censuring Local Organizations

AU1409065993 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 8 Sep 93 p 6

[Commentary by Emil Robev: "Who Is Compiling the Candidates List?"]

[Text] The Coordinating Council of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] decided to suspend the activities of local coordinating councils that are systematically deviating from the "correct" political line.

This act finalizes the gradual evolution of the SDS coalition into a political party. Theoretically, the SDS is a coalition, which means that it represents a transitional alliance of numerous political forces joining their efforts together to achieve a specific goal. Hence, the leading organs of the union are called "coordinating councils," rather than "regional party committees," for example.

In normal political parties (of a non-bolshevik type) local branches that "deviate from the line" are simply dismissed as no longer representing the interests of the party in question, and the case is closed. To suspend the activities of a local organization is quite a different matter. It is strongly reminiscent of the vertical subordination—one of the basic principles of the so-called democratic centralism—which was actually the major innovation of the organizational principle, introduced by Lenin and represented the backbone of the so-called "invincible communist unity."

Against this background, the otherwise democratic decision on the incompatibility of party and state functions that deprived Aleksandur Yordanov of his post as deputy chairman of the SDS National Coordinating Council, rather seems to be a new tactical move in the secret, internal power struggle within the SDS. This is so, because from an intra-party point of view (we should say "intra-party," because it may no longer be correct to use "intra-coalition"), the position of Filip Dimitrov's deputy is more important than the post of National Assembly chairman. For, is not the National Coordinating Council leader, rather than the parliament chairman, who is in charge of compiling the lists of the future National Assembly deputies?

Polls Show National Institutions Less Popular

AU1409120893 Sofia BTA in English 0928 GMT 14 Sep 93

[Text] Sofia, September 14 (BTA)—One in two Bulgarians agree it would be good for the country if parliamentary elections were held soon, according to a representative sociological survey conducted by BBSS Gallup International in September, quoted in today's 24 CHASA. The number of Bulgarians who want early elections has risen 6 percent from July. Proportionally, they are most numerous among supporters of the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) and the extraparliamentary parties.

The Gallup poll shows President Zhelyu Zhelev's approval ratings stand at 54 percent, 6 percent down from July. Still he is the only politician supported by the majority of Bulgarians. 27 percent of respondents in September were in favour of new presidential elections. According to sociologists, President Zhelev draws equal support from sympathizers of the SDS and the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP).

Support for the cabinet headed by Lyuben Berov dropped 6 percent from July and now 46 percent of Bulgarians believe the country needs a new government.

The BSP enjoys the highest approval ratings among the political forces—24 percent, a 2.8 percent drop from July. The poll gives 21.2 percent of popular approval to the SDS. 26.2 percent of respondents said they would not vote, as against 22.6 percent in July.

The approval ratings of the institutions are plummeting, according to sociologists of the MBMD Institute for Marketing and Public Opinion Research, who carried out a representative opinion poll on September 2, published in today's OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK. About 80 percent of respondents disapprove of parliament's work and 8 percent show approval. The cabinet's ratings are about 60 percent disapproval and 25 percent approval. Disapproval of the cabinet is most widespread among sympathizers of the SDS (81 percent) and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (45 percent), though the cabinet was formed on the movement's mandate. The cabinet has the approval of 51 percent of BSP supporters and the disapproval of 32 percent of them.

Fishing Agreement Signed With Ukraine

AU1409070393 Sofia BTA in English 1849 GMT 13 Sep 93

[Text] Sofia, September 13 (BTA)—Deputy Industry Minister Racho Petrov and the Vice-Chairman of the State Committee for Fish Farming and Industry of Ukraine today signed an agreement on cooperation in the fishing industry. The sides will cooperate in the transport of fish, the building and repairs of fishing vessels, the production of spares and equipment.

Bulgaria and Ukraine will develop invention, patenting and standardization in the fishing industry. The agreement will be effective until the end of 1997 and will be automatically renewed unless the parties denounce it six months before its expiry.

New Danube Bridges Planned With Romania

AU1409122593 Sofia BULGARSKA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 8 Sep 93 p 3

[Report by Stoyan Petrov: "Sofia and Bucharest Will Build New Danube Bridges"]

[Text] Bulgaria is losing approximately $60 million per month as a result of the war in former Yugoslavia. The losses to the Bulgarian economy from the crisis in the country of our Western neighbor exceeded $2 billion long ago. The Yugoslav conflict is making Romania Bulgaria's main gateway to Europe. With a view to opening the Romanian gateway to the Old Continent, the two neighboring states have agreed, first, to open several ferry routes and then later build two new bridges as well.

One of these bridges is planned to connect Oryakhovo with the Romanian town of Beket. Three possible projects have been proposed for its construction. The specialists consider that the most likely version will be to drive a tunnel under Oryakhovo to ensure that the level will be the same as the level on the Romanian bank of the Danube. Another possibility is to restore the old 10-kilometer-long road along the bank of the Danube between Mizia and Oryakhovo. The third version proposes constructing a new road through the vineyards of Oryakhovo. The local inhabitants welcome this possibility because they will receive handsome payments for their expropriated properties.

According to the project, the second bridge is to be built between Vidin and Calafat. It is impossible to say that one bridge has advantages over the other. Each has its own advantages and shortcomings. More importantly, however, they will have no competition, even if both bridges are built. The Oryakhovo-Beket bridge will be very convenient for passengers and freight that pass through our country in an easterly direction, mainly for destinations in the countries of the former Soviet Union. The second bridge will be more convenient for journeys toward Hungary and Western Europe. The projects envisage that both bridges will carry a four-lane roadway and twin-track railroad line. It will also be necessary to reconstruct the existing road and rail routes leading to the four towns.

Under the accord reached between the two countries' transport ministers, a protocol also specifies that customs and border checks will be conducted on only one side of the bridge. The reduced formalities will make it easier for travelers and also speed up the flow of road traffic.

The first offers have already been received for building the Oryakhovo-Beket and Vidin-Calafat bridges. Tenders will be received until 15 September, and the assessments of the tenders will be ready by 15 October. After selection of the three best tenders, negotiations will be conducted with the tendering companies to decide on the winner. To ensure that the offers are reliable, candidates will be required to provide bank guarantees of $4 million during the first stage of fulfillment of the project. In selecting the winners, the experts will consider factors such as the experience of each of the firms taking part in the tender competition in constructing similar bridges, the proposed completion date, the construction program, and the extent to which they plan to use the services of Bulgarian and Romanian specialists in the construction work.

Klaus Views Causes of East-West Disagreements

AU1409151993 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 10 Sep 93 p 11

["Excerpts" from Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus' address at a meeting of the European Democratic Union in Budapest on 2 September: "Different Meanings of Words; Our Efforts To Rediscover National Identity Do Not Amount to Nationalism"]

[Text] Some words that we tend to use rather carelessly have very different meanings in different contexts. [Swedish Prime Minister] Carl Bildt has said that there are no differences of opinion among us because we all denounce communism and are interested in seeing the last remnants of it discarded. This is most definitely true—to agree with a negative program and to reject something is always much easier than to agree on a positive program, and here, I feel, our unity is not as absolute. I am afraid that there exists a great difference between the use of some terms in Western Europe and in the postcommunist world.

I often hear the term "selfish nationalism." Usually, it is used in the form of a rebuke. I am not sure that this is fair. In the past decades, the now postcommunist countries completely lost their national identities in the deadly embrace of Soviet communism. Our present attempts to rediscover our national identity must not be lightly branded as selfish nationalism. I would have to point out that nationalism takes various forms and would have to regard as selfish nationalism also the present forms of economic protectionism of Western Europe, which is no less dangerous for us than the various forms of ethnic conflicts.

For half a century we lived in a world of pseudo-justice, in false equality based on injustice. There is no doubt that our aim is to create a just system founded on the equality of opportunity rather than on the equality of pensions and assets. Given our experience, we find it somewhat problematic that the European Democratic Union [EDU] has included the demand for "social justice" among the slogans it wants to assert. This demand may sound positive in the jungle but in our countries, unfortunately, it does not.

Our main enemy is not primitive communism, but dreams about a third way. We used to live in a marketless world, and now we want to have the market as the basic coordinating economic principle, but we cannot accept its thoughtless softening. Talk of an ecological and social market economy does not foster civic ecological and social responsibility (with which I fully identify) but it fosters the casting of doubt on the irreplaceability of the market in human society.

The post-November [1989] slogan in our country (as in all the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe) has been the bold "opening" of society and of economic policy. However, this does not mean that we are prepared at this moment for a Europe without frontiers. We had actually lived in a world without frontiers for several decades, because the iron curtain is not a frontier in the conventional sense of the word. Today, therefore, we need to live for some time with normal frontiers. If, for these reasons, we look upon a Europe without frontiers with certain caution, it does not mean that we are against the maximum openness of our society. Quite the contrary.

We have a subconscious fear of institutions, and of the bureaucracy that is inseparably linked with institutions. If we sometimes hesitate to create new institutions (such as the Visegrad Group [Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland] or the Central European Initiative) or to join existing institutions, it does not mean that we do not wish to cooperate, or that we want to seclude ourselves or shut ourselves off. Our unfortunate experience with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance makes us exceptionally wary [of institutions], especially when we see that all institutions tend to be governed by the same Parkinson's laws. That is why we put such emphasis on institutions growing up from below, and not from above, and on them expressing the true interest of their members.

If a problem, such as that of European security, exists, it does not mean we immediately have to establish new institutions to tackle it. There has been talk here of a security vacuum, a term that I do not share because it is implied in it that the problem can only be solved via institutions. This is simply not true. The fall of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in the early seventies and the creation of a system of flexible exchange rates was not a non-system (as Keynesian interventionists contended).

It is just as easy to talk lightly of the considerable growth of uncertainty after the fall of communism and the breakup of the Soviet Union. It starts being unclear who the enemy is, an enemy is being sought, and it is then said that this increases insecurity. I cannot agree with this because the end of the simple and lucid security arrangement (and the end of the Soviet military threat) cannot be simply branded as an increase in uncertainty. For the ordinary citizen, the security threat has definitely decreased.

The disappearance of the external enemy gives rise to one great danger, linked with the logical step of looking for the enemy "within," the enemy inside the country. In this case, too, we are somewhat oversensitive (due to our communist heritage), but talk of a "preventive" security policy, of averting internal conflicts, and so forth, strikes very unpleasant chords with us. I am convinced, therefore, that it will be a long time before we arrive in Europe at a rational security policy.

For all these reasons we have to listen to one another as much as possible. It is the only way of bewaring of over-simplified or even outright incorrect conclusions.

Havel Welcomes Foreign Policy Council Idea

AU1409152393 Prague CTK in English 1457 GMT 12 Sep 93

[Text] Prague Sep 12 (CTK)—Czech President Vaclav Havel today welcomed the idea to set up a Foreign Policy Council as the government's consultative body.

In his regular Sunday Talks From Lany radio programme, he said that according to the information he had obtained, Premier Vaclav Klaus had proposed to invite guests to the Council—the president, the parliament chairman and the chairman of the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee.

This would be the right place for permanent discussion on foreign policy, Havel said, adding: The Council would have to have such a structure that would allow the presence of all government coalition parties. If the chairmen of the four coalition parties discuss foreign policy earlier or later, this will also be very important.

Havel said he thought that a commission charged by the coalition could conduct dialogue with the Sudeten Germans. But he added that such a working commission should not have the power to make any decisions. At the most, it could inform the government and other constitutional officials about the course of the talks.

The talks with the Sudeten Germans have been urged by the Landsmannschaft which claims the restitution of Sudeten German property and the recognition of the right to a homeland.

Some 2.5 [as received] Sudeten Germans were expelled from Czechoslovakia after World War Two and their property was expropriated.

Havel recalled a Czech initiative, under which Czech citizenship would be restored to the Germans wishing to return and they could participate in privatisation in the Czech Republic. The Germans did not accept the initiative.

This was sort of a gesture which would benefit all, but it seems that something like this is no longer topical, Havel pointed out.

He said that the only feasible solution now seemed to be quick coming closer to the European Community and acceptance of its valid standards. Then, under the pattern of pan-European free movement of citizens and capital, he who feels something towards this country as a country of his ancestors could settle, work and do business there, Havel said.

Baudys: Necessary for NATO To Guarantee Security

AU1409173293 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 13 Sep 93 p 1

[Report by "km": "The Defense Minister Is Exasperated With the Situation in Russia"]

[Text] Prague—According to Defense Minister Antonin Baudys, the situation on the territory of the CIS, and particularly in Russia, is exasperating. The minister said this in an interview for MLADA FRONTA DNES in the context of military intelligence activities.

Antonin Baudys brought up the Russian parliament's negative reaction to the accommodating stance of President Yeltsin on the gradual integration of the Czech Republic and Poland into NATO. "One can see from the Russian parliament's angry reaction that the world power thinking has been preserved here. That is very dangerous. If economic reform fails in Russia and political destabilization occurs there, Russia could become the center of a monstrous conflict," he said.

Minister Baudys emphasized that obtaining information from potential centers of unrest is important even in peace time. "The fact that there is no immediate danger does not mean that we should not collect information. That would definitely be an unforgivable gamble with the future of this republic," he said.

Although, according to the minister, no obvious enemy exists today, this situation could change drastically in the future. Minister Baudys considers the former USSR countries: Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in particular, to be the key regions on which the security of all of Europe depends.

The situation in the former Yugoslavia, although also a center of unrest, does not seem to threaten to escalate into a conflict of European magnitude.

Minister Baudys spoke in favor of the Czech Republic joining NATO as speedily as possible. "Until then, it is necessary that NATO countries guarantee our security. The Czech Republic is unable to safeguard its own security," he added.

Zieleniec Views Relations With Hungary

AU1409135493 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 10 Sep 93 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Minister of Foreign Affairs Josef Zieleniec by an "il"-signed reporter; place and date not given: "We Are Very Close"]

[Text] Prague—Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs Josef Zieleniec is departing for a one-day visit to Hungary today. He will meet with his counterpart Jeszenszky, Prime Minister Antall, President Goencz, and members of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Hungarian Parliament. Prior to his departure for Budapest, LIDOVE NOVINY asked Josef Zieleniec a few questions.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] What is the aim of your visit?

[Zieleniec] Hungary and the Czech Republic are two countries that are very close to one another. Even though we do not share a common border, I consider Hungary to

be almost a neighbor. We have a similar history, especially that of the last 40 years, and similar experiences and problems in the transformation of the communist society to a Western-type society. The talks will concern the situation in Central Europe, but also bilateral issues. We are preparing a so-called big political treaty because we want to quickly replace the treaty from the communist era that is still in force.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] Present relations between the two countries are considered problematic, particularly in the wake of the controversy aroused by the different interpretations of Prime Minister Jozsef Antall's letter to [Czech Prime Minister] Vaclav Klaus.

[Zieleniec] I would not say that our relations are problematic, they are good. The problem that you mentioned had more to do with preparations for the meeting of the Central European Initiative than with bilateral relations. I believe that the problems associated with that letter (such as the question of the status of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia) should not represent a serious obstacle to mutual relations. On the occasion of the Budapest meeting of the European Democratic Union, our prime minister met with Mr. Antall and these issues were not raised at the meeting. I believe that our good relations will follow the traditional track.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] Nonetheless, views can be heard in Hungary to the effect that present Slovak policy disrupts Hungarian-Czech relations in a special way. Do you believe that Slovakia has an influence on our relations with Hungary?

[Zieleniec] This is a natural problem. Bilateral coexistence is always shaped also through the medium of a third neighbor. It is natural that we have special relations with Slovakia. This is due to the fact that, at present, we are still only winding up the complex process of division of the state, a process that is traumatic for both sides. For this reason, it is self-evident that relations within the triangle of Hungary-Czech Republic-Slovakia are somewhat more fragile than they will be a few years from now. I believe that our Hungarian friends are aware of the complexity of Czech-Slovak coexistence. In the wake of the emergence of two independent states, we are all learning, under new circumstances, to move in the Central European area. My visit should also help to mutually stabilize our relations, also in view of our mutual partnership with Slovakia. It should contribute to the understanding on both sides of the other side's attitude and of the motives that make it adopt certain positions. Understanding attitudes, and the reasons for them, is always the basis of good relations between individual countries.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] Could you tell us who will become Czech ambassador to Hungary?

[Zieleniec] I cannot give you a name yet, but I am confident that this issue will be resolved by the end of the year.

Coalition Not To Support Setina Dismissal

AU1409141393 Prague CTK in English 1921 GMT 10 Sep 93

[Text] Prague September 10 (CTK)—Government coalition members will not support putting a motion to dismiss Prosecutor General Jiri Setina on parliament's agenda for its next session on September 14. Parliament Chairman Milan Uhde said that coalition deputies came to the consensus at a meeting today.

The proposal to put the dismissal of Setina, who is under investigation for allegedly providing false or incomplete information to the City of Prague in order to obtain a community apartment, on parliament's agenda was made September 9 by members of the Left Bloc parliamentary group. Its chairman, Jaroslav Ortman, said that the proposal was supported by the entire opposition, as well as by the government coalition Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-CSL). The proposal lost by one vote.

The chairman [as received] of the KDU-CSL, Ludvik Motycka, told CTK today that we continue to insist, as we have presented our views until now, that we believe Mr. Setina should resign.

Asked whether his group would support a proposal to put Setina's dismissal on the agenda, Motycka responded: If Setina remains in good health, then most certainly yes. If he does not, I believe it would not be right to discuss such issues without his presence. Setina was hospitalised recently for kidney problems.

Uhde said he believed there were several ways to resolve the issue. He added that the acceptance of a bill on the new Office of Attorney, which we will be pushing for as quickly as possible, is the aim... and its very clear that the prosecutor general will not be continuing to work in this section. He doesn't even, I feel, want to.

Asked what other solutions are possible, Uhde answered: They are various, for example, Setina could resign. But I have to deny that I have discussed that or anything similar anything like that with him. That is simply his and only his business.

Daily Analyzes Havel-Klaus 'Exchange of Fire'

AU1409082093 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 9 Sep 93 p 6

[Commentary by Jiri Leschtina: "A Bitter Exchange of Fire Between the Prime Minister and the President"]

[Text] When Vaclav Havel disclosed information about his restituted property a few days ago, Vaclav Klaus provocatively retorted that he himself owned a Skoda, a three-room apartment, and a cabin in southern Bohemia. One could see the sparks flying between the two men, but it was all subdued and was not even lacking in a certain esprit. A few days later, however, in connection with British writer Salman Rushdie's visit to Prague, a

dramatic verbal exchange of fire took place between the two men, in which both the prime minister and the president laid it on a bit too thick.

The first to unsheathe was Vaclav Klaus when he formulated his "three theses," as he later called them. He expressed astonishment at not having been informed about the arrival of the author of The Satanic Verses, qualified Rushdie's stay as a personal visit, and finally expressed the hope that "the visit would not be interpreted as an act directed against the Islamic world." One can hardly object to the first two theses and, had the prime minister confined himself to them, there would have probably been no uproar. Surely, the president is under no obligation to inform the prime minister about his private meetings, but the reception of such a high-profile figure is a political gesture of such significance that, probably, the president should have discussed it with the prime minister in advance, which might also have prevented the subsequent controversy.

Vaclav Klaus' expression of fear about the Islamic world's response to Rushdie's visit, however, was absolutely inappropriate. Vaclav Havel's gesture of support for a writer delivered to the mercy of fanatics' hatred was unquestionably a praiseworthy deed, one that brings us closer to the most cultured part of Europe at least as vehemently as, for example, our efforts on the path toward the principles of the market. With his signal toward Islam, the prime minister only exposed himself to the risk of some Islamic despot praising him for his accommodating attitude, in the same way as the communist Milosevic praised Klaus' comments on Yugoslavia.

It seems that, in this case, Vaclav Klaus in a somewhat ill-considered manner encroached upon the president's domain, the world of moral politics, for which he duly received a jog. From this viewpoint one can agree with the president's idea that, if someone supports the basic values of justice and freedom, he should not be looking for various reasons why it is more advantageous and more practical not to have anything to do with Rushdie. If, however, within the framework of this transparent hint to the prime minister, the president added that "such an attitude borders on living in lie and on giving the nod to evil," he made himself guilty of a major unfairness toward the prime minister. One can have a number of objections to the prime minister, but it is absolutely inappropriate to evoke in connection with him, even on the most general plane, some kind of inclination toward lie or even toward evil.

Hence, the welcome given in Prague to the eternal fugitive Salman Rushdie, while unquestionably demonstrating the Czech determination not to dodge one's share of responsibility for world affairs, will apparently also leave behind a bitter prickle in the form of the realization that our two most important politicians are getting a bit too accustomed to snapping at one another through the media, instead of settling their disputes during their private lunches or castle hearings.

On the other hand, it is to be welcomed that the public dispute between the prime minister and the president has once again laid open an important problem in our policy— how to dovetail high moral ideals with practical responsibility for the state. The president has already said what he wanted to say on this issue, while Vaclav Klaus has promised to reply in the form of a philosophical treatise. He should do so as soon as possible. Philosophical disputes and contests of ideas always make a somewhat better impression than the increasingly noisy exchanges of fire between our political aces.

Editorial on Conflict

AU1409142993 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 9 Sep 93 p 1

[Editorial by Karel Kriz: "Silence Is Golden"]

[Text] The president's weekend meeting with [British writer] Salman Rushdie has quickly assumed another dimension. Against the background of the president's support for the persecuted writer, a political dispute has arisen that has its own dynamism. Both its protagonists, the president and the prime minister, have become in it mere pawns on the chessboard.

Both men, Vaclav Klaus and Vaclav Havel, have contributed to the politicization of the president's praiseworthy activity. Though it is quite probable that the interested parties in the background would have succeeded in conjuring up an alleged conflict between morality and immoral pragmatism, they would have surely had a more difficult job, were it not for some unnecessary circumstances. The president could have mentioned Rushdie's visit during his lunch with the prime minister immediately prior to the visit. He did not mention it. And Vaclav Klaus should not have reacted in a fit of pique. What is more, he should not have reacted at all. Incidentally, this was not his first such lapse of late. Increasingly, the prime minister evokes the impression that he must have a view and give his comment on everything. But even Vaclav Havel could not resist the temptation and added fuel to the fire. Only the minister of foreign affairs, who remained silent, has emerged without a stain on his shield.

What is at stake in this unfinished game? Apparently, certain political circles can live on the political stage (or return to it) only through conflicts between the president and the prime minister. The dispute between the right and the left is logical and even useful. Here, however, a conflict is being artificially fomented between state institutions. Such backstage pressures are ruinous for the state, however, and, therefore, reprehensible.

Accusing Vaclav Klaus of immorality really is absurd. As a matter of fact, the values of justice and morality are not at issue right now. What matters is, rather, that there still are a plenty of people who have not yet become reconciled to the fact that Vaclav Havel has not quit politics

and that he became (and, which is particularly important, that he had the will to become) president in the political constellation that came about after the elections.

After his visit to Prague, Salman Rushdie complained in London that British commentators had ignored his visit. This situation is bound to change now. These commentaries will not be about Rushdie, however, but about the Czech Republic. It is not difficult to guess in which light it will appear. And that is even worse for this country than the artificial internal conflict between two institutions of our state.

Statistical Office Reports August Price Changes

AU1409122793 Prague CTK in English 1440 GMT 10 Sep 93

[Text] Prague Sep 10 (CTK)—Consumer prices increased 0.7 percent this August compared with the same period last year, according to a report by the Czech Statistical Office (CSU) obtained by CTK today.

The prices of foodstuffs rose 0.6 percent, non-alimentary goods 0.9 percent, public catering 0.4 percent and public services 0.3 percent, the report says.

Compared with December 1992, in the first eight months of 1993, consumer prices increased 13.7 percent. The sharpest growth in prices was registered in services (19.4 percent) and public catering (18.7 percent). The prices of non-alimentary goods increased 14.2 percent and the prices of foodstuffs by eight percent.

The prices of public catering increased the most over August 1993 and that was by 27.2 percent. Prices of services increased 26.5 percent. The prices of non-alimentary goods increased 21.1 percent and the lowest increase was registered in the prices of foodstuffs which increased 17 percent.

Meciar Refuses To Answer CTK Correspondent's Question

AU1409151493 Prague CTK in English 1916 GMT 10 Sep 93

[Text] Kosice, East Slovakia Sep 10 (CTK)—At a press conference following his visit to an Air Force college here, Slovak Premier Vladimir Meciar refused to answer a question by CTK correspondent, Karel Hirman, who asked him about his stand on Slovakia's efforts to join NATO.

Excuse me, Mr. Hirman, I am answering questions only from reliable agencies, Meciar said and, together with the head of the Government Press and Information Section, Ondrej Hanko, invited the journalists present to ask other questions.

Hirman, the Czech News Agency's (CTK) Kosice correspondent, reported on Meciar's statements regarding the Romany question made in Spisska Nova Ves, East Slovakia on September 3. Due to this report, the Slovak Government initiated prosecution of CTK. A possible indictment of Hirman was mentioned by deputy chairman of the ruling Movement For a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS, of which Meciar is chairman—Ed.) and Slovak Culture Ministry's state secretary for media, Roman Zelenay, on Thursday [9 September].

Hirman is a Slovak citizen.

Denies Involvement in TA SR

AU1409172893 Prague CTK in English 2152 GMT 10 Sep 93

[Text] Bratislava Sep 10 (CTK)—Slovak Premier Vladimir Meciar said today he knew nothing about considerations to replace Dusan Kleiman as director general of the Slovak News Agency TA SR, or about preparations for any other personnel changes.

Speaking on Slovak Radio tonight, he said that he only knew that radio's Deputy Director Berko was to work in the diplomatic service.

Meciar was reacting to the information carried today by the daily SLOVENSKY VYCHOD, according to which Kleiman is to replace Slovak Radio Director Vladimir Stefko. Kleiman, in turn, is to be replaced by the present editor of the TA SR daily REPUBLIKA Jan Smolec.

Meciar said that radio was considering certain internal organisational changes to make its operation more economical, but this was a matter of the radio's management, not of the government.

He complained about the government being constantly distracted from solving essential problems which influence the social aspect of the population's life. He mentioned the problem of intolerance of some political parties, attempts to break up his Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), to discredit constitutional officials, to fabricate ethnic minority and Romany problems.

We are reacting preventively in order not to allow the disintegration of the country, Meciar said, adding that people who were asserting partial political interests must very strongly hate it Slovakia. I want to warn other people against them, he stressed.

Meciar said that as early as March he had warned against the chance that other political parties would attempt to radically change the political situation in Slovakia.

The struggle will be tough, but the government will prevail, he stressed.

Rejects Criticisms of Speech

AU1409173093 Prague CTK in English 1758 GMT 11 Sep 93

[Text] Kosice, East Slovakia Sep 11 (CTK)—Slovak Premier Vladimir Meciar says in today's issue of the regional daily LUC that he spoke in Spisska Nova Ves on September 3 in support of the Romanies, not against them.

He says that he suspects that he who dared quote words which he (Meciar) had never said may be playing into the hands of some unknown people, that he is acting as if on order because the whole thing was immediately publicised outside Slovakia.

On September 3, CTK published a reported on Meciar's speech which contained statements made by Meciar concerning the Romany population. According to the report, he said that it was necessary to lower family allowances in order to achieve a decrease in the extensive reproduction among the socially unadaptable and mentally backward population.

According to the transcript, Meciar said in a passage concerning Romanies, furthermore, we must take into consideration the extensive reproduction among socially unadaptable people... already children are giving birth to children and grandmothers are still having children—poorly adaptable mentally, ill-adaptable socially, with serious health problems, who are simply a great burden on this society. That is why we are making changes to the system of children's allowances.

Meciar also reacted to the statement by Simon Wiesenthal, head of the Vienna-based Simon Wiesenthal Centre, whom Meciar's words remembered of the usurpation of power by Hitler and his propaganda, and who said that Meciar had adopted the thinking and diction of Nazism.

Meciar said in the paper: And Mr. Simon Wiesenthal, who has been carefully monitoring Nazi crimes and documented them, now comes with an accusation, and

this for a second time within half a year. This is coincidence of such a type that I do not consider it coincidence at all.

Meciar said that Slovakia and its policies had been permanently an object of a political struggle to newly arrange the situation in Europe. We are witnesses to certain Hungarian interests to gain influence in Slovakia. The Czech Republic, the Foreign Ministry declare that they want to gain influence in Slovakia.

The key person posing the biggest obstacles is myself, Meciar says. He recalls what he had experienced during his political career. He says that, for example, he was labelled as a KGB, StB agent—state police of the former USSR and Czechoslovakia. Now, I have been labelled a fascist. But this is a little bit too much. Therefore my reaction will be different, targeted at people who must be made legally responsible for what they do... there is a limit to criticism, to ill-will, Meciar stresses.

The premier is seeking a positive solution to the Romany question in order to prevent social tension in the area, and racism is here immediately. Isn't it a little bit premature? Isn't anybody trying to create the border of the Western world on our border with Moravia?, Meciar asks in conclusion.

Kovac Congratulates Rabin, 'Arafat on Treaty

LD1409160993 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1500 GMT 14 Sep 93

[Text] President of the Republic Michal Kovac today sent congratulatory telegrams to the signatories of the peace treaty between Israel and PLO, Yitzhaq Rabin and Yasir 'Arafat. He praised the constuctive effort of the two sides aimed at establishing peace in the region.

The signing of the agreement was also welcomed today by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which, in its statement, stressed that it considers this step very significant and important on the way toward an overall and definitive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

President Kovac Cedes Some Powers to Government

AU1409070793 Bratislava REPUBLIKA in Slovak 8 Sep 93 p 3

[Unattributed announcement: "From the Decision of the President of the Slovak Republic"]

[Text] On the basis of the authorization given to me by the provisions of Article 102, letter A, of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic, I issue, while reserving the right of another decision in specific cases, the following decision:

1. I transfer

a) the negotiation of bilateral and multilateral international treaties that do not require ratification by the National Council of the Slovak Republic to the Government of the Slovak Republic.

b) in keeping with Slovak Government resolution No. 560 of 17 August 1993, the negotiation of bilateral and multilateral international treaties that do not require ratification by the National Council of the Slovak Republic and that do not go beyond the jurisdiction of a central body of state administration as laid down by law, the conclusion of such treaties, and accession to such treaties to the member of the government charged with the management of the pertinent central body.

[signed] Michal Kovac, president of the Slovak Republic

Foreign Minister Moravcik Rules Out Neutrality

LD1209195693 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1630 GMT 12 Sep 93

[Text] The current affairs television program "Kroky" [Strides] broadcast today was a dialogue about Slovakia's entry into the North Atlantic Alliance. Taking part in the debate on this highly topical issue were Slovak Foreign Minister Jozef Moravcik, Slovak Defense Minister Imrich Andrejcak, Julius Humaj, commander in chief of the Slovak Armed Forces, Slovak Parliament Deputy Radomir Zingor, and Mrs. Eleanor (Satter), charge d'affairs of the U.S. Embassy in Bratislava, who accepted an invitation to appear as a guest.

From a large number of interesting questions we have selected for you the reply concerning the possible neutrality of the Slovak republic. As the program announcer said, official representatives described it on more than one occasion as being an inappropriate alternative for the security of Slovakia. Why? Foreign Minister Jozef Moravcik, had this to say:

[Begin Moravcik recording] Neutrality is of importance when two or more blocs are facing each other, and some states are not interested for any reasons, whether they be security or strategic, to join either of these blocs and therefore, they maintain their neutrality. Neutrality must be guaranteed internationally otherwise it has no sense. To talk at present about neutrality in this area is, I believe, very precipitous. I would even say that it borders on naivety. There are simply no two blocs facing each other at present. There are, nonetheless, certain aspects of spheres of influence, and we do not how the situation is going to develop from this viewpoint. Therefore, to talk about neutrality is I would say somewhat outside context. We do not know what purpose neutrality would serve, what we would gain by it.

As a neutral state we would be excluded from political cooperation. It is necessary to see such political cooperation as an important factor. When we want to become integrated in Europe we are not doing this for any other reasons, other than we see in this the possibility of how to build in this country a stable and prosperous system. To go so we need to have political ties. Neutrality would not solve anything for us. We must be active. This is also

very important from the viewpoint of our neighbors. If we are together in one political bloc this very fact provides, on the whole, a different platform for the resolution of mutual relations. Neutrality therefore, implies passivity. We need an active attitude in order to carry out our strategic intentions. [end recording]

TA SR Director Says Media Waging War on Republic

AU1409140593 Prague CTK in English 2137 GMT 10 Sep 93

[Text] Bratislava Sep 10 (CTK)—Under the veil of sacred democratic relics like freedom of expression and free exchange of information, a war is being waged via the media against the independent Slovakia, Dusan Kleiman, director general of the official Slovak News Agency TA SR, said in today's TA SR-published daily REPUBLIKA.

Kleiman wrote that part of the service of the Czech News Agency (CTK) on Slovakia was biased and harmed Slovakia's interests abroad.

The tough media aggression aims at downgrading Slovakia to the position of a banana republic, Kleiman said, explaining this by Slovakia's achievement of independence, something that is not pardoned in our geographical latitude.

The first poisonous fruits of the war waged by the media against Slovakia have been ripening, Kleiman asserted. We are afraid whether the Council of Europe will tolerate our continued membership. We are looking for foreign investment, we are asking whether Mr. Kohl has only forgotten about us, or..., he adds.

The Prague-based CTK has also joined in this anti-Slovak campaign, Kleiman claimed. If we are not ostracised from the Council of Europe by representatives of our Hungarian ethnic minority, this will be done by Prague's CTK, he said.

A certain amount of the CTK service about developments in Slovakia has been unobjective, biased and it markedly harms the interests of Slovakia abroad, the TA SR management has agreed, Kleiman wrote.

He cited as examples CTK reports about the congress of the Slovak intelligentsia, about the allegedly considered replacement of Premier Vladimir Meciar by Parliament Chairman Ivan Gasparovic, a member of Meciar's Movement For a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), and especially the report by the Kosice, East Slovakia, reporter Karel Hirman which contained the widely discussed statement by Meciar about the Romany population.

On September 3, CTK published a report on Meciar's speech in Spisska Nova Ves, East Slovakia, which contained Meciar's statements about the Romany population. According to the report, he said that it was necessary to lower family allowances in order to achieve a decrease in the extensive reproduction among the socially unadaptable and mentally backward population.

According to the transcript of the speech, Meciar said in a passage concerning Romanies, furthermore, we must take into consideration the extensive reproduction among socially unadaptable people... already children are giving birth to children and grandmothers are still having children—poorly adaptable mentally, ill-adaptable socially, with serious health problems, who are simply a great burden on this society. That is why we are making changes to the system of children's allowances.

Kleiman accused Hirman of having structured the report so as to highlight especially the alleged statement by Mr. premier. He said that Hirman intentionally included the statement in the news lead which is supposed to contain information about where and when an event took place, and on top of it, he put in quotes that part of the lead which was not pronounced at the meeting.

Kleiman says Hirman did so on purpose for the sketched fascist ideas and parallels with the Nazis and their wrongdoings to excite the public.

He said that these were no mere professional mistakes which no agency could avoid, and quoted Gasparovic as saying: ...It can be assumed that somebody is to play the role of a sort of a subversive element in Slovakia's politics, and thus contribute to the longest possible postponement of political and economic stabilisation in Slovakia, Kleiman asserted.

According to him, today's CTK policy on Slovakia has its roots in that pursued by its past leadership. The image of Slovakia as it was created abroad over the past four years by these people cannot be remedied even by ten clubs For a Truthful Image of Slovakia, Kleiman wrote.

In this context, the reply to the question why CTK has been rejecting a reciprocal exchange of news services with TA SR and instead keeps its own correspondents on the territory of Slovakia is easy and clear, Kleiman points out.

Romany Organizations' Subsidies Suspended

AU1409180193 Prague CTK in English 1952 GMT 11 Sep 93

[Text] Kosice, East Slovakia Sep 11 (CTK)—The Council of Romany Associations in Slovakia (ARRS) today said it considered the suspension of subsidies to Romany organisations and to Romany culture, approved by the Slovak parliament, an willful act by the Culture Ministry.

The ARRS, associating 18 Romany political, social and cultural organisations, today discussed the results of the latest round table meeting between representatives of ethnic minorities and President Michal Kovac and of talks with Deputy Premier Roman Kovac.

ARRS representatives told journalists that the Council would lodge a complaint against Augustin Lang, director of the Culture Ministry's ethnic minorities department. They said that Lang had offended representatives of Romany cultural associations in the material which he had worked out for the Presidential Office because he claimed that he was investigating whether or not they had breached the rules of financial management.

The ARRS representatives stressed that no complaint against them had been lodged and no investigations had been started.

They pointed out that as early as May they had submitted to the government specific projects of solving the Romany problem in individual regions, but have not received any reply as yet.

The ARRS today called on Romany businessmen to help create jobs for unemployed Romanies. But they warned that without state assistance the Romany problems could not be solved.

Daily Calls For Prosecution of Miklos Duray

AU1409133893 Bratislava REPUBLIKA in Slovak 9 Sep 93 p 4

[Commentary by Peter Varinsky: "The Last Straw"]

[Text] If anyone still had any illusions that [Coexistence Chairman] Miklos Duray is concerned about the rights of the Hungarian minority, after the speech of this gentleman in Vac it is obvious that the reality is different. Miklos Duray is fighting for the rights of the Hungarian majority—within the framework of Greater Hungary.

This pan-Hungarian goal is also served by the tactics pursued by this incorrigible enemy of Slovak statehood. Let us recall: Egyutteles [Coexistence] recently published a manifesto (LITERARNY TYZDENNIK published this manifesto in its issue No. 35), in which it accused Slovaks of attempts at further ethnic cleansing, that is, of massacres in the tragic style of Sarajevo or Mostar. So far, no prosecuting body has reacted to this blatant provocation, in defiance of the fact that this document has been disseminated all over Europe.

This time, however, Duray cast off another mask. As [the Hungarian-language Slovak weekly] SZABAD UJSAG writes in its 1 September 1993 issue, Miklos Duray delivered the festive address on the eve of St. Stephen's Day in the city of Vac. A few quotes, quotes that have not been torn out of their context, will document where Duray's aspirations are heading, what his aims are.

St. Stephen, he said, advocated comprehensive solutions, rather than small steps. His legacy to contemporary politicians, as formulated by "our" politician, is: A hesitant politician who only looks back, rather than ahead, into the future, will fail.

What Duray said then is even more unequivocal—indeed, it is totally unequivocal. According to Duray, those are on the false track who interpret Stephen's bequest to his son that "a country with a single language is weak and vulnerable" as a topical creed for 20th century policy on minorities. He, Duray, would like to exclaim: King [Stephen], help reunite the people to preserve and defend the cause that should be natural and that should eliminate the fragmentation of our, the Hungarian, nation.

"How many times did we have to start building our state and national existence anew, to build a new homeland out of ruins...." Several times after Trianon, for example.

We must finally recover from Trianon. A task is therefore emerging before us: to design a new building of the homeland, in which even the millions of Hungarians would find their place who have for three generations only had a native land but no homeland and, often, not even a home.

What Duray said is no longer just a metaphor but an explicitly assigned task: to build Greater Hungary, to eliminate the consequences of Trianon, to incorporate the entire Hungarian nation into a new, great empire.

Miklos Duray does not realize that there are limits even to the assertion of minorities' interests. One of them—one, moreover, that is formulated in the well-known [Council of Europe] recommendation No. 1,201—is the inviolability and unchangeability of borders. Equally evident is that, under the leadership of people such as [Coexistence officials] Duray, Duka-Zolyomi, Csaky, and others, demands against Slovakia will escalate. Even now they exceed the framework of the Council of Europe recommendations.

It is high time that a dam be erected to the unsubstantiated, even criminal ambitions of Miklos Duray.

With his statements in Vac, he cast off the last mask. His speech there was the last straw.

Major Drop in Industrial Output Reported

AU1409082193 Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK in Slovak 8 Sep 93 p 1

[TA SR report: "We Prefer Drinking to...: Basic Trends in the Development of the Slovak Economy in the First Seven Months of the Year"]

[Text] Bratislava— Monthly output in July in industry dropped 15.3 percent and in construction 3.9 percent, compared with June. The volume of freight transport dropped 4.4 percent. This is noted in a Slovak Statistical Office report on basic trends in the development of selected branches of the Slovak national economy in July 1993.

The retail trade turnover and proceeds in catering and in accommodation and repair services were 4.8 percent higher than in June, and the physical volume of turnover

increased 3.6 percent. In agriculture, sales of milk dropped 1.7 percent, compared with June, sales of livestock for slaughter dropped 9.9 percent, sales of eggs 10.8 percent, and sales of poultry for slaughter 23 percent.

While average daily industrial output (using comparable prices) was 6.8 percent lower than in June, average daily output in construction increased 5.7 percent. The average volume of freight transported per calender day was 7.5 percent lower than in June.

The share of output of privately owned enterprises (including cooperatives, foreign-owned enterprises, and joint ventures) in July reached 20.3 percent in industry (compared with 19.4 percent in June) and 50.4 percent in construction (compared with 49.9 percent in June). Private carriers in July accounted for 53.2 percent of the total volume of freight carried in road transport (compared with 49.7 percent in June). The share of the private sector in total proceeds in retailing and in accommodation and repair services amounted to 86.1 percent in July and was the same as in June.

Compared with the same month a year ago, the volume of industrial output was 17.2 percent lower in July. (Since the beginning of the year, the volume of industrial output is 15.5 percent lower than in the equivalent period in 1992.) The volume of output in construction dropped 23.6 percent, compared with July 1992 (22.5 percent since the beginning of the year). Since the beginning of the year, daily output in industry dropped 14.9 percent and daily output in construction dropped 22 percent. The volume of freight transported in July was 34.2 percent lower than in the same month a year ago (since the beginning of the year, the volume of freight dropped 28.7 percent). Compared with July 1992, retail trade turnover and proceeds in catering and accommodation and repair services increased 26.6 percent in current prices (since the beginning of the year, they increased 25.6 percent). The physical volume of retail sales increased 2.9 percent.

Rectors Claim Universities on Verge of Collapse

AU1409140993 Prague CTK in English 2009 GMT 10 Sep 93

[Text] Kosice, East Slovakia Sep 10 (CTK)—Slovak universities are on the verge of collapse, university rectors state in an open letter to Slovak Premier Vladimir Meciar.

The letter, which was read to journalists at a press conference today at the conclusion of the two-day meeting of the Conference of Slovak University Rectors, states that in view of the drastic decrease in non-investment resources from the state budget, universities are no longer able to ensure basic instructional activities.

The rectors write that they decided to send an open letter because their previous attempts at mutually resolving the problems of Slovak universities have met with inadequate response.

The current situation threatens to halt operation of universities, the letter reads. The rectors add that this condition is caused to a large degree by insufficiencies in the leadership of the education department. On the basis of analysis of the current condition of our universities, and after exhausting the possibilities of resolving their problems by our own powers, the rectors of the Slovak universities state that without effective measures by the government we will not be able to assume full responsibility for the further development and mission of Slovak universities, the letter reads.

In conclusion, the rectors urgently request Meciar for a speedy resolution of the massive problems.

Szabo Receives Chinese Vice Premier Zou Jiahua

LD1409152893 Budapest MTI in English 1214 GMT 14 Sep 93

[Text] Budapest, September 14 (MTI)—Ways for China to settle its remaining debt to Hungary and possibilities to develop bilateral economic ties again were discussed by Chinese Vice-Premier Zou Jiahua and Hungarian Finance Minister Ivan Szabo on Tuesday.

Zou and his delegation arrived in Hungary on Monday. He said, in future, China would attach more importance to developing trade ties with Hungary. A precondition of establishing good ties, however, is that China settles its accumulated debt. Zou said China would settle the debt this year.

Earlier, Chinese-Hungarian trade was conducted within a clearing system in Swiss francs, where countries settled debts at year-end in convertible currency. Since 1990, when the countries switched to free-currency accounting, China managed to settle only part of its accumulated Sfr 140 million debt to Hungary. For Sfr 30 million of that, Chinese companies have delivered goods to Hungary.

Chinese-Hungarian trade is picking up, with turnover in the first half of this year reaching USD 70 million, nearly the total amount for last year.

Antall Compares 1943 Szarszo Meeting to Recent One

AU1409140793 Budapest PESTI HIRLAP in Hungarian 10 Sep 93 p 5

[Unattributed report: "Szarszo's Goal Was To Create a Political Popular Front—The Road of Honesty and Morals"]

[Text] On 9 September in the "24 ora" [24 hours] television program, Prime Minister Jozsef Antall gave an interview about Szarszo to Peter Feledy. An edited version of the interview follows here.

I see the 1943 Szarszo meeting as a historical, political, and intellectual event of outstanding significance, Jozsef Antall said as a way of introduction. At the same time, in connection with the recent meeting at Szarszo, he added that he considers all explicitly political, popular front type gatherings and workshops that stand over the parties incompatible with the current political system and parliamentary democracy. He approved that people, regardless of party affiliations, should come together to discuss big national strategic issues in the interest of national political goals. However, I do not approve, he said, of this kind of event and, under the veil of this historical event, a rather transparent and direct current political issue is put to the forefront. He thought that, right from the outset, the goal of the recent Szarszo meeting was to create a political front that he called popular front politics. This stretches from a wing of the Hungarian Socialist Party to Istvan Csurka and his political associates, therefore, it spans the multiparty system, directly in the interest of even the 1994 elections rather than in strategic distance. Antall did not agree, either, that while political battles are conducted on the surface between the left and the right wing, they enjoy excellent cooperation in the mole-holes of politics. He emphasized that he considers it cooperation; it is not strategic, contrary to parliamentary democracy. In fact, this is a concomitant debut of Imre Pozsgay's National Democratic Alliance and of the Hungarian Justice and Life Party.

Antall called Pozsgay's closing words at Szarszo propaganda slogans, according to which in 1990, the popular-national forces discarded the principle of a legislative national assembly—thus excluding the people from creating the Constitution. Antall continued by saying that the Constitution, parliamentary representation, and the interest protection system give people the opportunity to have their interests represented. According to him, this constant populistic gargling with the term people is infinitely boring.

In connection with the statement accepted at the Szarszo meeting, Antall said that he found the suggested formula of a national roundtable extremely unfortunate because this was a historically and politically reserved notion. He thought that this kind of large intellectual national workshop could be created but it should not be called a roundtable. He saw the national catechism as the latest fad. He listed similar historical examples and does not consider it harmful as long as its contents are positive, it is honest, and is in the interest of the nation.

In the government's view, a political regime change has taken place in Hungary, and economic transformation is also in transition although all this involves many human injustices. However, we must be able to decide whether we should choose Yugoslavia's example, a permanent civil war, or whether, in searching for a peaceful transformation, we choose the honest and moral way with a provision for justice.

Szabo Interviewed on Current Economic Issues

AU1409151693 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 11 Sep 93 pp 1, 11

[Interview with Finance Minister Ivan Szabo by Katalin Bossanyi; place and date not given: "Ivan Szabo: Social Peace Is the Best Recommendation"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Bossanyi] At the beginning of the year, the government was optimistic about the macro-economic processes. It is clear by now that the deficit of foreign trade, of the balance of payments, and of the greater are bigger than expected and, in addition, inflation is also higher than planned. However, what stands out most is that a 1 to 3 percent growth had been calculated for this year while, recently, you yourself said that the gross domestic product [GDP] may decrease by 1 to 3 percent. Why was your assessment so far out?

[Szabo] Three factors explain the Hungarian economy's current situation. The first one is that we had not calculated on such a deep and long recession in Western Europe, and this has an impact on the economic possibilities of the whole region, including Hungary. The developed European countries were also out by about 4 percent in their estimates on economic growth. German economic analysts have recently published data according to which a 2-percent reduction in the German GDP means a 25 to 30 percent decrease in the exports in theoverall exports of each of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary.

Domestic reasons, for example the lack of a competitive product base, are also behind the sudden drop in, mainly, our agricultural exports. Increasing foreign market protection, and the fact that we have not been able to compensate for our $1 billion loss resulting from the UN embargo on Yugoslavia have also hindered our exports and our growth. [passage omitted]

[Bossanyi] You have made many concessions in recent weeks, and many people think that this might be at the expense of the next government. Otherwise, is this submissiveness part of the election campaign of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF]?

[Szabo] In my view, if someone looks at the tensions in society realistically, he cannot accuse me of making excessive concessions. Even our opposition considers the draft 1994 budget too stiff. We will reduce the expenditure of the state administration by 10 billion forints [Ft] in nominal value, while we will increase support for the productive infrastructure, new housing, and agriculture by Ft60 billion. Therefore, all in all, state administration expenditure will be reduced by Ft70 billion through internal regrouping. This certainly cannot be seen as an election stunt by the MDF. Our budget would have been an "election budget" if we had yielded to the lobbying by the various ministries: Their extra demands would have pushed the deficit up to Ft560 billion. We reduced this to Ft250 billion. Hopefully, the budget will effect the elections by inducing actual growth and its positive effect will be seen, for example, in reduced unemployment. [passage omitted]

[Bossanyi] Can the larger than planned deficit of the state budget and social security have a negative influence on the IMF's decision?

[Szabo] The IMF was already aware of this year's deficit at the preliminary talks, and the 1994 social security budget will be drawn up by the local governments that are to meet on 13 September. I trust that they will stay within the limits set out in the agreement. In this case, we will also submit these documents to the IMF's board session on 15 September.

[Bossanyi] Is this the time when they can also make a decision on releasing the Hungarian credit agreement?

[Szabo] We are talking about a new, three-year agreement that also has a bridging loan part that we can call in every quarter, depending on the budget situation. If we do not need it, we will not call it in.

[Bossanyi] It seems that we will need it. In August, you were almost forced to ask for a bridging loan from the Hungarian National Bank [MNB] to alleviate the daily liquidity problems of the budget.

[Szabo] In the end, we did not have to do this. It was the social security deficit that caused the problem for which we had to make an advance payment. To cover this, the social security will now issue a bond that is guaranteed by the state.

[Bossanyi] This and the bonds issued by the state are usually bought by banks and other large institutions—for example the social security. This is rather similar to the situation when we put money from one pocket to the other.

[Szabo] This action is part of cleaning the social security portfolio. As a matter of fact, it does not burden the current deficit in the case of either budget.

[Bossanyi] What you are saying confirms the assumption that you have made behind-the-scene agreements with the strengthening trade unions that maintain social peace in the short run and make the agreement with the IMF possible, but which are a burden for the state budget in the long run.

[Szabo] Maintaining social peace is the best recommendation for investors in Hungary. My impression is that, both at the interest coordination talks and at the social security talks, the strengthening trade union movement is not using this support for forcing irresponsible promises, rather, it is negotiating in the manner of a responsible proprietor. In other words, it is not asserting short-term interests.

[Bossanyi] Let us assume that, for some reason, no agreement is achieved with the IMF. What comes from this? Will the economy indeed be impossible to finance?

[Szabo] In this case, we will not be able to start our programs that is partly financed by the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD] to help the banks and enterprises. If we do not have an IMF agreement then we will be forced to search for other resources. We will obviously be able to find money somewhere else, but at greater expense. According to our calculations, our losses would be $300 million.

[Bossanyi] What if the IMF talks are successful?

[Szabo] Then we will immediately begin our program of structurally changing the industry and, within a relatively short time, we can also make an agreement on the bank consolidation program with the World Bank. Taking on other loans will also become easier, because we will be treated as a good debtor.

[Bossanyi] It seems that the debates between the economic ministries have died down, with two exceptions. One is the support for the export stimulation package. This is difficult to understand because time—the considerable decrease of exports—has clearly shown that Bela Kadar [minister for international economic relations] was right.

[Szabo] The cabinet discussed the ministry's proposal, together with the main directions of the 1994 economic policy, at its session this week. Most of the measures to stimulate exports are already in progress. The previous debate was over devaluation. The government's view is that the MNB should continue the current policy of devaluation. [passage omitted]

Assembly Unanimously Ratifies EFTA Agreement

LD1409182393 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 14 Sep 93

[Text] The deputies of the Hungarian National Assembly have unanimously adopted the treaty concluded with the countries of the European Free Trade Agreement [EFTA]. Accordingly, the treaty with Austria, Sweden, and Norway will come into permanent effect from October. With Switzerland and Lichtenstein, it will come into effect provisionally. Finnland and Iceland will decide about enacting the free trade agreement with Hungary at a later date.

MSZP's Horn Views Election Prospects

AU1409165993 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 11 Sep 93 p 9

[Interview with Hungarian Socialist Party Chairman Gyula Horn by Dezso Pinter; place and date not given: "The Disappearance of A Coalition Majority Could Destabilize the Country"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Pinter] At a discussion held in May, you said that the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] would start the political autumn under different conditions. Has this prediction become reality?

[Horn] Although I cannot speak of any change, I find it quite essential that expectations regarding our policy and steps have increased considerably. Quite a few people are turning to us with requests, questions, and suggestions, and this is not only the result of the fact that our party issued an appeal for the revival of public dialogue, but also the result of the fact that people who sympathize with us and people who are interested in us want to help us in our endeavor for self-determination. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] What is your opinion about the claim that the MSZP seems to be the strongest and also most isolated parliamentary party in the autumn of 1993?

[Horn] MSZP has the strongest network of party organizations all over Hungary; thus it is true that we are strong. An observer can also see that the MSZP is dealing with the affairs of this country and not with the affairs of other parties, and the MSZP is successfully avoiding steps leading to an internal crisis. As for being isolated, indeed, almost every parliamentary party has already declared that it does not regard a possible coalition with the MSZP in 1994 as something highly desirable. However, one can also hear different views. Viktor Orban, the chairman of the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ] announced that he only excluded the Smallholders and the Hungarian Justice Party from a possible coalition. At our talks with the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] last week, we agreed that it was too early to speak about the composition of the next coalition. The two rivals, but not necessarily enemies, are now busy with something else: Among other things, they must make sure that Hungary continues to be governable both politically and economically until the next elections. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] What will characterize the steps of the MSZP in the coming months?

[Horn] There is a great danger that Hungary will break up into rich and poor strata of the population, and Hungary could also break into two regarding its approach to politics. Hatred has increased, and so has the intention to exclude others. The number of people who cannot accept that others are different is increasing. I am convinced that the nation would not tolerate such a break and its consequences. It would also have rather negative international consequences if people calling for some kind of a new revolution got into leading positions. The MSZP will act against such endeavors in the remaining months until the elections, hopefully together with other democratic parties. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] How will the MSZP make use of the weakness of the current government coalition in the period until the next elections?

[Horn] The big question is what steps the government is planning to take. We are not interested in weakening the coalition, all the more so because this would cause a vacuum in this country and this would benefit the extremists. Even Christian Democratic Party Chairman Laszlo Surjan's proposal to hold elections as soon as possible is better than the aforementioned vacuum.

[Pinter] In your opinion, what date would be realistic for the next elections?

[Horn] If no dramatic events take place, we could hold both election rounds in May at the latest.

[Pinter] What dramatic events do you have in mind?

[Horn] The collapse of the coalition.

[Pinter] Are there any signs of a possible collapse of the coalition?

[Horn] Yes, there are such signs, but one should not discard this coalition yet. Perhaps those people are

correct who claim that the times of departures from the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] are over. I hope this is true.

[Pinter] What personal impressions did you receive in the country? What issues will decide the elections?

[Horn] People are basically concerned about economic and social issues, and mainly the specter of unemployment. Everyone speaks about prices and wages and the difficulties of large families. It is essential for the voters to clearly see the principles of each party on privatization. Contrary to the rumors spread by our opponents, the MSZP also believes in private property. We also say that it is impossible to build a market economy without private property. However, privatization in Hungary is not under the control of the Hungarian Parliament, and the coalition is making use of the opportunities for party policy goals. Therefore, we want a parliamentary control here. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] Do you count on the possibility that you will again influence the foreign policy events from inside the government?

[Horn] My personal ambitions are primarily connected with the future of my party, but I must admit that I would gladly deal with foreign policy matters, but this can be done not only as a foreign minister. If, however, the political situation in Hungary allowed it, I might consider this possibility. I think now that the correct thing is to allow younger people to deal with foreign policy.

SZDSZ Nominates Prime Ministerial Candidate

AU1409143193 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 13 Sep 93 p 5

[Interview with Gabor Kuncze, parliamentary group leader of the Alliance of Free Democrats, by Szabolcs Sereto; place and date not given: "The Day's Interview With Gabor Kuncze, the Expected List Leader of the Alliance of Free Democrats—I Accepted the Nomination Without Reservations"]

[Text] The decision of the executive committee did not cause any tension within the party or between Gabor Kuncze and [Party Chairman] Ivan Peto, Kuncze, who is expected to be the list leader of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ], states. Answering our question, Kuncze said that the debate on selecting the prime ministerial nominee was not a political debate. As prime minister, Kuncze would first deal with putting the economy in order.

[Sereto] Was the decision of the executive committee preceded by a political debate? Does the selection between you and Peto cause any tensions in the party?

[Kuncze] No tension was created at all between Peto and myself, we have been on very good terms so far and I expect this to continue. This issue did not lead to any conflicts within the party, either; this was a purely personal decision.

[Sereto] We already know the prime minister designates of most of the other parties. Probably much pressure was put on the leaders of the SZDSZ to finally make a decision. To what extent has the pressure of time contributed to selecting the list leader now?

[Kuncze] Together with many people, I also think that, in 1990, the SZDSZ made a mistake by not making it clear whom it nominated for the prime minister's position, therefore, this time, we want to clarify this issue as early as possible. At the same time, I do not think that the SZDSZ has to adjust to other parties in timing this decision. The simple fact is that the time has arrived within the SZDSZ to make this decision.

[Sereto] Are you certain that the national council will approve this decision?

[Kuncze] Yes, I think that we can expect approval from the national council.

[Sereto] Now, and at the time you were elected parliamentary group leader, it seemed that you shy away from these positions. It seems that it is never you who applies for these positions, rather, that certain groups in the party appear to raise these suggestions....

[Kuncze] I have never shied away from these assignments. The issue is not this. Many people urged me to accept the position of parliamentary group leader, and then I said yes to this. From the moment I was elected parliamentary group leader, the position of list leader has been among the possibilities. When my name was actually raised, I accepted the nomination, therefore, uncertainty is out of the question.

[Sereto] As prime minister, what alternative to your competitors can you offer, I mainly mean [Prime Minister] Jozsef Antall?

[Kuncze] I do not think that we have to talk too much about people, because it is the SZDSZ that offers the alternative to the other parties. My task is to present this alternative to the voters and I believe that I will be able to do this. On the other hand, I do not think that I need to compare myself to the nominees of other parties.

[Sereto] However, during the campaign, the electors identify the parties with their list leaders and the differences in style can have an important role. Let us stay with Antall: To what extent do you represent a different mentality to that of the current prime minister?

[Kuncze] I think that I represent a much more direct style that is close to the people and one that is sensitive to people's everyday problems.

[Sereto] As prime minister, what issues would you deal with first, and what would be your first measures?

[Kuncze] Already, it can be seen that the economy is in such a state—and we cannot expect much improvement until 1994—that the first series of measures will definitely have to deal with the economic problems. The preparatory work within the SZDSZ that serves to lay the foundation of governmental work after the elections is focussed on the economy. The goal of the first measures can only be to establish such conditions in the economy that will provide the possibility of future development.

FIDESZ Wants Ties Between Visegrad, NATO

AU1409160093 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 9 Sep 93 p 3

[Report by "Gy.Z.": "The FIDESZ Urges Closer Ties Between the Visegrad Group and NATO—The Foreign Policy Consensus Has To Be Maintained"]

[Text] According to the young democrats, nothing in recent months has given grounds for ending the existing foreign policy consensus. For this reason, the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ] is concerned about certain statements by members of the Hungarian Socialist Party and the Alliance of Free Democrats in which doubts over the existence of a general consensus could be detected. This, among other things, was mentioned at the FIDESZ's news conference on 8 September, which was devoted to current foreign policy issues.

The FIDESZ would not like this debate to expand and possibly lead to the end of unity. Jozsef Szajer, leader of the FIDESZ's foreign cabinet, said of his party's views. In Szajer's view, relations with the neighboring countries and the issue of the national minorities living beyond the border could endanger the consensus. "We would not like a debate to evolve in this area because this does not serve the interests of the Hungarian minorities and it spoils Hungary's international image and the chances of the government's foreign policy," he said.

Szajer emphasized that the consensus demanded self-restraint from everyone and mainly a willingness for discussions by the government. He did not hide the fact that this has been very defective up to now. However, he welcomed the government's willingness to discuss issues relating to Romania's Council of Europe membership. "Basically, FIDESZ supports Romania's admittance to the Council of Europe," Zsolt Nemeth, deputy chairman of FIDESZ, said about the party's views. At the same time, according to Nemeth, the Council of Europe's practice, namely that it first admits a country and only expects it to the fulfill the conditions afterwards, "leaves much to be desired."

The FIDESZ lists its expectations from Bucharest in five points: They should free ethnic or political prisoners, accept a national minority educational law, with the Democratic Union of Hungary in Romania [RMDSZ—UDNR in Romanian] also participating in drawing it up, accept the charter of regional and national minority languages and join the charter on local government, stop the discrimination in connection with the return of property to the churches, and they should do all they can in the interest of ensuring the use of language. According to Nemeth, very serious guarantees will have to be given by Bucharest in order to be admitted to the organization.

Talking about NATO's system of relations, Tamas Wachsler, member of the foreign cabinet, pointed out that [Russian] President Yeltsin's statement in Warsaw created a new situation because he said that the NATO membership of Central-Eastern European countries did not clash with Russia's interests. At the same time, Wachsler also recalled Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev's previous statement that had been contrary to this. According to Wachsler, two conclusions can be drawn from all this. One is that Russia still has significant forces—we should not necessarily think of Kozyrev here—that have not completely given up the former expansionist policies. The other is that, at the moment, these forces are not in power in Moscow. Therefore, it is a historical opportunity and also a historical responsibility to act fast and define NATO's new role, he said. On the other hand, Wachsler can see a positive move and more flexibility in NATO than before. To the Visegrad countries [Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland], which already have an advantage, Wachsler suggests not to wait idly to be approached by NATO. Rather, they should themselves take an active part in the process. He sees three possible areas: building good relations with the neighbors, refraining from rash diplomatic measures and statements, and making efforts to make the army compatible. In Wachsler's view, one of the possible ways of institutionalizing relations with NATO is through establishing an associate status, which has already been suggested by the FIDESZ.

FIDESZ welcomes the so-called Balladur plan as a promising idea for handling the tensions created in the postcommunist world. The fact that it is based on the protection of national minorities and is ready to handle the problems of national minorities on the basis of collective rights is one of the plan's merits. As Nemeth pointed out, this attitude is rather new in French politics and it obviously includes the lessons learned from the south Slav crisis. Among the positive factors, he mentioned that this plan moves from the notion that the problems of minorities should be handled on the basis of bilateral agreements. Naturally, it does not exclude bilateral handling but it also strengthens these with effective international guarantees. MAGYAR HIRLAP asked Nemeth if France had made this initiative mainly to counterbalance Germany's presence and role in the region. According to Nemeth, counterbalancing the German dominance is probably one but not the only possible reason for the French prime minister's initiative. The presentation of the plan might also have had domestic political reasons, for example to demonstrate their resourcefulness, or to indicate that the new government has independent and different foreign political ideas compared with the former socialist government.

Opinion Poll on Popularity of Political Parties

AU1409160293 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 10 Sep 93 p 10

[Unattributed report: "Gallup Survey on the Popularity of Various Parties Among the Hungarian Population"]

[Text] The Hungarian Gallup Institute carries out monthly surveys among the Hungarian population on the changes in sympathies toward various political parties. The opinion poll is based on a representative sample of 1,400 people over the age of 18, according to sex, age, and type of settlement they are living in. The latest survey took place between 29 July and 1 August 1993.

According to this survey, just as before, the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ] leads the popularity list. The percentage of potential FIDESZ supporters has been decreasing constantly since April 1993. An opposite trend can be seen in the case of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], which currently occupies second place on the aforementioned list. The MSZP has been gradually increasing its supporters since December 1992 and, regarding "certain voters", the MSZP has reached and even surpassed the FIDESZ.

Asked which party they would vote for if elections were held next Sunday, six out of ten people named a party. We will call these people "repliers."

The percentage of people who said they "would not go to vote" stood between 12 and 18 percent in the period between January and July 1993. At the same time, the percentage of people who said they did not know whom to vote for stood between 18 and 24 percent. The joint percentage of these two groups remained virtually unchanged in the survey period, and stood between 37 and 39 percent. In July, 37 percent of the people surveyed said one of the aforementioned answers.

The Gallup Institute measured the people's readiness to vote by means of a scale of seven steps. The question was the following: "On this card, number 7 means that someone is quite certain he would go to vote if elections were held next Sunday. Number 6 means that he is certain. On the other side of the card, number 1 means that one is quite sure he would not go to vote, and number 2 means that he is sure he would not go to vote. The other numbers show the steps between these two intentions. Where would you place yourself on this scale?"

Every month, 60 percent of people said that they were "quite sure" or "sure" that they would go to vote. Based on this, we can form two groups from among the potential voters, namely the "probable voters" and the "certain voters." The former is a broader group and is made up of people who are certain or quite certain that they would participate in the elections. The group of "certain voters" is made up of people who said they were quite certain they would vote "next Sunday."

FIDESZ would receive most of the votes in July 1993, just as at any time since May 1991. One-third of the voters would vote for the FIDESZ. The changes in the percentage of people voting for the FIDESZ have been characterized by two opposing trends in recent months. There has been a gradual drop in support for the FIDESZ from December 1992 to April 1993 (from 42 percent to 35 percent); then, as a result of the Fidesz congress, the percentage returned in April to the December 1992 figure. In the months after April 1993, we again see a drop, 37 percent in May, 33 percent in June, 30 percent in July. A similar trend can be seen in the case of "probable voters" and "certain voters." In July, 28 percent of the former and 25 percent of the latter would have voted for the FIDESZ.

The "competition" between the FIDESZ and the MSZP has become increasingly more vivid since April. The difference in the percentage of their supporters has decreased gradually. Whereas the FIDESZ received 24 percent more votes than the MSZP in April, this difference dropped to 10 percent in June, and to 6 percent in July.

The relative weakening of the FIDESZ and strengthening of the MSZP is even more conspicuous in the realm of "probable" and "certain" voters. While FIDESZ received 23 percent more votes from both groups in April, in June FIDESZ only received 4 percent more from the "probable voters" and only 1 percent more from the "certain voters." In July, the advantage of the FIDESZ dropped to 2 percent among "probable voters" who make up the majority of potential voters. Among the "certain voters," the MSZP gained the lead (with 28 percent), compared with 25 percent for FIDESZ.

In July, the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] occupied third place, and the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] occupied fourth place. The SZDSZ lost half of its potential voters between November 1992 and April 1993, and the number of its supporters dropped from 18 percent to 8 percent. The current SZDSZ support percentage of 12 percent is roughly identical with the average results achieved by the SZDSZ in 1992.

Some 10 percent of the people would have voted for the MDF. The percentage of MDF supporters showed less fluctuation in the course of the years than that of the SZDSZ: 10 percent on the average (14-14 percent in February and March, and 9 percent in April).

The Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] received the support of 8 percent of the voters. The same is the average of KDNP supporters among "probable" and "certain" voters. This party received between 4 and 6 percent in the period between January and April, and twice as many people would have voted for the KDNP in July than in April.

The Independent Smallholders Party [FKgP] received 1 percent more every month between January and April

(from 6 percent to percent). This trend came to a sudden halt in May, and only 6 percent of the people would have voted for this party in May; only 5 percent in June. In July, some 7 percent of the potential voters would have supported this party.

In conclusion, let us mention the votes for the "other" parties, the non-parliamentary parties. The overall percentage of these parties is similar to the percentage of supporters of the KDNP or the FKgP, namely between 7 and 9 percent.

Walesa Letter to NATO Explains Membership Case

WS1509072393 Warsaw TVP Television Second Program Network in Polish 0530 GMT 15 Sep 93

[From the "Panorama" newscast]

[Text] President Lech Walesa sent a letter to leaders of 16 NATO countries and NATO's secretary general, in which he presented the reasons behind Poland's efforts to join the North Atlantic alliance, the President's Press Office said. The alliance's meaning in today's world extends beyond the areas of member states, and that is a reason to present Poland's position on the subject, wrote President Lech Walesa.

Poll Reveals Suchocka More Popular Than Walesa

LD1409154493 Warsaw PAP in English 1516 GMT 14 Sep 93

[Text] Warsaw, Sept. 14—Forty three per cent of respondents approve of recent activities of Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka while only 23 per cent are satisfied with activities of President Lech Walesa, according to an opinion poll carried out by Demoskop opinion polling centre on August 13-18.

As many as 63 per cent of those surveyed expressed negative opinion about Walesa's activities as the president and 44 per cent disapproved of Suchocka's actions.

The president's supporters are mainly among the elderly Poles (over 59), among young people (25 - 29 years), and among people with primary education.

Suchocka is supported chiefly by people with higher education, and criticised by people from rural areas.

The publication of the results of the poll a few days before the election day does not have any political connotations, said Jaroslaw Pawlak of Demoskop. According to him the results were to be revealed one week before but due to an error in feeding information to a computer the publication was delayed.

Possible Government Coalitions Considered

WS1409140093 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 14 Sep 93 pp 1, 2

[Article by Marcin Dominik Zdort and Pawel Reszka: "Who With Whom After the Elections; The Chickens Have Not Yet Hatched"

[Text] **The leaders of most political parties are already saying with whom they would like to form a new government. These declarations are rather cautious and almost all contain one reservation: A lot will depend on the configuration of forces in the parliament after the elections.**

Politicians are more eagerly and unequivocally stating with whom they would not like to share power.

The most popular coalition partner has become the Polish Peasant Party [PSL]. The parties with the lowest rating are "Self-Defense," "X" Party, and the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD].

"Fatherland": Coalition With Left Out of the Question

Unwillingness to share power with the left is most clearly shown by parties that define themselves as "government right" or "center right." The parties that have formed the Catholic Election Committee [KKW] "Fatherland" are unanimous in saying that they will not cooperate with SLD under any circumstances. Kazimierz Michal Ujazdowski, spokesman for the "Fatherland," also cannot see any possibility of forming a government with the Labor Union [UP], "Self-Defense," or the Confederation for an Independent Poland [KPN].

Center Accord [PC] With Other Liberals

PC is willing to form a government with "Solidarity" ["S"], the Peasant Accord [PL], and Coalition for the Republic [KdR], says Jaroslaw Kaczynski. He adds, however, that it may also hold talks with other parties.

"The Democratic Union [UD] would not be ready to implement our program; therefore, it practically excludes itself from the group of our allies. The Liberal-Democratic Congress [KLD] is a party of the status quo; we want to change the status quo. Therefore, if they wanted to form a coalition with us, they would have to be quite different liberals. We definitely do not want to cooperate with communists and parties related to them, such as UP. The 'X' Party and 'Self-Defense' are also out of the question. KPN should take a more realistic look at the economy. PSL must decide whether it is with the communists or against them; if the latter turns out to be true, we can talk with them," says the PC chairman.

KdR: Personnel Problem

"I am absolutely certain that we will not form a government with UD, KLD, and SLD," says Antoni Macierewicz of KdR. The cabinet coestablished by KdR would also not include the "X" Party, "Self-Defense," or UP. "As for the possibility of cooperation with KPN, there would be a certain personnel problem to overcome," says Macierewicz, who refuses to make a statement on the possibility of entering into a government alliance with PSL.

KLD: In Search of the Fourth One

The liberals list UD and the Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms [BBWR] as the two most likely allies.

If these parties do not obtain enough votes to have a majority in the parliament, we will have to look for a fourth coalition member, says Tusk. Before that, the

KLD leader did not exclude the possibility of cooperation with PSL. "We definitely reject cooperation only with SLD and UP," adds KLD General Secretary Grzegorz Schetyna.

SLD: Never Say Never

SLD, the political group that is least popular with the other parties, points out that "in politics the word never should never be used." SLD would be most willing to form a coalition with PSL, UD, and UP; it cannot see any possibility of entering into an alliance with the right: PSL-PL, PC, KdR, or "Fatherland." It rejects cooperation with the "X" Party and "Self-Defense." Zbigniew Siemiatkowski, SLD spokesman, does not exclude the possibility of postelection cooperation with KLD, for instance.

PSL: With Everyone

The ally that is in the greatest demand, PSL, is ready to hold talks with everyone "on the condition that we manage to agree on a joint program," says Aleksander Luczak of PSL.

UD: We Will Not Be a Slave

"Our closest ally was KLD; however, we do not exclude other partners"—this is the standard official answer to a question of future coalitions.

UD is prepared to cooperate with groups supporting a social market economy and parliamentary democracy.

"It is not important with whom; what is important is on what conditions"; this opinion can often be heard in the UD election headquarters. The fact that UD is so enigmatic about alliances can be explained with the following: "UD does not want to be a slave of the election campaign."

UD rules out the possibility of forming a coalition with "Self-Defense" or the "X" Party.

UP: A Difficult Alliance With the Alliance

UP would most readily form a government with PSL. It points to programmatic similarities and "the other side's great desire for cooperation." The alliance of UP and UD would be much more difficult to form—UP would make preliminary conditions. UP does not say "no" to SLD.

"After the elections, the good of the country may require some flexibility," says UP spokesman. He adds, however, that an alliance with SLD would be even more difficult than an alliance with UD. UP would ask who would be the prime minister of such a government and what candidates SLD would propose for ministerial posts. For ideological reasons, UP will not cooperate with the Christian-National Union; for economic reasons it will not form an alliance with KLD. It also does not want a coalition with PC, KdR, KPN, "Self-Defense," or the "X" Party.

KPN: It Is Best With KPN

KPN would be most pleased if it could form a government by itself. If this turns out to be impossible, the confederates will want to cooperate with PSL and PL, as well as PC and KdR. They can also see the possibility of cooperation with the "anti-union" part of KKW "Fatherland" (Krzysztof Krol mentions Jan Lopuszanski), and the "antiunion" part of BBWR.

KPN will definitely not form an government with SLD (for ideological reasons and because of its lack of authenticity), the liberals, and UD (because of programmatic differences). An alliance with "Self-Defense," the "X" Party, or the Union for Real Politics [UPR] is also not possible, because "these parties are political folklore."

BBWR: Moral Issues

BBWR would like to form a government with parties that would guarantee the cabinet a definite majority in the parliament and with parties whose programs are close to that of the bloc, says Jacek Szymanderski. He finds "similar programmatic elements" in the program of UD (even though there are significant differences—strengthening the executive authorities and the role of the president, as well as methods of privatization). The program of the "Fatherland" brings up similar "moral issues"; however, there are serious differences in other areas.

Asked about the possibility of forming an alliance with the left, Szymanderski said: "We would have difficulties discussing things with socialists."

He also rules out the possibility of cooperation with "Self-Defense."

[Box, p 2]

With Whom To Form a Government?

	NO	YES
SLD:	Self-Defense, "X," KdR, PC, PSL-PL	PSL, UD, UP
UD:	Self-Defense, "X"	KLD
UP:	PC, KdR, KPN, KLD, "X," KKW "Fatherland," Self-Defense	PSL, UD, SLD(?)
KPN:	SLD, "X," KLD, Self-Defense, UPR	PSL, PL, PC, KdR
BBWR:	Self-Defense	UD, KKW "Fatherland"

With Whom To Form a Government? (Continued)		
	NO	YES
KLD:	Self-Defense, "X," SLD, UP	UD, BBWR, PSL
PC:	Self-Defense, "X," UP, SLD	"S," PSL-PL, KdR, UPR
KdR:	Self-Defense, "X," UP, SLD	PC, "S," UPR
KKW:	SLD, UP, KPN, "X"	KdR, PC, KLD, PSL
PSL:		KdR, PC, KLD, PSL-PL, UD, KLD [as published], BBWR, UP, "X," Self-Defense, SLD, KPN, UPR

Opinion Poll Lists Possible Election Results

WS1309112893 Warsaw NOWA GAZETA in Polish 3 Sep 93 p 2

[Report by Stanislaw Remuszko: "A Poll for NOWA GAZETA—SLD in the Lead"]

[Text] On 30 August, 2536 respondents participated in a rapid poll conducted for NOWA GAZETA by the Private Office for Street Opinion Research "Sonda" in 54 cities of 31 voivodships inhabited by three-fourths of Poland's population.

The first question was: Will you take part in the elections on 19 August? [date as published] Here are the results:

Absolutely yes	44 percent
Probably yes	14 percent
Probably not	10 percent
Absolutely not	15 percent
I do not know yet	17 percent

Those who said they would most certainly take part in the elections (1,124 people) were then asked by interviewers: For whom will you vote? Thirteen percent of the people who were asked this question said: "It is hard to say, I do not have an opinion on the topic, I do not know yet." The remaining people, who for the remainder of the article are regarded as 100 percent, named the following political parties (here listed in alphabetical order):

Non-Party Bloc In Support of Reforms [BBWR]	8 percent
Coalition for the Republic [KdR]	2 percent
Catholic Election Committee "Motherland"	4 percent
Confederation for an Independent Poland [KPN]	8 percent
Liberal-Democratic Congress [KLD]	7 percent
Independent Self-Governing Trade Union "Solidarity"	6 percent
Polish Peasant Party [PSL]	6 percent
Center Accord [PC]	4 percent
Peasant Accord [PL]	1 percent
Self-Defense	1 percent
Democratic Left Alliance [SLD]	22 percent
Democratic Union [UD]	17 percent
Union for Real Politics [UPR]	3 percent
Union of Labor [UP]	8 percent
Party "X"	1 percent
Other parties	3 percent

Taking into account the poll results and the respective differences in political views between cities and the countryside, I hereby make the following all-nation election forecast:

SLD	18 percent
PSL	15 percent
UD	13 percent
UP	8 percent
BBWR and KPN	7 percent each
"Motherland," KLD, "Solidarity," PL	5 percent each
PC and Self-Defense	4 percent each
KdR and UPR	2 percent each
Party "X"	1 percent
Predicted overall participation	Between 44 and 51 percent

Liberals Claim Leftists Would Endanger Reforms

AU1509102393 Warsaw PAP in English 2031 GMT 14 Sep 93

[Text] Warsaw, Sept. 14—Leszek Balcerowicz, former Polish deputy prime minister and finance minister, said that the election programmes of parties can be divided into "programmes of violent destruction of the basis of economic development" as is in the case of the Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN) and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), and those of "creeping destruction" worked out by the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and the Union of Labour (UP).

Balcerowicz was attending the press conference of the Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD) during which the party representatives voiced opinions that the acceptance of the programmes worked out by the PSL or KPN would bring the most dangerous results. The programmes of the SLD or the UP are linked with each other in many points and in particular in the "intention to choke private enterprises."

Chairman of the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) Waldemar Pawlak told reporters in Katowice that money earmarked for allowances for the unemployed should be assigned for creation of new jobs or training for the unemployed. He also said that the division of profits in energy industry should be made "more evenly" and pointed to the fact that too much importance is attached to the speeding up of the process of collieries liquidation and too little to find solution to ailing mining industry problems.

Chairman of the Polish Peasant Party-Peasant Agreement (PSL-PL) Gabriel Janowski told a news conference that he is perceiving the agriculture and housing construction industry as incentives for the economy. The envisaged increased budget deficit would, in his opinion, provide funds for the development of small enterprises.

Krzaklewski: Only Solidarity Win Can Stop Left

AU1509102293 Warsaw PAP in English 1911 GMT 14 Sep 93

[Text] Lodz, Sept. 14—Solidarity leader Marian Krzaklewski stated in Lodz that only the Solidarity trade union was in a position to prevent the postcommunists from winning the Sunday general elections.

"If the communists win, it will be mainly thanks to those unionists who fail to vote for Solidarity or not go to the polls at all", Krzaklewski said.

In Katowice, the Solidarity leader told a press conference that his union reacted calmly to pre-election polls which showed strong support for the post-communist Democratic Left Alliance (SLD).

Krzaklewski said Solidarity would remain a strong trade union irrespective of the election results. In the future parliament Solidarity would not join any coalitions, it would only form tactical alliances, he added.

Walesa Comments on 'Redefined' Presidency

WS1409135793 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 14 Sep 93 p 2

[PAP report: "Lech Walesa: If I Must Pay These Bills"]

[Text] "It is indispensable that the public's idea of the office of the president be changed, or—if the people want that—that the president's executive powers be increased," said Lech Walesa in an interview with NEWSWEEK. According to him, the role of president in Poland should be redefined, so that he will not be held responsible for things over which he has no influence. According to the president, if the Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms [BBWR] had not been established, a deadlock in the new parliament would be "unavoidable." He also confirmed that if the left wins the elections, "all those who advocate democracy will have to acknowledge it." Asked whether BBWR is unanimous as to the role that a new constitution should envision for the president, he replied: "If the president were to be harassed as he is now and if his prerogatives were to be left unchanged, I would be for abolishing the Presidency, because it would be unnecessary in Poland. (...) If I am heckled at a rally, then it is because I must pay the bill for unemployment, for Minister Kuron, for Minister Lewandowski's privatization, or for the prosecutor's offices, which have not investigated great economic crimes. They have executive powers in these areas, not me."

Cabinet Adopts Unemployment Program

AU1509094993 Warsaw PAP in English 2003 GMT 14 Sep 93

[Text] Warsaw, Sept. 14—The cabinet today adopted a programme of counteracting unemployment and cushioning its negative results along with a list of the cabinet's tasks concerning the programme's implementation and a package of bills related to the programme which are to be presented to the future parliament.

According to Deputy Labour Minister Michal Boni, the programme primarily envisages measures leading to the creation of new jobs, the stimulation of the labour market and curbing of unemployment growth. Under the programme, limitations on public works are to be abandoned and insurances against the risk of unemployment be introduced.

The cabinet also initially approved a draft of the copyright law and related laws prepared by previous Sejm (lower house) committees and a team of ministry of culture experts.

Detailed solutions contained in the draft are to be consulted during the next several days with the finance and justice ministries. The draft is to be submitted as urgent to the new parliament.

The proposed copyright law which relates to authors, performers and producers is concordant with internationally accepted norms. It envisages that piracy will be punished with six months to five years in prison.

The cabinet also approved the assumptions of the state's pro-export policy prepared by the Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations. The assumptions have a character of a long-term programme envisaging the state's assistance to exports modelled on well-developed countries.

The programme includes fiscal, tax, tariff, promotion and hard currency policies as well as the creation of the infrastructure of financial support to export e.g credits, credit guarantees and insurances.

The government approved the cabinet economic committee's (KERM) stand on industrial policy. The KERM stated that the industrial policy is already being implemented in the forms of ministerial and regional programmes in accordance with previously approved priority goals.

The cabinet also discussed ministers' motions to submit nine government-prepared draft laws to new parliament.

The draft laws include, among others, a bill on the office of interior minister, police, State Protection Office (UOP) and the Border Guard, bills on the family code, civil code, international private law, a bill on protection of agricultural and wood lands and a bill on insurance activity.

The bill on the interior minister's office, police, the UOP and the Border Guard includes proposals being the result of a programme "just and safe state" adopted by the cabinet in September 1992.

The proposals include changes in the appointment of the UOP head. He would be nominated by the prime minister on the motion of the Interior Minister and following consultations with the president.

Deputy Labor Minister Reports Rise in Unemployment

AU1409081793 Warsaw PAP in English 1401 GMT 13 Sep 93

[Text] Warsaw, Sept. 13—The number of registered jobless grew by 0.6 percent (17,803 people) in Poland in August against the July figures, Deputy Labour Minister Michal Boni said today.

Minister Boni told a press conference in Warsaw that there were 2,829,634 unemployed in Poland at the end of August, that is 15.4 percent of the economically active population.

Boni stressed at the same time that the level of unemployment was 140,000 less than forecasted for August. The highest rate of unemployment has been observed for months in the Koszalin province (28.3 percent) and the Suwalki province (27.6 per cent) The Krakow and the Warsaw provinces have had the lowest unemployment rate of 6.8 and 7.5 percent respectively. Unemployment grew in August in 35 of Poland's 49 provinces (in July, 47). The biggest growth in the number of jobless was recorded in August in the Bielsko-Biala province (3.3 percent) and in the Radom province (2.7 percent).

The number of unemployed decreased in 14 provinces with the biggest drop of 4.7 percent being recorded in the Krakow province. Labour offices received in August about 55,000 offers of work. On the average there were 71 jobless per one offer of a vacant position.

35 percent of the newly registered jobless had no right to unemployment benefits. At the end of August persons who were not receiving such benefits constituted 57 percent (about 1.6 million) of all the registered jobless. Women account for more than a half of all the unemployed. Twenty percent of the unemployed are persons who lost their jobs due to mass layoffs.

Boni also informed the press conference that the Labour Ministry will experimentally introduce as of October 1, 1993 "training coupons" for unemployed school graduates in the Plock province. The coupons worth 5 million zlotys each will allow the recipients to attend vocational courses at different training institutions.

Training coupons form an element of a programme to counteract unemployment drafted by the Labour Ministry, Boni said. They will be introduced on an experimental scale and embrace school graduates registered in labour offices of the Plock province since June 1 of this year.

It is estimated that some 1,000 persons should take part in the new training programme, Boni added.

General Sikorski's Ashes Return to Poland

AU1509102193 Warsaw PAP in English 2021 GMT 14 Sep 93

[Text] Warsaw, London, Sept. 14—The remains of the Polish wartime commander-in-chief and prime minister, General Wladyslaw Sikorski, were brought to Poland aboard a special plane this afternoon.

The coffin was transported to the field cathedral of the Polish Army in Warsaw, where a requiem mass was celebrated by Primate of Poland Cardinal Jozef Glemp in the presence of President Lech Walesa, Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka, and other high ranking officials.

In Newark, the Midlands, where General Sikorski was buried for 50 years, there was a farewell ceremony attended by representatives of Queen Elizabeth II, the British Government, and Polish war veterans living in Britain since World War II.

A mass celebrated at the St. Mary Magdalen church in Newark was attended by the Duke of Edinburgh, Prince Philip. The people who came to bid farewell to the general were addressed by Minister of State at the British Foreign Office Douglas Hogg. The mass was said in Polish by the minister of the Polish community in Britain, Bishop Szczepan Wesoly.

After the ceremony, two Tornado jets escorted the Polish plane carrying the coffin to the border of the British air space.

Reportage on Foreign Minister's African Tour

WA1409135093

For reportage on Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski's visits to Kenya and the Republic of South Africa, including his meetings with Kenyan President Moi and RSA President de Klerk, see the 14 September and subsequent issues of the Sub-Saharan Africa DAILY REPORT.

Thousands Participate in Rally Against Corruption

AU1409201593 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1900 GMT 14 Sep 93

[Text] Some 3,000 people participated in a rally organized by the Civic Alliance [AC] in Bucharest's Revolution Square this evening on the following theme: Corruption and Lies Generate Poverty. The rally was addressed, among others, by Ana Blandiana and Petre Mihai Bacanu, members in the of the AC Steering Committee; Emil Constantinescu, president of the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR]; Adrian Dumitrescu, president of the 21 December Association; Matei Bratianu, leader of the National Trade Union Bloc [BNS]; Ioan Draghici, president of the PROPACT National Trade Union of Romanian Peasantry; Bogdan Deac, leader of the League for the Social Integration of the Unemployed; Ioan Vlad, leader of the Engineers' Free and Independent Trade Union Federation (93); and other AC members.

The speakers examined the corruption phenomenon in the Romanian society.

At the end of the meeting, Mr. Gabriel Andreescu, AC president, read a statement condemning the justice establishment for failing to fulfill its duty, the governmental coalition, which accepts corrupt people among its members, and Romania's president for the fact that, quote, he patronizes corruption in order to turn it into a lever of the restoration, end quote.

The participants in the rally chanted antipresidential, antigovernmental, and promonarchist slogans, our correspondent reports.

Iliescu Assesses Relations With Turkey

AU1409141793 Bucharest DIMINEATA Supplement in Romanian 11-12 Sep 93 p 4

["Interview Granted by President Ion Iliescu to Yavuz Dalogullory, correspondent of the Turkish Television TRT, on 6 September 1993," place not given]

[Text] [Dalogullory] Esteemed Mr. President, in recent years there has been an obvious improvement and openness in Romanian-Turkish relations. What do you think will be the contribution of your upcoming visit to Turkey to the continuous expansion of these relations?

[Iliescu] First of all, the visit is itself an expression of our mutual interest in developing our relations, and the meeting with President Demirel will be an opportunity to review everything that has been accomplished in this period, the way in which bilateral relations between our countries have developed and, at the same time, we will mark a new moment in the activity of stimulating these relations. As you said, we assess positively the entire evolution of bilateral relations between our countries. We appreciate Turkey's friendly position toward the Romanian revolution, toward the whole process of consolidating democracy in Romania, and toward the efforts that we make to promote economic reform. Likewise, we appreciate Turkey's support granted to us in European bodies, such as the Council of Europe. We also appreciate the bilateral relations that received continuous stimulation from both sides and this is indeed reflected in the development of economic relations between our countries.

[Dalogullory] Esteemed Mr. President, Romania and Turkey are members of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Council. What do you think are the prospects for cooperation between the two countries in this framework of the community of Black Sea coastal countries?

[Iliescu] First of all, we hailed this initiative with pleasure. Romania and Turkey were among the initiators of this action. We have actively participated in the preparations for the Istanbul meeting and later in working out measures for the implementation of certain accords and understandings that were endorsed at that meeting.

Both Romania and Turkey are interested in seeing that the Black Sea region becomes a region of peace. We should support the interests of all coastal countries in turning this area into a dynamic region and developing the economy of all countries that belong to this region, considering that they have complementary economies and represent a great interest for the future through their rich natural resources and creative human and technological potential. This region should become an active factor in promoting the more general processes of development and integration in European frameworks and in the world economy. In this respect, bilateral relations are an important factor and I believe that, from this point of view, Romania and Turkey can boast a good situation.

Our bilateral relations, which have developed continuously throughout this period, are a good example of the way that multilateral cooperation throughout this region should be developed. Certainly, for the time being, there are many difficulties connected with the hotbeds of tension in our immediate vicinity, that is, in Yugoslavia, in certain regions of the former USSR, and in the Caucasus. Nevertheless, we hope that, through our joint efforts—and we are happy that, from this point of view, Romania and Turkey are factors of stability that are making efforts to contribute to the establishment of a climate of peace and to find political solutions to all these problems—and, as I have said, through the efforts of all of us, we will overcome these moments of conflict and trouble and we will be indeed able to establish a zone of peace and a favorable climate for the development of multilateral relations, in the interest of the countries and peoples in this area.

[Dalogullory] In what way do you think the two neighboring and friendly countries, namely Romania and Turkey, can contribute to the establishment of a climate of peace in the Balkan region?

[Iliescu] I believe that, so far, our countries have acted as factors of stability in this area. The good relations between our countries, as well as our good relations with all the other countries in the Balkans are constructive elements and a positive factor for the promotion of dialogue and for finding political solutions to all conflicts.

We have hailed the ray of hope that has appeared in connection with the settlement of the conflict in Bosnia, and we continue to follow with interest the actions aimed at finding peaceful and political solutions to the Bosnian conflict and at finding acceptable solutions for all three sides, which should lead to the establishment of a favorable climate of peace in that republic and in Yugoslavia in general, and to the resumption of the peaceful activity of those people who have suffered so much. I believe that our countries can make a positive contribution precisely by promoting a balanced policy toward all sides involved in the conflict and creating a favorable climate to support these dialogues and diplomatic contacts that should stabilize the situation in this region.

[Dalogullory] Esteemed Mr. President, I would like to ask you a last question. In view of the visit that you are going to pay to the Republic of Turkey on the 9 September 1993, do you wish to address a few words to the Turkish people?

[Iliescu] On behalf of our people, I would like to extend our warm greetings to the Turkish people. We have a lengthy common history, which has also known moments of tension, but which, at the same time, promoted the mutual esteem and respect between our people. We are familiar with the progress made by Turkey in the past years and the dynamism of its economic development. We appreciate the role that Turkey is playing in this zone of contact between two civilizations, between Europe and the Middle East. We regard the bilateral relations as an active factor in promoting these relations in the area where we live. We are convinced that this visit will bring an additional element to the process of consolidating and developing bilateral relations, to the way in which our people can get better acquainted with each other, and to ensuring a better cooperation in all economic, social, political, cultural, and scientific areas. On this occasion, we would also like to express our warmest feelings and extend our best wishes to the Turkish people and to Turkey and wish them success in its efforts for modern development.

Press on Signing of Israeli-PLO Peace Accord

AU1409202393 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1358 GMT 14 Sep 93

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 14/9/1993—Romanian press publishes on Tuesday commentaries on the PLO-Israeli peace agreement signed in Washington. Regrets are expressed for the fact that Romania, that promoted in the past decades an inspired diplomacy of mediation between conflicting parties, especially appreciated at the time, was not mentioned among the countries which brought significant contribution to the achievement of this historic event.

"Among the countries, which Yasir 'Arafat thanked for their contribution to this historic action, he should have necessarily mentioned Romania too," the daily EVENIMENTUL ZILEI reads. "During the past decade, Romania was a communication channel between PLO and Israel. We may remember the many problems which Romania had within the former socialist camp for having preserved diplomatic relations with both parties. We have thousands of reasons to reject Ceausescu's dictatorship. But now, when we have witnessed the historic hands-shake between Yasir 'Arafat and Yitzhaq Rabin, it would be fair to acknowledge Nicolae Ceausescu's role in the achievement of a moment without which the planetary event on Monday could not possibly have occurred. That special moment is the peace between Egypt and Israel. Historians maintain that Ceausescu advised Egyptian President Sadat to take the bull by the horns and negotiate directly with Israel. That is what Yasir 'Arafat has done lately. Considering the tight relations between Ceausescu and the Palestinian leader, we can assume that the former Romanian head of state often advised 'Arafat to act the same way. The present agreement is the result of direct negotiations between Palestinians and Israeli. Nicolae Ceausescu may have had his contribution to it. This is what Yasir 'Arafat forgot to tell," concludes EVENIMENTUL ZILEI.

The daily ADEVARUL, too, comments on the topic: "It is an irony of the destiny that the country which got involved to the largest extent and at a time when dialogue was inconceivable, the country which succeeded in propping the first bridge of creeper over the precipice separating Arabs from Jews, Romania, should miss the ceremony in Washington. It seems the leading actors of the event felt embarrassed with Ceausescu's memory and ignored Romania without which the agreements of Camp David could be hardly imagined. It seems, they have forgotten the Romanian efforts, the risks Romania took as it was entered in the black list for total ban drawn up by Middle East extremists."

"Even the Israeli, with whom Russia and its East-European bloc had severed any relation in an attempt to isolate Israel as much as they could, seems to have forgotten as much as the Palestinians, to whom Bucharest had become a Mecca of their international diplomacy and the single communication channel with Israeli leaders. For almost two decades, Romania has held the outstanding position of having diplomatic relations both with Israel and the PLO and, in key-moments it facilitated secret contacts with an essential role in peace making. The Romanian diplomacy has one more reason to more realistically apprise in future the advantages and disadvantages of its actions, aware by now of the fact that generosity in politics is most often repaid with ungratefulness," concludes the daily ADEVARUL.

The daily VREMEA poses a question: "Could anybody question the fact that the agreement Rabin-'Arafat represents the second pier of 'the peace bridge' while the first one is the Begin-Sadat agreement? Beside the role played in the working out of the first agreement, Romania preserved and developed good relations and friendly contacts with both parties in spite of big squeezes and threats and in contrast with other countries involved in fire fueling which were, of course, invited to the ceremony in Washington. It is not about some person, it is about the absence of that 'Romanian factor' embodying the political thinking and practical action of a political formation to which some obstinately try to deny any merit. Sure, the presence of that factor in Washington would have been a physical impossibility, but morally, politically and historically the big absentee should be conjured up," the daily VREMEA reads.

Coposu on Political Guilt of Accused Ministers

AU1409064893 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 8 Sep 93 p 3

[Interview with Corneliu Coposu, senator and president of the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party, by Loara Stefanescu; place and date not given: "Gheorghe Florica Was Intimidated by the Circus Staged by the Majority"]

[Text] [Stefanescu] Mr. Coposu, through your voice, which actually represents the voice of the parliamentary opposition, you have insistently demanded that the former chief commissioner of the Financial Oversight Body—Gheorghe Florica—be heard in the joint plenary session of the two parliament chambers, because of the sensational disclosures he may make in addition to those "locked up" in Mr. Vonica's [PDSR senator] safe. Now, a few hours after the speech by the former commissioner, and his answers to problems raised by certain parliamentarians, how do you assess the performance of this controversial figure, Mr. Florica?

[Coposu] In his speech, the former chief of the Financial Oversight Body demonstrated that he is recovering from an illness; he has just left hospital and, of course, he was intimidated by the circus the majority staged, so that he could not even answer the questions he was asked. It was impossible for him to shed light on the accusations of corruption made in the preliminary report, something that was not to the benefit of the discussions. They lost their seriousness, turned into constant vociferations, and thus degraded the image of the parliament in the country.

Irrespective of General Florica's attitude and incoherence, the fact as such remains, that is the existence of corruption up to the highest levels. Even if it cannot be counteracted on the basis of precise texts in the Penal Code, it exists from a moral and political point of view.

[Stefanescu] Can one draw the conclusion that, following the marathon parliamentary debates in the past days, the three ministers accused of corruption have been officially "cleansed" or, on the contrary, that things have become worse?

[Coposu] The government members have not been discharged of the suspicion that is even mentioned in the preliminary report and no one contradicted the arguments that prompted all commission members to sign it. The activity of the anticorruption commission, however, is not finished; its mandate will last until 31 December in order to gather additional information. The discussions on the two reports (of "the seven" and the separate opinion of the six opposition members) will continue in the days to follow as well. Time will decide on these matters. It is desirable that none of the government members be accused of corruption.

[Stefanescu] Does this possibility exist?

[Coposu] It depends on the result of the discussion on the report of the anti-corruption commission, which will include new information gathered in the two months of summer activity.

[Stefanescu] What is your opinion of the government reshuffle?

[Coposu] It was a mere cosmetic operation whereby the government did not succeed in becoming stronger, but, on the contrary, it completely lost its image abroad because of three of its members, who committed the imprudence of taking a clearly anti-American stance, something that will darken our country's image and create future difficulties. In addition, due to Mr. Misu Negritoiu's transfer to Cotroceni [presidency], the government has been deprived of the person who enjoyed a certain credibility in international financial bodies. This means that either President Iliescu attempts to guide the reform process from Cotroceni, or he thought that Mr. Negritoiu is inefficient and incompetent; in this case, however, his promotion to presidential counselor would be a contradiction.

[Stefanescu] Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu came to parliament accompanied by the entire government team to support the three ministers accused of corruption by General Florica. What is your opinion of the report presented by the prime minister at the session of the parliament chambers and of the replies by the three "accused" dignitaries?

[Coposu] The prime minister's performance was poor because he made some statements for which there was no confirmation, thus actually provoking the response and protests by the parliamentarians, who contradicted his affirmations.

There should not have been any attempts to mislead the parliament with the government's modest, below standard achievements.

As far as the three ministers are concerned, we witnessed their exoneration. What we do not know is whether,

during the discussions of the final report, this exoneration will be enough or whether it will be enhanced through documents.

[Stefanescu] What about yourself, have the latest discussions and the exoneration convinced you of the innocence of the three?

[Coposu] I did not accuse and I did not think that the three ministers should be taken to court. What was at stake was only their moral and political responsibility. And from this point of view, the exoneration has not changed, whatsoever, the impression of their moral and political guilt.

UDMR Leader Discusses Party Strategy

AU1409081893 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 10 Sep 93 p 5

[Interview with Bela Marko, president of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania and Mures County Senator, by Rodica Ciobanu; place and date not given: "Within the UDMR Interests Are Stronger Than Disagreements"]

[Text] [Ciobanu] Mr. Senator, is it true what one can hear in journalistic circles that within the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] there is a major confrontation between the groups that we could call radical and moderate; that is, between Messrs. Laszlo Tokes, Geza Szocs, and Adam Katona on the one hand and Gyorgy Frunda, Laszlo Borbely, and Gyorgy Tokay on the other?

[Marko] Yes, it is true that recently, debates were held in the Hungarian press on the issue of the UDMR's tactics. However, there is no disagreement of a strategic nature, because our program was endorsed in Brasov and accepted by each group individually, above any platform that exists within our movement. This conflict of ideas is somehow natural within the UDMR because we are a pluralistic organization and not a party with a single platform. However, a question arises whether the tactics applied so far have yielded the expected results. And this discussion gives us the opportunity to review our actions. Yet, I would not use the term "confrontation" between two wings.

[Ciobanu] Nevertheless, I find the term justified because the "debates" were held in a rough manner, and the three aforementioned parliamentarians were called "traitors" to the interests of the Hungarian minority because they attended the talks [between representatives of Romania's Council for Minorities' Issues and of the UDMR] held at the Neptun resort.

[Marko] I believe that one should never use such terms of moral qualification in a political discussion. Unfortunately, in general, political life is full of tough terms, which misinterpret criteria. We will try to put an end to such outbursts in the UDMR. I categorically refuse such labeling.

[Ciobanu] However, does not the withdrawal from the Minorities' Council mean an agreement with the assertions voiced by Mr. Laszlo Tokes, honorary president of the UDMR?

[Marko] Mr. Tokes did not condemn the participation in the Minorities' Council but the Neptun meeting of my parliamentarian colleagues with Mr. Viorel Hrebenciuc and other representatives of the government and of the Presidency. He referred in a critical manner to the propagandistic effect of that private meeting, where the representatives of the Power promised that the claims of the Hungarian minorities will be solved, although we know from experience that such promises were made before but yielded no results. The current Power carried out positive propaganda in Neptun, claiming that there is a political will to solve our problems. However, we cannot perceive this will. No solutions have been found, the necessary government decisions have not been taken, and the laws that we demanded were not submitted to the parliament. We, as early as the establishment of the Minorities' Council, have had reservations as far as the composition, the duty, and the goal of this council are concerned and accepted the idea that this institution could become a useful factor in solving the claims of the Hungarian minority, if the submitted proposals were accepted by the government. I can tell you that we had an effective dialogue with the other minorities and useful proposals have been made, so the withdrawal of the UDMR does not mean a low grading of the council but rather a critical attitude toward the government, which promised that it would take the minorities' proposals into consideration but did nothing of the kind.

[Ciobanu] The withdrawal from the council coincided with the act of sending the UDMR memorandum to the Council of Europe. Taking the previous statements into consideration, can't this be regarded as a plainly demonstrative gesture?

[Marko] Yes, these actions indeed coincided. However, for us it has become imperative to draw the balance sheet of the solved and unsolved issues and to get a clear picture of the government's intentions. I agree with you that the two actions cannot be treated separately, because both political moves represent a categoric stand toward the current situation created by the government and the other institutions of the Power.

[Ciobanu] Both the act of sending the memorandum to the Council of Europe and its contents were disavowed by the UDMR's partners within the Democratic Convention of Romania. Don't you believe that your gesture is endangering the good relations that have existed so far with the parties within the Democratic Convention?

[Marko] Within the Democratic Convention we have agreed that the problems of the Hungarian minority in Romania are particularly important and have to be solved in accordance with the ideas included in the Alba Iulia decisions [taken on 1 December 1918]. At the same time, we have never denied that there are very many

discrepancies among us as far as concrete solutions are concerned. A very serious dialogue within the Democratic Convention of Romania is needed in this respect, but I do not believe that our alliance is endangered.

[Ciobanu] Don't you believe that first it would have been imperative to discuss the content of the document with the partners in the Democratic Convention? Your action took them by surprise.

[Marko] I do not believe that the memorandum was properly understood. Our claims are not new at all, not even those regarding the constitution which were raised in the parliament itself. If the syntagm national state would have only a sentimental meaning for the majority, then we would have no reservations toward it. But the articles of the constitution clearly mean that this definition is synonymous with a concept, a mentality, that there is only one nation and only one language in Romania.

[Ciobanu] The general secretary of the Council of Europe, Mrs. Catherine Lalumiere, has declared that the Hungarian minority has no particular problems in Romania.

[Marko] My colleagues from other parties and I held discussions in Bucharest with Mrs. Lalumiere, who repeatedly stressed that the problems of minorities are of utmost importance in the Council of Europe, and that they are connected not only with the issue of human rights but also with stability in Europe. In our discussions no conclusion was drawn whatsoever; her declarations came later.

[Ciobanu] Will there be new UDMR tactics, and what will this mean?

[Marko] No essential changes are going to take place in our tactics. However, certain clarifications are necessary. We have to do much more in order to explain to the Romanian public what our intentions are. Likewise, we are thinking about a general program that refers to the democratization of the entire Romanian society and another one, a special one, regarding the Hungarian minority. The two of them cannot be separated. There can be no democracy without minority rights.

[Ciobanu] Soon there will be a meeting of the Council of UDMR Representatives in Targu Mures. What are this council's major objectives?

[Marko] The Council of Representatives will have to clarify all discrepancies of a tactical or strategic nature in the UDMR policy, and I am duty-bound to be a mediator. There is no question about one group winning and another one losing. It is necessary to reach an understanding regarding the major points of our policy, and I am convinced that this will indeed happen. The interests that bind us are above all disagreements.

Foreign Media Bulletin: Balkan Crisis 15 September

WA1509172993

The following is an overview of current FBIS reporting on events in the Balkans. It supplements other FBIS reporting and consists primarily of selected summaries of longer reports. For reference purposes, serial numbers of the longer reports are provided.

SUMMARY

Croatian President Tudjman, Bosnian President Izetbegovic sign cease-fire agreement; continued Muslim-Croat clashes reported in Bosnia ... Krajina Serbs, Croatian Government say they will halt fighting ... Croatian plane downed by Krajina Serbs ... Rebelling Serbian soldiers in Banja Luka demand new elections, resignation of Bosnian Serb government.

DIPLOMATIC

TUDJMAN, IZETBEGOVIC AGREE ON CEASE-FIRE (Sarajevo Radio): Croatian President Tudjman, Bosnian President Izetbegovic agree on end to Muslim-Croat fighting, closure of all prison camps. Izetbegovic says agreement not connected to negotiations to split Bosnia into three ethnic republics. Tudjman "certain" that Bosnian Croat leader Boban, who was not present at the talks between the two presidents, would respect the provisions of the agreement. (AU1409201493)

MILITARY

CONTINUED MUSLIM-CROAT CLASHES: Zagreb Radio claims Muslim forces killed 30 civilians and 12 soldiers in town near Prozor, while Sarajevo Radio accuses Bosnian Croats of launching artillery attack on Mostar, leaving 10 dead and several dozen wounded. (LD1509115493, LD1409230193)

SERBS, CROATS ACCEPT CEASE-FIRE (TANJUG): Krajina Serbs agree to accept UNPROFOR proposal to end recent upsurge of clashes with Croatian Army provided Croats withdraw from territory captured on 9 September. Croatian Foreign Minister Granic accepts cease-fire proposal, calls for resumption of peace talks. (LD1409210493, LD1409205893)

CROATIAN PLANE DOWNED BY SERBS: TANJUG reports Krajina Serb forces shot down Croatian MiG 21 that had "bombed civilian targets in Kordun." Croatian Defense Ministry statement, broadcast by Zagreb Radio, admits plane "did not return from its task" but claims fighter was used to "protect the innocent population" from Serbian attacks. (LD1409151593, LD1409204093)

POLITICAL

BANJA LUKA SERBS DEMAND NEW LEADERS (TANJUG): Rebellious Serbian soldiers who continue to blockade Banja Luka demand new elections to Bosnian Serb assembly, replacement of Bosnian Serb leadership, in order to end corruption, "improve material position of soldiers." (LD1409122193)

Izetbegovic, Tudjman Discuss Joint Declaration

LD1409195293 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 14 Sep 93

[Interview with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency President Alija Izetbegovic by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Tudjman] President of the Presidency Izetbegovic and I signed a joint declaration in the presence of members of our delegations. Those who took part in the signing, on the Croatian side: Sarinic [advisor in Tudjman's office]; Zuzul [Croatian ambassador to the United Nations mission in Geneva]; Matic [Tudjman's foreign policy advisor] and Biscevic [Croatian ambassador to Turkey]. On the Bosnia-Herzegovina side: Foreign Minister Silajdzic; Ganic [member of the Presidency]; Muhamed Filipovic [advisor to Izetbegovic] and Ivo Komsic [president of the Croatian Peasant Party in Bosnia-Herzegovina].

We agreed that both presidents would take immediate steps to end the hostilities, to free all detainees, to secure unhindered humanitarian steps and, in general, to resolve all foreign policy issues between the Croats and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to create prerequisites for lasting cooperation between the Republic of Croatia and the union of Bosnia-Herzegovina and, within Bosnia-Herzegovina, between the Bosnian Muslim republic and the Croat republic.

In other words, this is an agreement which should contribute toward efforts to find a definite solution to ending the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and to install its system [as received].

Both Izetbegovic and I have appointed personal envoys who will be responsible for the implementation of the agreement. On the Croatian side these are: Dr. Granic, deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, and on the Bosnia side Dr. Silajdzic. In our view, the agreement will remove all that was in the way of settling the unresolved issues between the Croats and Muslims, and will put an end to all the controversial issues. Some open issues still remain but they will be tackled within the framework of joint working groups.

[Correspondent] Mr. Izetbegovic, does this mean a cease-fire between the Croats and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, or, rather, can you please make a statement.

[Izetbegovic] You have asked the right question. Our main motive for signing the agreement and the declaration, and the fact that this proceeded fairly quickly, and, as you can see, very efficiently—we needed only two or three hours to reach agreement—was the desire to end this unfortunate conflict. I hope that this will be done. Well now, I would add to what President Tudjman said—I agree with everything that he said—but I would say that a new feature, a new quality in the declaration, is the fact that we have envisaged mechanisms for its implementation. These are to set up a whole series of bodies in addition to what President Tudjman mentioned, i.e. appointing our envoys, a whole series of bodies, including the involvement of international elements in implementing the declaration. I think that this time our agreement will be successful, and although on all previous occasions our intention was to have the agreement implemented, there were sometimes insurmountable obstacles from some people or factors that were not in favor of such agreements. This time I think that we are both determined—or at least I am determined—to have such obstacles removed and to have this conflict, this senseless conflict eliminated.

[Correspondent] Have you set deadlines for peace, and what are the implications for the Geneva conference?

[Izetbegovic] The Geneva conference dealt with a different issue. It dealt with the constitutional system in Bosnia-Herzegovina, while this refers to the sphere of relations, or primarily on the need to remove tensions, conflicting situations, in the part that refers to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and between the Bosnian and Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Talks on the constitutional system will continue. This declaration does not resolve this issue nor was the issue the subject of the declaration.

[Tudjman] Our agreement is undoubtedly a prerequisite for ending the Geneva conference.

[Izetbegovic] For the successful outcome.

[Correspondent] And for a general solution?

[Tudjman] Yes. We have set deadlines by which steps should be taken: The cease-fire and the closure of the camps.

[Izetbegovic] Details of the deadlines and other points can be found in the text of the declaration, the text of which we have prepared for you.

Banja Luka Rebels Expect Meeting With Karadzic

LD1509093293 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0838 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Text] Banja Luka, 15 Sep (TANJUG)—The crisis headquarters of the "September 93" action issued a statement this morning saying that "a meeting took place between representatives of the crisis headquarters and president of the republic of Srpska Radovan Karadzic at which they agreed to have talks today".

The statement goes on to say that the time and place for the talks will be "chosen by President Karadzic."

The statement also says that "all institutions, schools, and work organizations in Banja Luka are working normally."

The crisis headquarters at the same time denies all reports that "there is a blockade of normal work activities in the town of Banja Luka."

The crisis headquarters is of the opinion that "public statements by Serbian Radical Party Chairman Vojislav Seselj are lamentable and highly reprehensible. In his public statement yesterday Seselj presented a series of untrue facts about developments in Banja Luka."

The statement particularly denies the allegation that this action is connected with any political party.

"To put it mildly, Seselj's statement lacks the seriousness expected from the chairman of such a reputable party. We think Seselj's sudden change of heart is due to the arrest of the confirmed war profiteer Pantelija Damnjanovic, who is vice-chairman of the Serbian Radical Party in the republic of Srpska," the crisis headquarters says in its statement.

Rebels Demand Replacement of Bosnian Serb Leaders

LD1409122193 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1118 GMT 14 Sep 93

[Text] Banja Luka, 14 Sep (TANJUG)—At today's news conference, the crisis headquarters of the "September 93" operation in Banja Luka put out a somewhat altered list of demands of the authorities.

The most significant one relates to the organization of elections ahead of schedule, and it was explained that the current "deputies are not worthy of carrying out their duties as deputies." It was said that some of them have too many accumulated functions—as deputies, executive officers, and others—and they have used all of these to benefit and enrich themselves.

The other important demand is for the replacement of the whole government and most of the executive committees of the municipalities, especially the Banja Luka municipality. Honesty and professionalism is required of all of them.

There is a special group of tasks which relates to the resolution of obligations toward the army—improving the material position of soldiers and relations between those on active service and those in the reserves, pensioning off some officers, and securing food and equipment.

The institution of criminal proceedings against all profiteers and criminals is requested, and the demand is made to institute urgent proceedings against people who are already under suspicion.

Guarantees are sought from the president of the republic of Srpska, the commander in chief of the army, the speaker of the National Assembly, and from the prime minister of the republic of Srpska, for the carrying out of all the tasks.

Speaking to journalists, the crisis headquarters announced that the Djukic gasoline station in Banja Luka has been handed back to Energopetrol because this enterprise, it was said, has 100 fighters at the front and Momo Djukic, the lease-holder of the gasoline station, owes 130,000 marks in rent.

Muslims Reportedly Kill 42 in Village Near Prozor

LD1509115493 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 15 Aug 93

[Report by Zdenko Vranjes from Mostar for Croatian radio]

[Excerpt] A day of mourning has been proclaimed today in the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna because of the tragedy which took place yesterday morning, when Muslim forces committed a horrendous crime against Croatian civilians in the village of Uzdol, east of Prozor. According to the latest reports, 30 civilians and 12 members of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] were killed in the village. It is feared that this figure is not final because there are probably more dead civilians in burned down houses. [passage omitted]

Muslims Launch Fierce Attack on HVO Units

LD1509105493 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Text] At 0640 this morning, the Muslim army began an artillery and infantry attack on Novi Travnik, the Herzeg Bosna news agency has reported. The village of Zubici and the Rastovci relay have come under particularly fierce attack.

Yesterday's fierce Muslim attacks on Croatian Defense Council [HVO] units in the Zepce and Maglaj battlefields, which started three days ago, were repelled late last night. Fifteen Muslim soldiers were killed while three others were wounded. In heavy fighting, Muslims used all weapons at their disposal, even poisonous gas. They destroyed the entire Croat village of Custo Brdo with shells. The defense positions on the Zepce battlefield remained unchanged. One defender was killed and two others wounded in the fighting yesterday.

This morning, Muslims engaged in sporadic provocations opening fire from mortars, heavy machineguns, and infantry weapons.

Mostar Shelled, General Alarm Sounded in Sarajevo

AU1409203793

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1700 GMT on 14 September, in its regular 50-minute newscast, carries several reports on the situation in the Republic.

A studio announcer says that "this morning the forces of the Croatian Defense Council and the Croatian Army attempted a new infantry assault on Mostar, that is, a breakthrough in the Aleksa Santic Street. In an energetic action by the fighters of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, this attack was repulsed. During the morning, the aggressor's forces used tanks and mortars to shell the regions of Blagaj, Malo Polje, and Kosor. Several shells also fell in the region of Potok."

In his report from Olovo, Valid Dzindo says that "today again, the aggressor's tanks, mortars, and howitzers fiercely attacked the free Olovo territory and the center of the commune. Destructive projectiles that arrived from the directions of Arapovci, Pridvorice, and (Krscan Vrh) have caused a real wasteland in some parts of the broader town region. The situation was infernal also along the front lines, particularly in the sectors of Oloski Luk and (Kusevo) which were subjected to the occupiers' artillery and tank fire for several hours."

The studio announcer says that "there was no peace in the Sarajevo battlefield either. The aggressor opened most fierce fire at Vis, (Ingerici), Zabrdje, and Sokolje. Heavy artillery projectiles from recoilless guns, howitzers, mortars, and antiaircraft guns launched from Rajlovac, Dvor, and Sukovo were falling on the city. The aggressor was opening fire from infantry weapons at almost all defense lines and the city itself." An unidentified correspondent reading a report by the Press Service of the 1st Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina says that "the Serbo-Montenegrin aggressor has violated the truce again. He launched two 82-mm mortar bombs from Brezovaca at our positions at (Isnik). These two bombs fell closer to a French battalion transporter than the positions of the fighters of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, so one wonders who they were intended for."

Further on in the newscast, the studio announcer says that "while you were listening to our latest report, we received the report that due to Stari Grad being shelled, a general danger alarm is in force in Sarajevo."

Croats Reportedly Launch Attack on Eastern Mostar

LD1409230193 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2200 GMT 14 Sep 93

[Excerpt] At least 10 dead and several dozen injured civiliams is the first result of a criminal attack by Croatian Defense Council [HVO] formations and the Croatian Army. Tonight, between 2000 and 2100 their multiple rocket launchers and other artillery pieces were destroying the eastern part of the town of Mostar. The city was ablaze. It is feared that a number of casualties are still buried under the ruins.

This was in all probability the response of the HVO and Croatian Army to the declaration signed today in Geneva between Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman. [passage omitted]

Escalation of Fighting Reported in Brcko, Gradacac

AU1509085893

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 0800 GMT on 15 September carries in its regular 13-minute newscast the following reports on the fighting in the Republic.

An unidentified correspondent reports on an extremely poor line from the 3d Corps Press Center and says that "the fighting has intensified in the 3d Corps zone of responsibility, particularly on the Gornji Vakuf and Zavidovici fronts." He says further on that "[words indistinct] attempted to break through our defense lines with combined artillery-infantry attacks. However, our defenders launched a counterattack causing the enemy heavy losses in manpower and hardware." He adds that "more intense Chetnik activity and their regrouping is the main characteristic of the Visoko-Breza front."

Brcko correspondent Hamiz Deronjic reports that "the aggressor supported his (?intense) fire against all of the defenders' positions with the sporadic use of mortars, while strong artillery strikes were launched overnight against Bukovac, Kladje, and Dzukic."

The correspondent from the Gradacac Press Center reports that "the fighting is escalating on the Gradacac front. Yesterday, the entire western part of the front came under [words indistinct] and 82-mm mortar fire, particularly Medjedja Gornja and Zelinja Srednja." He adds that "there are constant small arms' provocations, but our defenders are holding their positions and are not responding to the aggressor's provocations."

Attacks on Maglaj, Jablanica Reported

AU1409154693

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1300 GMT on 14 September within its regular 45-minute newscast carries several reports on the situation in the Republic.

Correspondent from Maglaj, Hajrudin Sermic, reports that "attacks on Maglaj by joint aggressor are not stopping. On the contrary, they are gaining in intensity by the hour." Sermic says that "the fighters of the (?201st) Mountain Brigade of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina are resolutely rejecting these attacks" which are "coordinated with the support of tanks, howitzers, guns, mortars of all calibers, pragas, antiaircraft machine-guns, and antiaircraft guns operating from all directions."

In his report from Gornji Vakuf, Correspondent (?Adzip Agic) says that "a powerful artillery attack at the broad region of Gornji Vakuf begun (?this morning). (?Guns), howitzers, and mortars and [word indistinct] of the

Croatian Army and the Croatian Defense Council were simply competing in sending larger quantities of these destructive projectiles."

Haldo Dervisbegovic says that "Jablanica was attacked today again. At 0910 this morning, aggressors of the Croatian Defense Council used long-range guns and projectiles of the great destructive power and commenced their game of death. They are destroying, killing, and mutilating again. This morning, they (?ruined) three housing buildings. Huge material damage has been caused."

Brcko Correspondent Hamiz Deronjic reports about "Serbian long-range artillery fiercely shelling the free Brcko territory" and adds that "at 1005, the Serbian aggressor used the 155-mm howitzers to pound civilian targets on the free Brcko territory. One woman has been killed and three people wounded. Explosions by the large projectiles have caused huge material damage."

Boban Responds to Tudjman Letter on Human Rights

LD1409130993 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 14 Sep 93

[Text] Mate Boban, president of the Croat republic of Herceg Bosna, has sent a letter to Republic of Croatia President Franjo Tudjman which stresses:

Your letter, in which you drew attention to my responsibility and to the responsibility of all the bodies of the Croat republic of Herceg Bosna at this crucial juncture for the survival and future of the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in which you powerfully appealed that in our tasks we should be guided by respect for human dignity, basic human values and rights, and the strictest application of international wartime and humanitarian law, is a new stimulus for our conscientious work on mitigating the suffering of innocent people and each individual, a suffering which is the consequence of Serb and Muslim aggression against the Croatian people and their rights in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The horrible war that has been imposed on us has made it possible for individuals to be responsible for the violation of these principles, and I can assure you that all the perpetrators have either been or will be punished.

Your letter has been accepted at all levels as particularly promoting responsible behavior among the Croatian people, its officials and soldiers. We have defined duties for every Croatian man, woman, and institution in the Croat republic of Herceg Bosna and have decided to do, or have already done, the following:

As always before, we will wage a war of defense; we will strictly abide by international war and humanitarian law; we will immediately secure humane treatment of POW's in POW camps in accordance with international humanitarian laws and Geneva conventions; we will allow ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross] and all international media free access to POW's and will release POW's for whom we have already given guarantees to the ICRC; we will secure and, as a permanent process, agree on the unhindered and unconditional passage of humanitarian aid on the entire territory of the Croat republic of Herceg Bosna; and, as before, we will not obstruct the implementation of the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] mandate.

We have also ordered all HVO [Croatian Defense Council] units to strictly observe all these decisions and warned them of the consequences if they act in contravention of these decisions.

A department for human rights and humanitarian issues has been set up within the president's office, and the head of the department is responsible for the implementation of these principles in the Croat republic of Herceg Bosna, the letter from Mate Boban, president of the Croat republic of Herceg Bosna, to Croatian President Franjo Tudjman says.

U.S. Ambassador Visits Blockaded Town

AU1409172293 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 14 Sep 93

[Text] Victor Jackovich, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, is visiting Zenica today. Here is a report by Mujo Delibegovic:

[Begin Delibegovic recording] During his visit to the free territory of Zenica, the U.S. ambassador held talks with regional and community representatives who told him in detail about the situation in the region. Zenica Major (Besim Spahic) said the current situation in Zenica was very difficult and stressed that there is no production; that they have been under a total blockade for more than six months and the 400 tonnes of food the commune has [word indistinct] received amounts to less than 8 percent of its needs. (Spahic) asked the U.S. ambassador for help from the air, that is, by airdrop operations, and also asked him to inform President Clinton, the U.S. Administration, and the public about the extremely difficult position in which about 180,000 citizens and 40,000 refugees find themselves. The Zenica Mayor also informed Mr. Jackovich that Serbs and Croats are still living in Zenica, that their numbers are unchanged, and that they participate in the community government.

Ambassador Jackovich carefully listened to his hosts and pointed out that he had come to get acquainted with the situation in central Bosnia and (?probably) in Tuzla region and stressed that the United States is ready to help to put a stop to the war, to help with the humanitarian crisis, and help find a solution that would satisfy all three sides, particularly the Bosnian Government and state. Mr.Jackovich [word indistinct] such a U.S. stand with the fact that for his country the Bosnian Government and Bosnian state are legal entities that the entire world has recognized, and that this is the best comeback to all those who see in this position some kind of U.S. bias.

After the talks, U.S. ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina's program includes a visit to the Zenica Steelworks and one of the reception centers for refugees and expellees. [end recording]

Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev Arrives in Sarajevo

AU1509091893 Paris AFP in English 0904 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Text] Sarajevo, Sept 15 (AFP)—Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev arrived in the besieged Bosnian capital Sarajevo on Wednesday [15 September], a U.N. Protection Force spokesman said.

Kozyrev arrived here shortly after 10:00 a.m. (0800 GMT) and immediately headed for the Bosnian presidency building, said Major Idesbald van Biesebroeck.

TANJUG Says Izetbegovic Wants Islamic Peacekeepers

LD1509103693 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0917 GMT 15 Sep 93

["Pool" item—By Nevenka Jovicic]

[Text] Belgrade, Sept 15 (TANJUG)—The nearing of the moment for signing an agreement on peace in the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina has forced Bosnian Moslem leader Alija Izetbegovic, who has so far consistently blocked the Geneva peace process, to ask his Islamic friends to send troops to maintain peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

During his visit to Saudi Arabia, Iran and Kuwait over the past few days, Izetbegovic played his remaining card in his feverish struggle to "preserve" Bosnia-Herzegovina as the first Islamic and fundamentalist country in the Balkans.

Although not announced officially, it has been learnt that Izetbegovic requested his Islamic friends in Riyadh, Tehran and Kuwait to obtain from the United Nations the green light to send their troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina to maintain peace there after the signing of an agreement on the creation of a union of three ethnic states—Moslem, Serb and Croat.

The proposal is not a new one. The Islamic countries, and especially the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), have so far criticized the U.N. for its allegedly lenient policy towards Bosnia-Herzegovina and demanded its direct involvement in the military operations there.

Izetbegovic has so far approved such initiatives, always pointing out that he would prefer a military intervention by Western countries or the U.S., in the form of air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions.

The countries which were the most interested for sending the Mojahedin to Bosnia-Herzegovina were those recently toured by Izetbegovic—Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, plus Pakistan to which he previously visited.

These countries granted Izetbegovic most of the funds for buying arms for the Bosnian Moslems. And for organizing anti-Serb and anti-Yugoslav propaganda which contributed to creating in the world a wrong image of the war, alleged threat to Moslems in Bosnia-Herzegovina and escalation of the conflict which has taken the toll of thousands of victims.

Of the seven thousand Mojahedin from these countries, fighting alongside the Bosnian Moslems, most of them are from Pakistan.

It was Pakistan, a non-permanent member of the Security Council, which has recently officially demanded from the U.N. that troops from Islamic countries be included in the peace troops for maintaining peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

At the end of Izetbegovic's visit to Tehran, Iranian President Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani said that Iran was ready at any moment to send its troops to maintain peace in Bosnia. He explained this as a wish of Islamic countries to help the U.N. which is having problems in financing peace operations.

The world powers, especially those from Europe—Great Britain and France—have so far firmly resisted such offers by Islamic countries.

The U.S. has not officially reacted to the offer, but has clearly announced it would prefer that peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina be monitored by NATO.

The zeal of U.S. and Islamic countries in the schemes concerning the composition, authority and number of U.N. troops which Butrus- Ghali and the United Nations believe should maintain peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina after an agreement is signed, points out that in question is something more than their concern for the destiny of the peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The question of maintaining peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina has obviously turned out into a great race for capturing strategic positions in the sizzling Balkans.

Serbs To Observe Cease-Fire if Croats Withdraw

LD1409210493 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1958 GMT 14 Sep 93

[Text] Knin, 14 Sep (TANJUG)—The main headquarters of the Serb army of Krajina announced this evening that the Serbian side has proclaimed an absolute cease-fire which will last until 2000 tomorrow, 15 September, on condition that Croatian military formations withdraw from the territory captured on 9 September.

According to a statement, Croatia must withdraw its troops between 0900 and 1800; the Serbian side promises that it will not impede the withdrawal operation.

By taking this step, after several proposals and initiatives from the United Nations and UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces], the Serbian side stresses that it wants to show its good will and desire to solve the conflict with the Croatian side by peaceful means.

By deciding to order a cease-fire, Krajina has also assumed the obligation that its forces will refrain from combat activities in the wider area if the Croatian Army stops its provocations.

This agreement enables UNPROFOR immediately to enter the temporarily occupied areas of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK], to facilitate the work of humanitarian organizations, and to protect the territory and the population.

"We will allow freedom of movement to UN forces at a minimum of 10 km away from both sides of the border—that is, from the line of separation between the warring sides [as received]," the statement stresses. It adds that on this occasion once again Krajina clearly indicates that it is ready for and open to further UN and UNPROFOR-mediated negotiations on a permanent cease-fire.

Croats Accept Cease-Fire

LD1409205893 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1826 GMT 14 Sep 93

[Text] Zagreb, Sept 14 (TANJUG)—Croatia accepted on Tuesday afternoon [14 September] a proposal by the commander of the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia, French General Jean Cot, on a cease-fire with the Republic of Serb Krajina (R.S.K.), Croatian Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Mate Granic said on Tuesday.

Last Thursday, Croatia launched a fresh offensive against the R.S.K., which has been under U.N. protection since March 1992. Although Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, under international pressure, on Monday ordered his troops to cease fire, the Croatian Army continued attacks on the R.S.K.

Granic said that immediately after a cease-fire was installed, negotiations on an integral agreement to end hostilities should be opened and the U.N.-sponsored talks resumed towards drafting a resolution to 'determine a new UNPROFOR mandate separately for Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia.'

Croatia had already submitted such a proposal, but it was turned down by U.N. Secretary-General Butrus Butrus-Ghali.

Granic underlined that Croatia was not satisfied with the UNPROFOR, whose mandate is expiring towards the end of September.

According to the plan by U.N. mediator Cyrus Vance, the UNPROFOR was supposed to protect the Serb people in the R.S.K. until a peaceful solution was reached for the conflict between Serbs and Croats. The Croatian side, however, expected help from the UNPROFOR in establishing its authority in the Serb Krajina.

The Republic of Serb Krajina was formed in 1991 in Serb-populated parts of the former Yugoslav Republic of Croatia, in protest to the Croatia's forcible secession from the ex-Yugoslav Federation and its attempt to reduce the status of the Serb people to that of a national minority.

Kozyrev Urges Croats, Krajina Serbs To Resume Talks

LD1409224493 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2135 GMT 14 Sep 93

[Text] Belgrade, Sept 14 (TANJUG)—Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, who is visiting Croatia, on Tuesday [14 September] invited Croatian authorities and Krajina Serbs to immediately end hostilities and resume talks, REUTERS said.

Croatia launched an offensive on the U.N.-protected republic of Serb Krajina (R.S.K.) on Thursday, its fourth since the signing of an internationally brokered ceasefire, capturing the Serb villages of Citluk, Divoselo and Pocitelj.

Speaking at a press conference after a meeting with Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic in Zagreb, Kozyrev said that both sides had a duty to end the fighting and allow the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) into the disputed areas.

'Croatia has agreed to place the three villages it captured last week under U.N. control', said Kozyrev.

He explained he had asked Zagreb to exercise restraint and implement different patterns of behaviour—viz. negotiation, otherwise the situation would deteriorate.

'We respect the territorial integrity of Croatia but we insist that human and minority rights be guaranteed', Kozyrev added.

The R.S.K. was proclaimed within the arbitrary communist-era borders of Croatia in 1991, in response to

Croatia's violent secession from Yugoslavia and attempt to downgrade its Serbs, until then a full nation, to an ethnic minority.

Tudjman Meets Kozyrev, Qian Qichen

LD1409214493 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 14 Sep 93

[Text] Republic of Croatia President Franjo Tudjman has just received Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev in the Presidential Palace in Zagreb.

The main topic of their discussion is expected to be the peace efforts and the reintegration of Croatia's occupied areas, as well as the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina after our President Franjo Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovic signed in Geneva today the declaration on solving certain issues vital for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Before this meeting President Tudjman received Chinese Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, who is staying in Croatia for two days at the invitation of his counterpart and host Mate Granic. This visit reflects the continuity of relations between Croatia and China, which were discussed at the meeting between President Tudjman and Qian Qichen. Of course, the unavoidable topic was again the crisis in the former Yugoslavia and possibilities of solving it.

Valentic Meets With China's Qian Qichen

LD1509101993 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Text] The People's Republic of China respects the will of the Croatian people and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia, Qian Qichen, Chinese vice premier and foreign minister, said when he was received this morning by Croatian Prime Minister Nikica Valentic.

Valentic informed his guest about the development of economic relations, which makes China one of Croatia's most important partners. He also expressed the conviction that these relations will be further developed.

China particularly appreciates Croatia's observance of the principles and declarations regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations with China, and its support for the sovereignty of the People's Republic of China.

Qian Qichen conveyed to Croatian Prime Minister Nikica Valentic an invitation from Chinese Premier Li Peng to pay a visit to China. The invitation was accepted with pleasure.

Government Sources Confirm Downing of Plane Over RSK

LD1409151593 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1438 GMT 14 Sep 93

[Text] Knin, September 14 (TANJUG)—Croatia on Tuesday [14 September] admitted its MiG 21 plane was downed during a combat mission above the territory of the republic of Serb Krajina (RSK) in the early morning hours.

The plane was shot down at around 7 a.m. local time on Tuesday and the pilot was killed, REUTERS news agency quoted government sources in Zagreb as saying.

The downing of the Croatian fighter plane was first reported by a local RSK radio and later confirmed by the RSK army command, which said that its antiaircraft defence units had shot down the Croatian MiG 21 plane in the area of Vrgin Most (the region of Kordun) at 6.53 a.m. The aircraft, which previously bombed civilian targets in Kordun, the northern part of the RSK, used corridors secured for UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] helicopters flying between Zagreb and Topusko.

The Croatian Army on Thursday launched a new offensive on the RSK territory despite the fact that the region is under the protection of the United Nations. It occupied three Serb villages near Gospic in the region of Lika in Sector South of the U.N. Protected Area (UNPA) and intensified attacks on other parts of the RSK using also its air force.

The RSK was proclaimed in 1991 in areas within the administrative borders of Croatia in which Serbs make up the majority population in response to Croatia's violent secession from the former Yugoslav Federation and an attempt to downgrade the status of the Serbian people to that of an ethnic minority.

The RSK territory has been under the U.N. protection since March last year.

As learned from unofficial but reliable sources, the pilot of the downed plane was Captain Miroslav Peris, pilot of the former Yugoslav Air Force. REUTERS quotes UNPROFOR officials in Zagreb as saying that they knew four Croatian planes had flown over the RSK territory. We have a report showing that three planes returned to their base, the news agency quoted the officials as saying.

Defense Ministry Statement

LD1409204093 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 14 Sep 93

[Text] During the news bulletin, we received a statement from the Political Department of the Republic of Croatia's Defense Ministry.

Unlike today, which can be described as relatively quiet, yesterday was one of the fiercest days of war judging by the frequency of enemy attacks. The enemy was active along the entire battlefront from Sunja, Sisak, Karlovac, Ogulin, and Gospic, to the bigger towns in Dalmatia. While the Croatian Army—as ordered—honored the one-sided cease-fire, the enemy took the opportunity to deploy their forces, reinforced with the First and Second Krajina Corps [Bosnian Serb forces] and parts of the 12th Novi Sad Corps.

The enemy's aim was to advance toward Karlovac and take Turanj, with the final goal being to take the area west of Petrinja. After the period of cease-fire, during which a solution was attempted to be found through peaceful means, the Croatian side resolutely and effectively responded to the enemy's attacks on civilian targets. The enemy suffered great losses, a large number of their soldiers and military equipment were neutralized, and a lot of artillery equipment—several tanks and armored vehicles—were destroyed. One Orkan multiple rocket launcher was destroyed as well as an important communication center, several fortified positions, and the Vasil Gacesa barracks in Petrinja.

Because of the enemy's attacks with Luna and Orkan missile systems on villages and towns, which resulted in civilian casualties, the Croatian Army decided to destroy the enemy in their strongholds in order to protect the innocent population. Unfortunately, one of the Croatian Army planes did not return from the task. Following an effective response by the Croatian Army, the enemy's attacks subsided as early as yesterday afternoon, and had almost stopped by the evening.

Although it has been relatively quiet today, the Croatian Army remains on high alert and in a state of combat readiness. This is said in the statement from the Political Department of the Republic of Croatia's Defense Ministry.

Serbs Claim Croats Still Attacking Krajina Region

AU1409192093 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 14 Sep 93

[Report by Radmila Kablar from Krajina]

[Text] The attacks by the Croatian Army launched last night are still going on in most parts of the north Dalmatian front. The Croatian artillery is attacking Serbian villages with multiple rocket launchers, howitzers, tanks, and mortars. More than 100 shells landed on the villages in the Skradin hinterland alone.

Serbian villages in the Drnis region also came under attack. The Croatian artillery also targeted the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] post in the village of Miranje near Benkovac. The Obrovac region was again attacked. This afternoon, at about 1500, the Croatian artillery renewed its attacks on the villages of Smilcic and Biljane Gornje near Benkovac. These attacks are still going on. There is no information on casualties yet.

The Croatian Army is not stopping attacks on the Lika front. Its intention is to retain the captured villages of Divoselo and Citluk. After being reinforced, the units of the Serbian army of Krajina, as stated by the general staff, are in control of the terrain and plan to liberate the captured villages of Dovosleo and Citluk.

Krajina Serb Official Asks FRY for Help

AU1509102793 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 14 Sep 93 p 1

[Report by S.R., D.M.: "Krajina Calls for Help"]

[Text] Knin—At a time when the Serbian people in the republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK] are forced to fight for their survival, we, the people's representatives, appeal to you to actively involve yourselves in the defense of our endangered existence. This is stated in the RSK Prime Minister Djorje Bjegovic's letter to Zoran Lilic, President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; Slobodan Milosevic, President of Serbia; and Momir Bulatovic, President of Montenegro.

The letter goes on to say that Croatia—with the blessing of the international community and its passivity— has violated the Vance plan on several occasions. However, it also expresses "surprise at the similar passivity present in the policy of the FRY, Serbia, and Montenegro."

We wish to remind you of the commitment the FRY made when it signed the Vance plan. It vowed to defend the endangered Serbian people in the RSK from aggression perpetrated by Croatia. Furthermore, states the letter, we are aware that the position of the FRY, Serbia, and Montenegro is exceptionally difficult owing to international sanctions, but, on the other hand, we are faced with an aggression which could call into question the survival of the Serbian people in the Krajina.

Court Sentences Former Yugoslav Army Officers

LD1409224693 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 14 Sep 93

[Text] [Announcer] Sentences were passed in Split today on a group of officers from the former Yugoslav Army who were responsible for attacks on Split, Kastela, Ploce, Trogir, Brac, Solta, and Hvar during an aggression by the Serb-Montenegrin Army in 1991. Unfortunately only the second accused, Nikola Mladinic, a Major General in the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army], was brought to justice.

[Begin unidentified correspondent's recording] Following the trial that began on 29 July, the Supreme Penal Council of Split District Court today pronounced sentences on Nikola Mladinic, Maj. Gen. in the former Yugoslav Army—the only high-ranking Yugoslav Army officer to be tried—and on another 30 officers of the enemy army who were tried in absentia.

[Presiding judge] Defendant Nikola Mladenic is sentenced to 12 years imprisonment.

[Correspondent] Other defendants were given sentences ranging from seven to 15 years imprisonment but Ensign Ivan Tomajic was acquitted.

The following were sentenced to 15 years imprisonment: Admiral Mile Kandic, commander of the former Naval

District; Rear Admiral Nikola Ercegovic, commander of the former Yugoslav Navy fleet; Dojcilo Isakovic, former commander of Lora [naval base in Split] and the recently appointed commander of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Navy; Ljubisa Beara, head of KOS [Yugoslav counterintelligence]; Zivorad Ninkovic, recently appointed commander of the air force of the so-called republic of Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Ilija Brcic, Dragan Jovin, and Tomislav Stamatovic. They were all sentenced for war crimes against the civilian population and for breaching international laws, by either directly issuing or executing orders to attack central Dalmatian towns and islands at the end of 1991 and the beginning of 1992, where five civilians were killed and 22 were injured and enormous material damage was caused. [end recording]

Vance Plan Said Legalizing Serbian Aggression

93BA1412G Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 17 Aug 93 p 23

[Commentary by Zvonko Lerotic: "End of Vance Plan"]

[Text] After the shelling and crippling of the Maslenica bridge, the Knin Serbs, for the umpteenth time, not only cut off the natural road artery between northern and southern Croatia, but also expressly confirmed that they intend to continue waging a war of conquest against Croatia. In order to wage such a war as long and successfully as possible, they will weaken and destroy the Croatian economic system through armed attacks on the most vital part of Croatia. According to statements by Knin leaders, they will not agree to any serious discussion or negotiations on normalizing economic relations until the Croatian authorities accept the occupied territory as a separate reality outside Croatia.

In contrast to the Greater Serbs in Knin, Croatian politicians maintain that the economic crisis in the UNPAs [UN Protected Areas] is deep-seated and that because of that economic life in the UNPAs will be gradually normalized and the Croatian legal system will be slowly introduced. The fact that the crisis under the Hadzic dictatorship is in fact deep-seated and serious was revealed by the recent event when Serb rebels from the front in the southern sector appeared before the headquarters of the Knin government with tanks, rebelling against their wage of only several German marks, for which they can buy only one or two packs of the better brands of cigarettes.

It is certain that we will increasingly be confronted with criticism like the kind on 16 February of this year, when negotiations with representatives of the Knin Greater Serbs began, from which there have been no positive results to this day. The negotiations in New York and Geneva have even harmed Croatia, many contend, noting that the Serbs succeeded in gaining almost the same status in the negotiations as the Croatian delegation. In addition, they have achieved success in the world media, where the occupied territories in Croatia are not called UNPAs, but simply "Krajina," capitalized and without quotation marks. Nevertheless, it can be responded that the liberation of Maslenica and other regions in Dalmatia has opened up more room for real political talks as well. The talks themselves have managed to lower the intensity of the war and have eliminated the threat of global war.

At the negotiations in Geneva between the Croatian delegation and the Serbs, with the mediation of the deputies of the two Conference cochairmen, one thing became utterly clear. The Croatian delegation is striving for a cease-fire agreement, while the Serbs are strutting about as if they are a state delegation. Since the liberation of Maslenica, the people in Knin have been persistently working on how to genuinely legitimize and impose themselves as a real government, with the help of Geneva and the Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, as well as with the help of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] and the United Nations. It is only in this sense that one can interpret Milosevic's statements about the need "... for Croatia to solve the problem directly with the 'Serbian republic of Krajina'" and that Serbia will not interfere in this. He also uses these words with talking about Karadzic and negotiations between Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. Milosevic wants to achieve real recognition of "Krajina" and is less interested in its formal recognition. But his achievement in this regard is that the international community is beginning to regard Croatia and so-called Krajina on equal terms, and every attack or threat to the territories is subject in advance to economic or political sanctions.

Last week in Geneva saw the epitome of the conflict between the Croatian delegation, which was trying to delegitimize "so-called Krajina," and Hadzic's group, which has used the Conference and the Erdut agreement to present itself as an equal to the Croatian delegation. At the Conference itself, the Croatian delegation proposed discussion of a possible cease-fire agreement. The Knin Serbs were not interested. They stubbornly demanded the implementation of the Erdut agreement. Because of their hard-line stance, the Croatian delegation deemed it unnecessary to meet with them under the patronage of the deputy cochairmen. It was more than obvious that the Serbs view the July agreement as simply a pretext for criticizing and blackmailing the heads of the Geneva conference and as a means of achieving something completely different, which is equal treatment with the Croatian delegation. But they did not have an opportunity for that. Once again, they did not arrive on time. They were half a day or a whole day late. They behave like Russian delegations used to. To the very end, people from the Conference did not know whether or not the Serbs were coming. They simply received a message saying that there is no reason for negotiation until the Erdut agreement is implemented. In this way, they wanted to humiliate the cosigners—the deputies of Owen and Stoltenberg who guaranteed the implementation of that agreement with their signatures. In essence, the Knin Greater Serbs were not interested in resolutions, nor in the Erdut agreement, nor even in the

Conference; they decided to use all this in order to legitimize themselves as much as possible in the eyes of the international public and to achieve equal status with other states in the former Yugoslavia. Everything was completely subordinate to that goal.

It must be said that from the viewpoint of the world media, the process of de facto legitimation of so-called Krajina as some sort of para-state is slowly being advanced through the Conference and through UNPROFOR, amid Milosevic's skillful maneuvering and the poor information and antidefamation strength of Croatian information services.

In the clash between Croatian proposals and Serb goals in Croatia's UNPAs, the Geneva conference has in actuality ceased to treat the Serbs in the occupied areas as a minority. The Conference has yet to open discussion of those resolutions that call for the integration of the UNPAs into Croatian legal territory. As we have said, since February of this year Croatia has tried at the Conference to extricate itself from the trap of Resolution 802, and now it must clear the deep chasm known as the Erdut agreement. The basis for this sort of treatment of Croatia lies in the Vance plan. It placed Serbs in the UNPAs under the protection of Belgrade and the United Nations. In actuality, the Vance plan makes it possible for the Serbs to present themselves as an equal negotiating partner in real relations, not under international law, and lately they have met with increasing success in this regard, ever since UNPROFOR has been under the leadership of people who understand little or nothing about Greater Serb aggression.

It is precisely because of this that the Geneva negotiations are become increasingly difficult in the practical sense and increasingly far-removed from the goals that Croatia faces. Despite preparations, efforts, diplomatic niceties, or political resolve, Croatia under these circumstances is becoming estranged from discussions of resolutions such as 815 and 847, which expressly call for the extension of Croatian authority to the UNPAs. Many people have already raised the question of whether it is not possible to abrogate the Vance plan and replace it with a plan that would define the UNPAs in accordance with Croatia's position as a member of the United Nations. It is not only possible, but also high time that Croatia wrest free of the former SFRY, with which it is still "tied" through the UNPAs and UNPROFOR.

Police Manning Border Near Nuclear Power Plant

AU1509093393 Paris AFP in English 0249 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Text] Ljubljana, Sept 14 (AFP)—Police are on guard along Slovenia's eastern border for fear that the fighting in Croatia could threaten the Krsko nuclear power station, newspapers here have reported.

The government here has said that if the war between Serb secessionists and the Croatian Government were to overspill into Slovenia, the power station would constitute a grave risk.

In the past few days missiles, allegedly fired by the Serbs, have landed in Zagreb, the Croatian capital which lies about 35 kilometres (22 miles) from Krsko, and explosions have been heard in Samobor and Jastrebarski, two Croatian towns in the border region.

The Slovenian director of security for nuclear power stations, Marjan Levstek, has said there is no need to close down the Krsko reactor at the moment. But the authorities did have a contingency plan for the station in case it was bombarded.

The reactor's staff had a hot line to the Slovenian defence ministry, Levstek added.

Defense Minister Questions Kucan Election Funds

LD1309160593 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1440 GMT 13 Sep 93

[Text] Ljubljana, September 13 (TANJUG)—Defence Minister of the former Yugoslav republic of Slovenia Janez Jansa has again criticized President Milan Kucan and openly raised the question of how he had obtained such ample funds for the election campaign.

Former members of the Yugoslav and Slovenian communist party central committees are now acquiring Slovenia's major firms, banks, insurance companies, casinos, media houses etc., said Jansa, the leader of Slovenia's Social Democrats, at a party convention in Begunje.

Before Yugoslavia's disintegration, Kucan was member of the innermost communist party leadership of Slovenia and former Yugoslavia.

Earlier this month, the president and defence minister exchanged mutual accusations of involvement in large-scale smuggling of arms intended for the former Yugoslav republic of Croatia and for Moslems and Croats in war-battered Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Jansa said communists had occupied posts in all administrative organs in Slovenia - government, ministries, judiciary, media, diplomacy, inspection bodies etc. 'Old connections are being used for new deals,' he said.

Jansa urged that Slovenian workers be protected because, in his opinion, they have been deprived of their rights and cheated in the process of Slovenia's economic transformation. He also insisted that Slovenian economy be protected from being sold out to foreigners and stressed the need for Slovenia's admittance to NATO.

China Promises To Support Lifting of UN Arms Embargo

AU1309153093 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 13 Sep 93

[Report by Blanka Dobersek]

[Text] What did an official visit by a Chinese politician, the highest Chinese politician in our country so far, bring behind all the procedural splendor? Primarily, an agreement and protocol in the foreign affairs' sphere, a cultural cooperation agreement, and two economic relations agreements.

In the opinion of the Chinese guest the agreements represent a legal basis for further development of friendly economic and political relations. Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen said in a brief statement following the signing of the documents that both sides can be optimistic regarding future economic cooperation. Slovene Foreign Minister Lojze Peterle added that the formalization will be followed by concrete steps. We hope that this will actually be the case.

The Chinese have already offered to Slovenia 210 economic projects—that this Asian giant wishes to carry out over the next 10 years. In the opinion of the Chinese, there is also a place for Slovene companies and businessmen in their realization. There is another thing that should be pointed out. The two nations, particularly during the talks between Qian Qichen and President Kucan, agreed on closer cooperation within the United Nations so that Slovenia could achieve lifting of the arms embargo with the support of China. China has promised this, just as it has announced greater Chinese Red Cross and government assistance to Bosnia-Herzegovina refugees in Slovenia. This is extremely important now that West European supplies are diminishing.

The Chinese guest and his partners spoke a lot about the situation in this part of the world. Here Qichen stressed that the Chinese believe Slovenia is a stable Central European state, the only one from the territory of former Yugoslavia that has obtained its independence in a peaceful manner.

When the Chinese guest emphasized that Bosnia-Herzegovina is a sovereign country and a UN member, it was also clearly stated that the Chinese side favors peaceful resolution of the conflict and does not support a policy of faits accomplis by force.

Despite tensions in the nearby Croatia—due to which the Chinese delegation was not quite sure, last night, whether it would be travelling to Zagreb the next day—it

was nevertheless decided today that Qian Qichen will conclude his East and Central European tour with our southern neighbor.

Troop Deployment Strains Relations With Italy

93BA1398B Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 14 Aug 93 p 3

[Article by Mojca Drcar-Murko: "Against the 'Helsinki Spirit'"]

[Text] What is the decision to deploy several hundred Italian mountain troops and members of motorized units at the border crossings with Slovenia (and Croatia, officially at the border with "the former Yugoslavia"), where they are to reinforce police units with the intention of preventing "Serbian terrorist threats": a legitimate act of self-defense, or a disturbing sign of a lack of cooperation and a two-faced game against Slovenia?

In support of the former, one can state that Italy—admittedly against its own will—is among the first to participate in preparing for a possible NATO air strike against Serbian positions in Bosnia; if they do, the U.S. F-14 and F-16 aircraft will take off from the base in Friulia. From the outcomes of the use of naked violence that have been favorable for the Serbs to date, the half-crazy Karadzic is threatening Italy with medium-range missiles with nuclear warheads (he will buy them in the international market), and that threat is not even very funny, because of the not very clear role of Russia, a Serbian sympathizer.

These, of course, are all logical reasons. Unfortunately, there are many more that are at least illogical, if not deliberately uncooperative. Let us start with the statement by Defense Minister Fabbri: "The capture of weapons and explosives and the arrests of some suspicious people who tried in recent days to enter Italy from Austria and Slovenia are the reasons why we must not underestimate this crucial moment in the development of the Bosnian crisis." The suspicious individuals thus entered from Austria, in addition to Slovenia; why isn't Italy also stationing its army at the Austrian border, or the French one, where there is virtually no control? Why not at the Swiss border, where arms dealers are also passing through? Why only at the Slovene border?

Another element: "The Republic of Slovenia's full cooperation in oversight of the border obviously cannot guarantee us security against terrorists," Fabbri said. If Slovenia, even in Fabbri's opinion, has shown indisputable willingness for stricter control of the border crossings, among other things for the sake of its own security, why, during the days before yesterday's decision to deploy the soldiers, was there no crisis meeting at the level of the Italian and Slovene interior ministers at which things could have been settled through agreements, as is customary between good neighbors and as was possible with respect to drug trafficking? Why does the Slovene government have to learn about the measure from the newspapers? In light of the fact that there was no communication at all, the legitimate defense measure becomes at least improper with respect to the "Helsinki spirit" of good-neighborly relations, if not something even more serious.

The current Italian government of Prime Minister Ciampi has adopted the theory developed by the Foreign Ministry that the recognition of Slovenia was a bad mistake. A "gravissimo errore," Ciampi's press representative said about the recognition recently in a conversation with one of the foreign correspondents in Rome (the assessment probably has to do with the fact that in exchange for recognition, Italy did not get everything that it is demanding in connection with the restoration of the optant's property and the minority's position). If there was a "gravissimo errore," it thus in principle becomes permissible to do everything to "correct" the mistake, even an attempt to interfere with the full de facto international recognition of Slovenia. That can be done through interventions in international headquarters, as has already happened and will again, and also by ruining the image of Slovenia's independence; if it is possible to affect tourism at the same time, so much the better. With the army on the other side of the western border, Slovenia has been pushed back into the state from which it extricated itself with such difficulties, as during the time of the Iron Curtain.

We can only recommend to our diplomats extreme caution and an immediate response, on the international scene as well. The magazine NEUE ZURCHER ZEITUNG, in a response to a certain article about the spring phase of Italian-Slovene relations, received angry letters from readers with the common thought "the typical Italians once again; they are always taking on the little ones." In addition to the interesting news that Switzerland also feels little and is angry when a big guy harasses a little one, a serious warning, proven by history, is also concealed in this. Italy really does have the reputation of being servile toward the large and aggressive toward the little, but today the little ones are nevertheless not as much without possibilities and a defense. One only has to know how things stand, and prepare appropriately, in terms of strategy and personnel, for a period of a very stormy neighboring sea.

Federal

Government Denounces Croatian Attacks on Krajina

LD1409163593 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1442 GMT 14 Sep 93

[Text] Belgrade, 14 Sep (TANJUG)—The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] stated today that it most vehemently condemns the latest aggression against the republic of Serb Krajina.

In a statement issued in connection with Croatian attacks on the Republic of Serb Krajina, the FRY Government expresses hope that the Croatian side will understand that it is also in its interest to stop the attacks and will withdraw from the occupied territories.

The text of the statement says:

The FRY Government most vehemently condemns the latest aggression by Croatia against the republic of Serb Krajina, i.e. the zones under UN protection, the occupation of villages, the killing of innocent civilians, and the huge material damage done to these areas. This attack represents not only an act of aggression, but also a violation of the Erdut agreement and of an agreement reached in Geneva on the peaceful settlement of problems in areas under UN protection. It also contravenes the Vance plan and UN Security Council resolutions 802 and 847.

Although Croatian President Dr Franjo Tudjman has issued a cease-fire order, the situation in the field shows that attacks are continuing, even coming from the regular Croatian units against the republic of Serb Krajina, i.e. the zones under UN protection.

The FRY Government lays stress on the efforts being invested by the army of the republic of Serb Krajina to refrain from opening fire, in compliance with the cease-fire agreement, i.e. its resolve to act only for necessary self-defense.

The FRY Government expresses hope that the Croatian side will understand that it is also in its interest to stop the aggressive attacks, to withdraw from territories taken by force following the signing of the Erdut agreement, and to turn to seeking solutions of problems with the Republic of Serb Krajina within the framework of the Geneva negotiations.

The FRY will for its part continue to pursue the policy of lending support to seeking a solution through the negotiations in Geneva and will urge immediate cessation of combat activities and reaching a solution on all contentious issues, so that peace returns to these areas as soon as possible.

Serbs Favor Dictatorship Over Democracy

93BA1435C Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 20 Aug 93 p 15

[Article by Ljuba Stojic: "One Person Has To Be Listened to"]

[Text] *The responses from supporters of dictatorship and democracy, in a NIN telephone poll, show that we cannot acquire the habits of democratic decisionmaking, not only in the family but also on the public scene.*

The August NIN Forum showed that the supporters of dictatorship are now stronger than the supporters of democracy, not because there are more of the former than in the May poll, but rather because there are fewer of the latter. A considerable number of the former supporters of a democratic path have crossed into the category of the undecided.

What is the basis for citizens' belief that we would get out of the crisis faster with one leader than with parliament?

Most of them simply do not believe that it is possible to coordinate differing views without a strong authoritarian leader. "There is always one master," says Aleksandar Stefanovic, a driver from Sapac, 22, an independent. "Ten of them cannot be masters in one house!" Farmer Mileta Velickovic, from Golupac near Paracin (53, independent) has a similar belief: "One person has to be listened to!"

An Exercise in Futility

The belief in authority instead of consultation, however, is not associated only with experience from the family and the household. Many people directly cite the experience with our parliament, whose work takes place in front of everyone's eyes and ears. "Because of the quarrels in parliament" (a student from Novi Sad, 18, independent); "because what is happening in the Assembly ridiculous" (Radoslava Rakovic, a sales clerk in Belgrade, 50, independent); "nothing is coming out of parliament, it is an exercise in futility" (Olga Stojanovic, a Belgrade housewife, 59, independent).

In this category, there are also those who view the transfer of authority to a leader democratically. "I think that it has to be known who should be replaced if things go wrong," said an auto mechanic from Donja Sabanta near Kragujevac (27, independent).

A second category of supporters of dictatorship comes from the mentality of our people.

"We are not ready yet for a parliament, unfortunately," as a 32-year-old construction worker from Velika Drenova (an independent) beautifully expressed it. Borko Ilic, an office worker from Medvedja (45, a former SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] member, "Now I don't trust anyone"), is much harsher: "Only a firm hand can help us!" "It is hard for us to agree," said Danica

Kraljeva, a housewife from Kraljevo, 55, an independent; "Everyone conducts his own policy."

A third, somewhat weaker group consists of those who are nostalgic for Broz's (woolly) times. "We lived better when there was one leader," claimed a retired teacher from Lovcenac near Mali Idjos (60, SPS). "While we had Tito, no one dared to make a peep," said a driver from Adran near Kraljevo (48, SPS), "and now everyone wants to command."

Less Risk

A fourth category consists of idealists, skeptics, and carpers. They would like a leader, but they set impossible conditions for him ("if he were good and eradicated these idlers," "he should not be a thief," "someone who would be the right one, but we do not have such a person today," "not someone eager for an armchair," "he should be intelligent," and so forth). Some accept a dictatorship only temporarily, until "this situation" is resolved, and finally, every eighth person does not know why a dictatorship seems more practical to him than a parliament.

The belief in parliamentarianism, in contrast to a leader's dictatorship, usually comes from the collective experience summed up in the maxim "More people know more." There are various versions of this. Some emphasize that more people are "smarter," "more rational," and "better" than an individual. What is important to others is that this reduces the risk of a mistake. "There is no completely intelligent person to speak on behalf of everyone" (a retired economist from Novi Sad, 59, independent). "They are all incompetent, so it is better to have more of them" (Slobodan Stepanovic, a farmer from Valjevska Kamenica, 48, independent). There are also those among them for whom parliament is better because "A conflict of opinions leads to better decisions" (a lawyer from Grdelica, 31), because it makes it possible "for us to hear another opinion" (a teacher from Krusevac, 30, NKP [New Communist Movement]), and to reach a "compromise" (a literature student from Novi Pazar, 22).

The "conditional" democrats accept a parliament as a better solution, but "not this kind" (a lawyer from Belgrade, 41, DS [Democratic Party]), "if the deputies behaved differently" (a retired technician from Ljiga, 62, SPS), "They should all be brought to their senses" (a chemical technician from Aleksinac, 27). In addition to this, the condition most often set is harmony or at least "a common language." A private hotel manager from Velika Plana (24, DS) would like parliament to be not just a "formality," but "the only one making the decisions."

A third category of those committed to parliamentarianism draws that commitment from bad experiences with Broz (there are more of these than the "nostalgics"). "We have already gone through this business with one leader," said Janko Jankovic, an electrician from Novi Banovci, 35. A retired spouse from Jagodina, 32, independent, thinks that we would "get Tito again if we empowered one leader."

There are also those who believe in parliamentary democracy as the best way to find a way out of our crisis, although they are aware that we as a people are not yet ready for that kind of democracy. "It is necessary, however," said Nadezna Jerinic, a graduate political scientist from Valjevo, 42, DS, "even though the Serbs are a people that needs a leader."

Among the supporters of parliamentary decisionmaking, there are more of those who cannot explain why they have that orientation than among the supporters of an authoritarian system (20.4 versus 12.1 percent). This category of respondents is larger than all except the first. Those who will not know in the future what their orientation is, toward democracy or dictatorship, will probably be recruited from this category.

It Should Be Known Who the Master Is in a House

In these difficult times for our country, we would get out of the crisis faster if we empowered one leader to make the decisions for all of us.... Why is that better?

Response	August 1993	May 1993
It should be known who the master is in a house	39.6%	46.2%
We need a firm hand	18.7%	12.9%
It was good for us	13.2%	2.1%
Under the condition that the right one is found	9.9%	15.0%
While there is a state of emergency	6.6%	11.8%
I don't know	12.1%	11.7%

More People Know More

In these difficult times for our country, we would get out of the crisis faster if we continued to make decisions through multiparty discussions in parliament than if we empowered one leader to make decisions for everyone. Why is that better?

Response	August 1993	May 1993
More people know more	36.5%	56.1%
Under the condition that they are decent	17.9%	7.1%
We had enough of a leader	16.6%	8.2%
Although we are not ready for democracy	8.4%	3.1%
I don't know	20.4%	25.5%

On Sunday, 8 August 1993, NIN's research center polled 200 telephone subscribers from Serbia (without Kosovo).

Serbia

UN Sanctions Said Aimed at Provoking 'Social Unrest'

LD1409160293 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1502 GMT 14 Sep 93

[Text] Belgrade, Sept 14 (TANJUG)—Prime Minister of the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia Nikola Sainovic on Tuesday [14 September] warned that the U.N. sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (F.R.Y.) were, among other things, aimed at provoking high inflation and social unrest in Yugoslavia, as well as at severing the country from the world.

'We possess, however, sufficient expert, business and other know-how which we should use to keep us up in the final phase of the Baikan crisis,' Sainovic told a meeting in the Zemun-based Belgrade footwear factory, attended by representatives of the republic's trade union and chamber of economy, and by general managers of Serbia's largest leather-processing enterprises.

Sainovic said that Serbia would continue the efforts aimed at reinforcing the peace process and signing an agreement on the ex-Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and reinstalling peace in the republic of Serb Krajina, against which the Croatian Army last week launched a new aggression.

He underlined that Serbia's stand on the equal rights of all the peoples (in the territory of the former Yugoslavia) was presently gaining place also in world community's resolutions.

The U.N. Security Council late in May last year introduced sanctions against the F.R.Y. for its alleged involvement in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), although all the troops—Yugoslav citizens—had already been withdrawn on May 19 from this former Yugoslav republic.

As a result of the sanctions, inflation in Yugoslavia has soared to 2,000 percent per month. Last month, the Serbian and Yugoslav governments carried fresh measures intended to eliminate hyperinflation before this year is out.

Explaining why the government did not decide to freeze salaries, Sainovic said that in such a case the population could not bear the burden of the crisis. He recommended the general managers of the leather-processing enterprises to step up their joint consultations on prices and other business issues, rather than to appeal individually to the government for help.

Organizations To Extend Blockade to Macedonian Border

AU1409172493 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 10 Sep 93 p 5

[Report by S.S.: "Blockade of Macedonia Announced"]

[Excerpts] Belgrade—The Danube Blockade Headquarters announced that it would bring charges against Zoran Sokolovic, the Serbian minister of internal affairs, and Zarko Katic, the minister of traffic and transport, for exposing lives and property to danger on the Danube. This was stated yesterday in a press conference given by the nonparty associations "Bela ruza" [White Rose] and "Nova Vizantija" [New Byzantium] that have been blocking the navigable section of the Danube at Zemun since 18 July 1993. The charges were announced because the Ukrainian convoy "Captain Iljusin" [name as transliterated] breached the blockade "in the night between 6 and 7 September with its lights turned-off, sinking three boats and a motor boat. At the same time they exposed the lives of their crews to danger." [passage omitted]

The blockade organizers announced two more actions yesterday—demonstrations in front of the Serbian government building, which would last until "the ministers and the government have fallen," and a blockade of all border crossings toward Macedonia and Greece on the Yugoslav side, because of the Macedonian decision to tighten the control of the road traffic toward the FRY. Only Greeks and Bulgarians, "who have showed solidarity with us," will be allowed to breach this encirclement. "The blockade of roads," the chairman of "Bela ruza" said, "will be reciprocal and it will not be suspended until Macedonia has revoked its decision on traffic toward Yugoslavia."

Radicals Appeal to Rebels To Unblock Banja Luka

AU1409161293 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 14 Sep 93

[Text] Following the events in Banja Luka, the Serbian Radical Party has issued a communique, which states among other things:

The Serbian Radical Party holds the view that the wrath of the people and the army of the republic of Srpska is justified. Crime and corruption have exceeded all limits of tolerance and have spread to many sections of the state and society. We think that the state should consider this the most urgent task and that no wrongdoer should remain unpunished, regardless of his position in the state hierarchy.

We do not doubt, the Radicals say, that the majority of the young soldiers and officers who have been blocking Banja Luka for several days, have good and honorable intentions. However, they have become a victim of manipulation by circles that do not wish the Serbian people well and are trying to destroy their war efforts, the communique issued by the Serbian Radical Party stressed. It adds:

The aim is to oust Radovan Karadzic, president of the republic of Srpska, or at least to weaken him prior to the next round of peace talks in Geneva to force him to make new concessions to the Muslims. Another aim is to

weaken the defense of the Serbian army of Krajina at the beginning of the latest Ustasha offensive.

We appeal to all soldiers and officers to immediately unblock Banja Luka and return to their combat positions. We demand that the authorities of the republic of Srpska guarantee that no officer or soldier will be punished for expressing their contempt, the communique of the Serbian Radical Party states at the end.

Power Industry Officials on Heating Problems

93BA1424C Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 20 Aug 93 p 5

[Article by J. Putnikovic: "Heating for Conservation"]

[Text] Belgrade—Special headquarters formed at the Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce will deal with obtaining energy sources—electricity, coal, natural gas, and oil derivatives—for the upcoming heating season. At a meeting of this economic association's board of directors yesterday, representatives of energy producers and distributors spoke most often about the difficult situation that these public enterprises are in because so far fuel prices have been governed by the state's social policy.

Pointing out that without more serious state involvement one cannot count on having enough energy sources this winter, especially electricity and coal for heating, the directors of these enterprises particularly emphasized that they did not have enough money in their treasuries to pay repair contractors and the firms from which they purchase spare parts and semifinished products. As stated by Stanisa Paunovic, director of the Djerdap hydroelectric power plant, it could therefore happen that the EPS [Serbian Electrical Industry], without the promised aid from the federal government (1,300,000 billion dinars) will simply sink its creditors.

Tomica Simovic, federal minister without portfolio, emphasized that the federal government had provided 1.2 million billion dinars for repairs during the third quarter, 2.8 million billion dinars for special programs and certain public works, and 250,000 billion dinars to ensure coal reserves for winter consumption at thermoelectric power plants. On the issue of paying claims, Simovic promised assistance from the federal government in seeking a solution to the "riddle" and proposed payment in goods.

Noting that there would not be enough gas and fuel oil during the upcoming winter, Zivorad Rataljac, general director of Kopaonik, cited as the primary task for the headquarters formed the job of setting priorities for distributing the available amounts of coal. In his opinion, Belgrade is threatened the most. It used to obtain the necessary amounts of coal from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and so far only 2,000 metric tons have reached the capital from coal mine pits. All the other cities will have a better chance of using alternate fuels (waste in agriculture, according to Federal Minister of Economy Tomislav Simovic, can replace the annual consumption of 1.3 million tons of oil). After the Serbian mines gave out, Belgrade still has hope in Montenegro's Pljevlje and Ivangrad.

According to Simovic, the federal state will also provide certain amounts for ensuring the production of energy sources during the fourth quarter of this year. The question of obtaining money to pay for fuel oil and natural gas—if humanitarian imports are approved—remained without an answer, however. This is because, as Progres director Mirko Marjanovic said, "The Russians have not yet been paid a single dollar for the gas delivered in 1992."

[Box, p 5]

The Belgrade Heating Pipeline Is Still in the Future

Speaking about heating installation, primarily for Belgrade, Tomislav Simovic said, "Even if we had the pipes laid, which we do not, we could not heat ourselves from the Nikola Tesla thermoelectric power plant in Obrenovac this winter. It would be in the 1994-95 season at the earliest." Continuing by criticizing politicians for promising heating from the Nikola Tesla thermoelectric power plant as early as this winter prematurely, before looking into the facts, Simovic "denounced" Vlajko Stojiljkovic, president of the Serbian Chamber of Commerce, who retorted, upset, that at numerous meeting "that aspect was absolutely taken off the agenda."

Montenegro

Radicals Accuse Authorities of Repressing Serbs

AU1409184693 Novi Sad DNEVNIK in Serbo-Croatian 9 Sep 93 p 4

[Report by N. Djuric on news conference by the Serbian Radical Party of Montenegro held in Podgorica on 8 September: "Police Protects Authorities"]

[Text] Podgorica, 8 September—While notorious criminals are cruising throughout Montenegro, the police are arresting and beating up small, selected dealers. Battering is the most usual practice in the towns where Serbs make up the majority, as is the case with Niksic, Pljevlje, Herceg-Novi, and Zeta. No one, not even the Ministry of Justice, wants to shed light on the murder of Misko Zecevic from Ulcinj, on the case when father and son Boskovic from Bar were killed, or on seven murders committed in the last two months in Podgorica.

The people of Zeta have been threatened with weapons, while the children have been taken to and from the school by their headmaster, escorted by a group of armed policemen. What are we supposed to do with the authorities that have been establishing a police-run state, or is it, perhaps, the case that the ruling party has decided to batter the people in order to change them?

These are the messages and questions from today's news conference held by the Serbian Radical Party of Montenegro [SRS], at which the correspondents were addressed by Acim Visnjic, head of the club of SRS representatives, Ljubo Ilic, chairman of the Assembly's Board for Complaints, and Drago Bakrac, vice-chairman of the Assembly of Montenegro.

Commenting on the more-and-more obvious separatist movement in Montenegro, Visnjic said that it was supported by certain treacherous parties, so no wonder that, through some individuals, such separatist tendencies of Montenegro had been strongly felt even in the ruling party. According to Visnjic, such a tendency is best illustrated by the statement of Montenegrin Foreign Minister Miodrag Aleksic who is against the abolition of his ministry, which is to say he refuses to follow Serbia's example, since he wants to use his function to make Montenegro secede from Serbia, that is, to cut Montenegro asunder. "Since it is highly improbable that he will succeed in his intentions, I believe he and his ideologists will experience a political defeat," Visnjic claims.

After that, Visnjic commented on the recently-founded Montenegrin National Party, and said it was the party of Tito's followers led by the brother of Slavko Perovic, chairman of the Liberal Association of Montenegro, who is, by the way, married to a catholic. Besides, according to Visnjic, that is a party led by infidels, Catholics, and Muslims. According to Visnjic, it is incomprehensible that all these separatist parties are launching theories about Montenegro's being impoverished through the union with Serbia, while nobody is wondering where the flour, oil, and sugar are coming from, and why the food from Serbia has been transported to Albania and resold there.

Answering a correspondent's question why the case of Blagoje Lucic, vice-chairman of the Federal Government, has not been settled yet, Ilic said:

"At the latest meeting of the Board for Complaints, Mirko Medojevic, head of the Board for Petitions and Complaints, informed us he was told that the Financial Commission had been ordered not to meddle with the case, because it was under the authority of the federal-level commission."

Regarding the proposal made by the People's Party of Montenegro that all the parliamentary parties should support a vote of no confidence to the Montenegrin Government, Bakrac said that they [the SRS] did not take the People's Party seriously, and that they would not join it in that initiative. "Besides, the People's Party is recognizably an offspring of the Serbian Renewal Movement, and when we see who is attacking the Democratic Party of Serbia, the only thing we can do is to defend them," Bakrac believes.

According to Visnjic, the People's Party is colorless, scentless, and tasteless, and no serious arrangements are to be made with it.

[Box, p 4]

"Bulatovic Finds Albania Closer Than Serbia"

To the question of how he comments on the announced visit to Albania by Momir Bulatovic, Visnjic said:

"In this moment, we understand that visit to be a sign that Bulatovic is more interested in all other countries than in Serbia, with which Montenegro makes up the FRY. Still, I do believe he is going there in order to warn them not to play with fire because of the ever-expanding Albanian aggression against the FRY."

Issue of Independence of Montenegrin Church

93BA1434D Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 20 Aug 93 p 22

[Article by Dragoljub Vukovic: "Cetinje Yule Logs"]

[Text] *Some people need an independent church as a confirmation of the nation and the state, and others see that act as almost completing the anti-Serbian actions in Montenegro.*

The recent placement of the foundation stone for the Cathedral of Christ's Resurrection in Podgorica, which in architectural terms is to be a synthesis of "the 11 episcopal Nemanja churches," was not only proof that Montenegrin-Coastal, Zeta-Mountain, and Skenderlija Metropolitan Amfilohije is keeping his promise from three years ago, but also an eloquent sign of his willingness to work to strengthen the Serbian Orthodox Church and Serbian national awareness in Montenegro. The delivery of the foundation stone for the cathedral from the center of Orthodoxy (Constantinople and Moscow), and the presence of the "first among equals" of the Orthodox pastors, stretched the symbolism of the beginning of construction to its ultimate limits.

On the other hand, among nationally self-aware Montenegrins and champions of the renewal of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church's autocephalism, the beginning of the construction of the Podgorica cathedral was perceived as the culmination of "a four-year-long anti-Montenegrin campaign by the Serbian Orthodox Church," and the design intention of architect Dr. Predrag Ristic was assessed as bullying in this spiritual area, with the ultimate intention of "imposing that architecture in the awareness of young people as the crowning proof of their Serbian roots." Their joy over the first arrival of an ecumenical patriarch in Montenegro was muted by the belief that the Serbian Orthodox Church wanted to exploit "his moral reputation" "for its own sinister goals."

The beginnings of the period which, in the opinion of the Committee for Renewal of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church's Autocephalism, was marked by "the SPO [Serbian Renewal Movement's] anti-Montenegrin campaign," coincided with the "antibureaucratic rebellion" in Montenegro, but also with the announcement of Dr.

Amfilohije Radovic's coming to the throne of St. Petar Cetinjski. In the political articulation of the resistance to "Serbian integralism," which started with the establishment of the Liberal Alliance and the Montenegrin Federalist Movement, it was not possible to overlook the issue of the position of the Orthodox Church in Montenegro. In Cetinje, at the end of June 1990, the two above-mentioned political parties organized a symposium with the aim of "a confrontation of different opinions" on the subject of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church. The nonattendance by representatives of the SPC [Serbian Orthodox Church] and scholars and public figures inclined toward Serbdom was a reliable indicator that nothing would come of weighing technical arguments and that this current topic necessarily had to shift onto political ground.

Not even a month later, the "sociopolitical authorities of Cetinje and Montenegro" received a message from some of the descendants of the Martinovices and Borilovices from Bajic who, in Bishop Danilo's time, for the first time brought a Yule log and placed it before the Cetinje monastery. They unequivocally demanded that the Montenegrin Orthodox Church's autocephalism be restored. This demand is the basis for the Initiative Committee for Restoration of the CPC's [Montenegrin Orthodox Church's] Autocephalism, which is requesting that the Assembly, then still that of the Socialist Republic of Montenegro, restore "those rights to the Montenegrin Orthodox Church which were taken away from it forcibly and therefore uncanonically in 1920." The demands were formulated in detail in the message from the All-Montenegrin National Synod that was held in Cetinje on 6 January 1991 on Christmas Eve.

"Elementa Montenegrina"

"It is an indisputable fact," that message said, "that the Montenegrin Orthodox Church, for several bloody centuries, was the headquarters of Montenegrin statehood and spirituality, and it is unreasonable and culturally untenable that today, when the Montegrin people have again won their own national state, the Montenegrin Orthodox Church is subordinate to another state's church. Along with the church, the priceless cultural and historical wealth of the Montenegrin people, achieved through unparalleled sacrifices and preserved during the most difficult periods of our 10-century history, has also been alienated from the people."

Since then, the demands in the above-mentioned message have been repeated most often by the Committee for Restoration of the CPC's Autocephalism, which receives political support from, above all, the Liberal Alliance of Montenegro. It was manifested most clearly on Christmas Eve, when an "alternative" Montenegrin yule log was placed at Cetinje, in front of King Nikola's Court, at the same time that the yule log consecrated by Metropolitan Amfilohije was being placed in front of the St. Petar Cetinjski monastery. The police "officiated" between the two groups of people gathered around the yule logs.

The champions of restoring the church's autocephalism persistently prove that the CPC was independent both de facto and de jure, and that its "annulment" by Regent Aleksandar Karadjordjevic in 1920 was pure violence. In the collection "Elementa Montenegrina," published in 1991 and dedicated to the CPC, several articles were published, in their entirety or partially, attempting to support the thesis of the church's independence. Among the chosen articles and documents, the one in first place is the Constitution of the Holy Synod in the Kingdom of Montenegro, article 1 of which says: "The autocephalous Orthodox Metropolitanate in the Kingdom of Montenegro, as a member of the one holy catholic and apostolic church, whose pastor, chief, and head is our Lord and God Jesus Christ, preserves and maintains unity in dogmas and in canonical institutions with all other Orthodox autocephalous churches, and it will preserve and maintain this unity forever."

Next presented are several excerpts from the letters and ceremonial addresses of various church dignitaries to Montenegrin metropolitans, in which the CPC and its autocephalism are mentioned. Among them is a greeting from Raska-Zahum Bishop Kiril on the occasion of "your 25 years of service to God, the Throne, and the Fatherland," as well as the one from Petrograd Metropolitan Antonije. Evidence of the CPC's autocephalism is also found in Nikodim Milas's book "Orthodox Church Law," issued in Zadar in 1890, which, in accordance with the "catalog of the Constantinople Patriarchy," issued in April 1855, determines that there then existed "the following local churches with their own independent administration, or independent churches:

1. Constantinople
2. Alexandria
3. Antioch
4. Jerusalem
5. Cypriot
6. Russian
7. Karlovac
8. Sinj
9. **Montenegrin**, and
10. the church in the Kingdom of Greece.

Others from more recent times can be added to these:

11. Sibinj,
12. Bulgarian
13. Cernovicko-Dalmatian
14. the church in the Kingdom of Serbia, and
15. the church in the Kingdom of Romania."

Identity

After assuming the throne of Montenegrin-Coastal and Skenderlija Metropolitan, Mr. Amfilohije Radovic tried to be conciliatory, expressing the hope that "the people who have been carried away by some sort of autocephalism will slowly begin to realize certain things." He interpreted their demands as a quest for identity, and he characterized the way in which they wanted to achieve them as "inappropriate and unsuitable for the historical essence of Montenegro and the Cetinje Metropolitanate." "Their desire is good, and their intention is good, along with that quest for identity, but an identity cannot be based on a lie, on some sort of hybrid inventions," Metropolitan Amfilohije said.

"It is well known what the structure of the Orthodox Church has been like for centuries, and it is known what the position of the Zeta Metropolitanate, and later the Cetinje Metropolitanate, was within the Pec Patriarchate throughout the centuries. It is known what caused the creation of those autonomous churches, during times of enslavement and division. The Cetinje Metropolitanate is not the only one that was autonomous—de facto, not de jure. The Karlovac Metropolitanate was also autonomous. Then there were the Bukovina-Dalmatian and Dabro-Bosnian eparchies, in certain historical periods. It always changed. Nevertheless, as soon as normal conditions came, life was once again organized normally," Metropolitan Amfilohije explained in one of the interviews in Podgorica's POBJEDA, commenting that "There are no problems and ambiguities here for normal people."

On the profane, political level, three almost paradigmatic approaches to the issue of the Orthodox Church's status in Montenegro crystallized.

"The demand for autocephalism for the Montenegrin Orthodox Church is doubly absurd," NIN was told by Dr. Novak Kilibarda, president of the National Party of Montenegro. "In the first place, that issue is not being raised by believers, but rather by atheists with a communist orientation and the members of other religions. It is well-known that the autocephalists are also gathering signatures from Muslims and Catholics, through which they want to convince the world that autocephalism is the desire of the Montenegrin people. In the second place, the demand for Montenegrin autocephalism ignores the canonical law that prescribes how autocephalism is achieved. Specifically, high-level church representatives of a local church, such as the Montenegrin-Coastal, Zeta-Mountain, and Skenderlija Metropolitanate, for example, have to request that autocephalism, verbally or in writing, from the parent church. As is well known, such a request has never been written or verbally expressed in Montenegro, alias Zeta, during the thousand-year history of the CPC. Accordingly, the issue of autocephalism for the Montenegrin church is not following the spiritual path that was planned by Bishop Danilo, Petar I, and Bishop Rade, but is rather a political ruse that suits those forces which have always provoked Balkan divisions and disagreement within the Serbian people as a whole."

The leader of the "populists" thinks that if the autocephalists achieve their goal, their church "would be more a Uniate one than a genuine Orthodox one," and that it would be a "sister of the Macedonian church which was founded by the communists, and which is recognized by neither the ecumenical patriarch nor by any Orthodox church in the world." In Dr. Kilibarda's opinion, only "some sort of new Germogen" would be suitable to head such a church. Specifically, this refers to the monk whom Ante Pavelic, the head of the Independent State of Croatia, appointed as head of the Orthodox Church in the ustasha state.

Politics

Dr. Radoslav Ratkovic, a member of the Main Committee of the Liberal Alliance of Montenegro, spoke quite differently about the same thing to NIN. He proceeds from the fact that "All countries with a primarily Orthodox population have an Orthodox church at the state level—the Romanian one in Romania, the Russian one in Russia," and since that is the case, "Montenegro gradually, from the SPC formed by St. Sava, formed a completely independent CPC, which was independent even before the abolition of the Pec Patriarchate in 1766. That can be seen from the fact that no one from outside appointed the Montenegrin bishops; instead, it was done by the Montenegrin synod," Dr. Ratkovic said.

"In the end, the CPC also became formally autocephalous, when it was so proclaimed in the Constitution of the Holy Synod, and also in the Constitution of the Kingdom of Montenegro in 1905. Naturally, when the Montenegrin state was liquidated in 1918, the conditions were also created for the abolition of the Montenegrin Autocephalous Orthodox Church. Now, when Montenegro exists as a sovereign republic according to the constitution, it would be natural for it to get its own Orthodox church again. Instead, even this status of a Montenegrin-Coastal, etc., Metropolitanate is being infringed upon by the fact that part of the republic, in the religious sense, is being separated from Montenegro and annexed to Serbia (Bijelo Polje) and Herzegovina (Pljevlje, Sutorina, Krusevac, etc.)," Dr. Ratkovic said. He concluded by saying that the LSCG [Liberal Alliance of Montenegro], accurately predicting this kind of political situation, and because of the above-mentioned reasons, included in its party program the need to re-establish an independent CPC.

"In a lay civil state, like ours, it is not possible to have a privileged institutional form of religion, a so-called state church or religious community," emphasized Milan Gajovic, a member of the secretariat of the main committee of the Democratic Party of Socialists, in a statement for our newspaper. "In its history, as now, the church and religious community were less oriented toward perfecting the paths leading to God and the

perfection of divine and human love. They essentially were more in the service of a given state or states, a given nation, or even individuals, and on that basis they were primarily oriented toward the manipulative recruitment of people in order to achieve specific political goals and interests. Naturally, by criticizing institutional forms of religion I am by no means questioning the freedom to support one's own vision of the church or religious community, because I perceive that as part of the body of human rights and freedoms. This," Gajovic explained, "also applies to the Committee for Restoration of the CPC's Autocephalism, as an organized form of such support, which is, I repeat, essentially political in nature."

Gajovic did not want to go into the essence of the issue of the church's status in Montenegro. He preferred to underline the importance of respect for the law, democracy, and tolerance.

The issue of autocephalism remains open, naturally. For nationally self-aware Montenegrins, the church's autocephalism remains a missing link, a sore point for the Montenegrin nation and state. For the "glowing Serbs [ardent believers]" (as Metropolitan Amfilohije called Montenegrins), and for Montenegrins with a Serbian national sensitivity, the independence of the Orthodox Church in Montenegro would mean that "95 percent of the anti-Serbian actions in Montenegro would be completed."

[Box, p 23]

Correspondence

"I am not aware that there has ever existed an autocephalous Montenegrin church, with the full church meaning of that term. In any case, the Ecumenical Patriarchate has never granted such autocephalism. The criterion for granting autocephalism has to be a purely church one, not serving political goals or national interests. The modern example of the alleged autocephalism of the Skopje church clearly confirms this truth," stated Ecumenical Patriarch Vartolomej in an interview for Podgorica's POBJEDA, recommending "unanimity and unity, and not schism."

The Committee for Restoration of the CPC's Autocephalism "wrote back" to His Holiness that it is true that the Ecumenical Patriarchate never granted the CPC autocephalism, because it was never asked to do so, since its headquarters was in the capital of Turkey, but that it was granted by the Russian Orthodox Church.

Macedonia

U.S. Threatens Sanctions for Violation of Embargo

AU1409202593 Skopje MILS-NEWS in English 13 Sept 93

[Unattributed report: "The United States Threatens Macedonia"]

[Text] If Macedonia does not consistently adhere to the resolutions of the UN Security Council for sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, it could also be subjected to sanctions, is said in the letter sent from the U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, to the Macedonian state management.

Quoting government sources, MAKPRES informs that Christopher showed compassion for the consequences the Macedonian economy is facing from the sanctions, and promised that the United States will directly engage itself over the settling of the problems regarding the credit at the international bank, namely the $120 [as received] recorded as Macedonia's debt to other countries from the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Processing Plant Threatened by Sanctions

LD1109142393 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0036 GMT 11 Sep 93

[Text] Kavadarci, 11 Sep (TANJUG)—The Macedonian Government's decision to strictly observe the sanctions against Yugoslavia from 3 September has brought further production at the huge Fenimak nickel processing plant in Kavadarci into doubt.

The technological process in the plant, better known to the Yugoslav public under its former name, Feni, has a daily requirement of 250-300 tonnes of high-grade coal from the Kolubara basin [in Serbia], but it currently has reserves only for the next couple of days. Deliveries of Kolubara basin coal from the FRY for Fenimak have so far been regular. Several freight trains carrying Kolubara coal for Fenimak are now stranded at the Tabanovce border crossing point near Kumanovo as a result of the [Macedonian] Government's decision.

They say in Fenimak that, in the event coal deliveries do not resume within the next few days, the plant will have to cease production because the furnaces will go out which, they conclude, will spell the end of nickel production.

Fenimak is one of the few Macedonian enterprises to generate sizeable hard currency earnings over the past few years.

Kosovo

Rugova Views Situation in Kosovo

AU1109203193 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 8 Sep 93 p 7

[Interview with Ibrahim Rugova, leader of the Kosovo Albanians, by Shefki Ukaj; place and date not given: "Kosovo Will Not Be a Reward to Serbia"]

[Text] At a time when there are indications that the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis could be rounded up, Kosovo is waiting for the international community to raise the

question of solving the crisis there as well. We talked to the leader of the Kosovo Albanians, Ibrahim Rugova, about how near Kosovo is to peaceful existence or to the danger of war.

[Ukaj] Zdravko Tomac recently said that the Kosovo Albanians are waiting for the "playoff," i.e. for someone else to solve the problem of greater Serbian imperialism, and that they will join the game in the final act.

[Rugova] I will comment on this briefly. I think that we, too, by political resistance and other activities, contribute to breaking the greater Serbian regime.

[Ukaj] Have you ever believed in a kind of anti-Serbian alliance made up of non-Serbian peoples on the territory of former Yugoslavia? If you did, who is to blame that it was never realized?

[Rugova] I would not like to look for culprits right now; the situation is different, and so are the circumstances. I believed in, and I personally attempted to get involved in, the creation of a democratic coalition, which was suggested by the international factors already three years ago, at the time of democratic elections in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia. However, we did not succeed in that, because everybody believed that they were self-sufficient in fighting greater Serbian hegemony. We were among the first, already in 1981, to demand a healthy coalition in order to confront the Serbian aggression, but unfortunately we were not understood and it was not created.

[Ukaj] What do you think about the thesis which says that, if Serbia does not insist on total division of Bosnia-Herzegovina and giving support to Knin, the West will reward it with Kosovo?

[Rugova] Regardless of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbian tendencies to keep Kosovo a part of Serbia, it cannot and will not remain in the hands of the Serbs, nor as a part of any kind of Yugoslavia. The problem of Kosovo has been internationalized and the world believes that it is not an internal problem of Serbia, as Belgrade wants to show. The West cannot reward Serbia with Kosovo. I think that those are speculations. Kosovo cannot in any way be compared to "krajinas" and the Serbs living in Croatia. Kosovo has its history and its status. It was a federate unit in the organization of Yugoslavia of 1945, with all rights, especially according to the constitution of 1974. Serbia is now maneuvering, trying to make it look like it does not support the Serbs in Croatia, but it is actually persistent in creating greater Serbia. I therefore believe that the West is aware of that and that it will not reward Serbia with Kosovo.

Economy in Collapse

[Ukaj] We are interested in institutional organization, i.e. the former and present composition of the parliament of the republic of Kosovo, and especially the functioning and the life of the Kosovo Albanians—the level of endurance and possible danger of the outbreak of conflicts in Kosovo.

[Rugova] We tried to organize an institutionalized life. In the beginning, the Kosovo parliament and government worked in hiding. Later on, after multiparty elections a year ago, a new parliament was elected as well as the president of the republic of Kosovo. Unfortunately, in spite of our efforts, we did not manage to constitute a new parliament, because Serbian authorities prevented us from doing that, and we did not want any conflicts. Therefore, we are forced to work in parliamentary groups of political parties. That does not mean that we gave up constituting a new parliament. We will do it as soon as we get the chance.

The economy of Kosovo is facing a collapse, because Kosovo is under double sanctions—those imposed by Serbia itself, after the suspension of Kosovo's autonomy, and then under those international sanctions imposed against Serbia and Montenegro, and which ruthlessly affect the Albanians living in Kosovo. For example, due to this double blockade, we were not able to get the 5 million dollars in aid awarded by the U.S. Congress.

However, thanks to mutual solidarity of the Albanians in Kosovo and abroad, we managed to alleviate somewhat the serious social problems.

[Ukaj] The government of the FRY said that all conditions for lifting the sanctions are fulfilled.

[Rugova] I think that one signature cannot solve the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis, nor is it the main condition for lifting sanctions. Solving the crisis in Kosovo is also one of the conditions for lifting sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. Let us not forget that Serbia and Montenegro also have political sanctions imposed by the international community, and we will keep insisting that one of the conditions for lifting sanctions is the question of Kosovo.

How Long Will It Last?

[Ukaj] Is there a full coordination and unity of the Albanian factor in the Balkans for solving the Kosovo problem peacefully, or is conflict imminent?

[Rugova] Regarding the possibility of conflicts, it all depends on the Serbian side, which is the aggressor in many areas of former Yugoslavia. Kosovo suffered a different kind of aggression. It was a real occupation—repression and organized terror. In Kosovo, there is a great concentration of military, police, and paramilitary forces, as well as legally armed Serbian civilians, while, on the other side, there are unarmed and unprotected Albanians. Aware of that fact, we tried to promote and strengthen our peace movement, though that way is very strenuous and long. I often wonder myself—how long could all this last? This is not a kind of fatalist statement, but a reality.

[Ukaj] They say this is about absolute unity between the Albanians in Kosovo and those in the Republic of Albania.

[Rugova] Democratic processes in Europe also stimulated the cooperation between the Albanians who live in their ethnic areas of former Yugoslavia with Albania. Indeed, this interest of Albania in the Albanians in Kosovo is criticized, and we are even accused of greater Albanian nationalism! However, it is clear that we are a nation which has the right to build a joint strategy, cooperate, and think. The myth about the division of the Albanians is slowly breaking up, though we are formally and physically still divided by a strictly controlled and closed tragic border.

[Ukaj] What are the effects of the internationalization of the Kosovo problem and is there a need to change the strategy of work?

[Rugova] During the past three years, since we are on the political scene, we proved, I hope, our political and national maturity. We achieved a lot. Of course, there are some weaknesses. First of all, we promoted ourselves as Kosovo in the world, and as a nation which remained outside the Albanian borders and we gained sympathies. There is an understanding and we gained many friends in the world.

Main Goal—Exile

[Ukaj] What is actually the ultimate goal of the Serbian aggression in Kosovo?

[Rugova] Unfortunately, the main goal is to use unprecedented repression to exile as many Albanians as possible from their homes. I think this is a quiet ethnic cleansing of Albanians in Kosovo. As distinguished from the front of war in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Kosovo there is a front of violence. The Serbian regime leads wars for territories. Serbia wants clean territories in which slaves are also becoming superfluous.

[Ukaj] Do the Kosovo Albanians want to unite with their brothers in Albania one day and what would that union look like?

[Rugova] When the first Yugoslavia was created by the Treaty of Versailles, the destiny of the Albanians was sealed, since half of that nation remained outside Albanian borders. Since then, and even earlier, during the times of Ottoman domination, there was a yearning for a joint state of the Albanians, i.e. later on for a union of the Albanians. That means that it has been an idea and a dream of all Albanians. Unfortunately, it was just a desire throughout history.

However, at this moment, in this phase, we think that it is possible to get a real solution in the creation and recognition of independent and neutral status for Kosovo, open toward Albania and Serbia. The political constructivism of the Albanians in Macedonia should, I think, be recognized, as well as the right to self-government of the Albanians in Montenegro and southern Serbia. We think that is a realistic and a possible solution, because the international community, for the time being, does not recognize changing outside borders of former Yugoslavia. A neutral and independent Kosovo can calm the Albanians and the situation in the Balkans, for that would enable free circulation of Albanians who live in their ethnic areas of former Yugoslavia and in Albania. Uniting all Albanians in one state would, in that case, be a question of future generations of Albanians.

[Ukaj] Do you have any contacts with the former republics of Yugoslavia which gained their independence, particularly with Croatia, where there is quite a large number of Albanians, and what are these contacts like?

[Rugova] We have some direct and some indirect connections and contacts but it not easy because of circumstances and the blockade.

During our visit to Ljubljana, we arranged to have a certain cooperation regarding a series of questions, particularly regarding granting Slovenian citizenship to Albanians in Slovenia.

In spite of certain problems, Croatia showed understanding for our demands and for the position of local Albanians, particularly with regards to issuing certificates of citizenship and offering hospitality and help. Some problems were alleviated, even the deportation of the Kosovo Albanians from Croatia via Albania, which caused considerable anxiety in Kosovo.

Increased Greek-Serbian Coordination Viewed

AU1209181893 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 10 Sep 93 p 1

[Article by Gani Mehmetaj: "Belgrade-Athens Comings and Goings"]

[Text] Comings and goings between Belgrade and Athens become more frequent whenever aggressive Serbian policies are placed in an awkward position in relation to the international community. Opinions differ over whether it is simply a matter of consultations and an exchange of views or of coordinated action. Nevertheless, most analysts, on the basis of Greece's open support for Serbia's behavior and the statements of politicians in Athens, are inclined to believe that Greece stands behind Belgrade's tactical steps and supports them on the basis of her own strategic interest. Meanwhile, this support, sometimes open and sometimes given with diplomatic moderation, often creates conflicts with Greece's allies, who have taken great exception to her noncompliance with the economic blockade, which was arranged by agreement with Skopje, and to her attempt to minimize Serbia's guilt over the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the violence in Kosova, and Serbia's support for the Knin rebels.

Many domestic political movements in Serbia and Greece show great similarity. Both Serbia and Greece have open or jealously concealed problems with non-Serbian or non-Greek nations. In the new world order, both states are worried about their position and the possibility of equilibrium in the Balkans. The economic, military, and political consolidation of Albania and the Albanians in the Balkans presents a danger to Serbian and Greek interests, just as the greater presence of the West and specifically the United States in this heated region, on the verge of a frightening explosion, presents a conflict of interests. With their unfair division of Balkan territories to the detriment of the Albanians, Serbia and Greece have remained in Albania's territorial debt, with one-half of its territory remaining under the former Yugoslavia, and almost one-third under Greece. While Kosova and the other Albanian territories that were under the occupation of the former Yugoslavia are at the focus of international interest, international political circles do not consider the problem of Cameria and the Albanian of this region and the Albanians in areas deeper in Greece with even remotely with the interest and seriousness it deserves. On the contrary, the various international mechanisms have remained silent over this problem for decades and are inexcusably maintaining this silence.

The greatest irony is that Greece, in strong and arrogant language, not only refuses to open the case of the Cams and Cameria, but shouts to high heaven about the alleged discrimination against the Greek minority in Albania, a minority that is cosseted when this suits current Greek policy and is maltreated barbarously by the Greek state when Greece sees fit, as a few days ago at Kakavije. Dozens of minority refugees working in Greece have found out what Greek love for the minority really means and complained last year that they are treated as foreigners, discriminated against by local Greeks, and viewed with contempt. Nevertheless, like Serbia, which has exploited to the utmost the Serbian minority in Kosova in order to provide a pretext to intervene with tanks in Kosova and totally occupy it, Greece is also attempting to exploit the Greek minority in Albania for some possible intervention at a favorable moment, or, if international relations are not favorable for such a step, at least to exert powerful pressure in order to suppress the problem of the Albanians of Cameria and the other Albanians in Greece. The Serbian church, with its medieval-style propaganda and its contrived myth of Serbian Kosova, was and continues to be a powerful instrument for the realization of Serbian hegemony. The Greek church, with its own people appointed even at the head of the Albanian Autocephalic Orthodox Church, is trying to sow division in the south of Albania, and attempted to destabilize the south by conducting openly anti-Albanian propaganda through Greek priests. When it did not succeed in this, it put into action the Greek military machine, which mobilized large forces along the Albanian border, weakening Albanian military forces in the north. Of course, all these Serbian and Greek activities against Albania and the Albanians are coordinated and are the fruit of the comings and goings between Belgrade and Athens. We can expect other challenges that we do not now and cannot guess at.

Potential Outbreak of Fighting in Kosovo Viewed

AU1409102893 Belgrade POLITIKA EKSPRES in Serbo-Croatian 1 Sep 93 p 7

[Report by S. Krsmanovic: "Ordered Incidents"]

[Excerpt] The high risk areas and potential centers of war in the former Yugoslavia are slowly moving southward. With the first signs of appeasement in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Yugoslav-Albanian "border problem" has been brought up, because all of a sudden incidents have escalated there.

"Whenever a military power exerted some kind of pressure on Yugoslavia, Albania tried to bring up the Kosovo and Yugoslav-Albanian border issue," General Major Blagoje Kovacevic, deputy head of the Yugoslav Army Operation Division, says. This division is in charge of the security in the border area. Albania also seized this opportunity to bring up the issue again.

Continuity of Over Half a Century

General Kovacevic points out that incidents at the border with Albania occurred more frequently after the United States threatened air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions.

"Based on a series of indicators, we think the Albanians are not doing this on their own initiative," Kovacevic continues. "They have simply seen an opportunity for their greater-Albanian interests within the interests of great powers, who use them in the materialization of their own plans for the Balkans." [passage omitted]

"Albania is active in two directions now. On the one hand it supports high tension at the border with Yugoslavia and stirs up the separation efforts in Kosovo. On the other hand, it accuses Yugoslavia, in other words Serbia, at the international level, with the aim of internationalizing the Kosovo issue in order to enable the military powers to send their observers and consequently soldiers to this territory," Kovacevic continues.

Although Yugoslavia is, as concerns this issue, superior in the legal, moral and military sense of the word, the unfolding of events in this problem area does not depend on its actions.

"Two factors are important for the future, that is to say for the continuation or termination of the incidents. First, it is important to know what kind of plans the United States has for the Balkans, because—judging by its announced intentions so far—it wants to be here. If this is true, it is good that there are as many incidents as possible at the Yugoslav-Albanian border. As far as we know, certain steps have already been made in this respect," Kovacevic points out.

Europe Supports Peace

The second important factor according to General Kovacevic is the progress of the Geneva peace talks.

"There are more and more indications that the Bosnian Muslims will try to reach their aims by war. Since the Croatian attitude toward the Bosniam Muslims is known, and since they have cut off the corridor through which Mujahedins obtained weapons from Islamic countries, "the green transversal" via Kosovo and Sandzak will probably become more important. One must not exclude the possibility that Albania might take advantage of support from Arab countries for materialization of its greater-Albanian aims and activation of a "transversal" through Albania, too.

"Naturally, there are also opposing views and political actions aimed at achieving peace at the Yugoslav-Albanian border. This can be seen through activities of some European countries that have realized the United States intends to dominate the Balkan Peninsula. Therefore they have a completely different view of these problems now. From the military point of view, the only factor we can count on is our military potential, which is capable of keeping the Yugoslav-Albanian border incidents at the level of minor incidents, regardless of whether or not Albania has allies. Any aggression from the Albanian side can be excluded from the military point of view," General Kovacevic claims.

[Box, p 7] [passage omitted]

Partial and Too Quick

Most incidents on the Yugoslav-Albanian border are presented to the world by the European observers, who were brought here by Albania. Almost every time the Yugoslav side has been accused of provoking incidents, although—based on the evidence—Albania should have been accused. For this reason the Yugoslav side rejected such observers.

The information that has been released has been not only false, but also judged too quickly. The Voice of America programs reported on some of the incidents only two hours after they had happened, and the culprit was already known. It can be easily guessed who was blamed for them.

Balance of Clashes

In almost half of the 51 incidents at the Yugoslav-Albanian border weapons were used. Our border guards killed 14 persons who illegally crossed the border from Albania to Yugoslavia or who shot at Yugoslav patrols from the Yugoslav territory. Two of these persons were Yugoslav citizens. Some of the persons were wounded.